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ATTORNEY GENERAL v. WALDRON - THE MARYLAND
JUDICIARY'S EXPANSIVE POWER TO REGULATE THE BAR
UNDER THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARTICLE;
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY UNDER MARYLAND'S NEW
EQUAL PROTECTION "CLAUSE"
In 1974 the Maryland General Assembly enacted section 56(c),
which prohibited retired judges who receive a pension from practicing
law for compensation.' The Maryland Court of Appeals declared the
statute unconstitutional in Attorney General v. Waldron.2 The court
ruled that section 56(c) violated: (1) the separation of powers article of
the Maryland Constitution;3 and (2) the equal protection guarantees of
the state and federal constitutions. The court's separation of powers
analysis expands judicial authority to an extent unprecedented in Ma-
ryland. In the course of its equal protection analysis the court made
new law by holding that the Maryland Constitution contains an equal
protection component and that certain important rights invoke an in-
termediate standard of review under equal protection. The court then
treated following one's chosen profession as such a right.
Section 56(c)'s statutory predecessor permanently barred a retired
judge from receiving his pension if he chose to practice law for com-
pensation.' By contrast, section 56(c) prohibited practice for compen-
sation if a judge elected to receive a pension.'
The Honorable Richard Waldron retired in 1977 after serving ten
years as a judge of the District Court in Prince George's County, Mary-
land.6 Upon notice of Judge Waldron's retirement, the Maryland Em-
1. 1974 Md. Laws ch. 483, § 2 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 56(c) (1978)).
Section 56(c) provides in relevant part: "A judge who retires and accepts the pension pro-
vided by this subtitle may not, thereafter, engage in the practice of law for compensation
2. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
3. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. 8, quoted infra at text accompanying note 18.
4. See Chairman of the Bd. v. Waldron, 285 Md. 175, 180-81 & n.6, 401 A.2d 172, 175
& n.6 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 55(e) (1957), repealed by Act of Apr. 30, 1974, ch.
483, § 1, 1974 Md. Laws 1753.
5. Chairman of the Bd. v. Waldron, 285 Md. 175, 180, 401 A.2d 172, 175 (1979).
6. 289 Md. at 686, 426 A.2d at 931. Judge. Waldron sought but did not receive reap-
pointment. Appellee's Brief at 2. The Court of Appeals did not address the involuntary
nature of Judge Waldron's retirement. In an earlier case concerning judicial pension bene-
fits, however, the court construed the term "retired" to contemplate both voluntary and in-
voluntary retirement of a judge. See Walker v. Montgomery County Council, 244 Md. 98,
101-02, 223 A.2d 181, 183-84 (1966).
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ployee Retirement System started his pension benefits.7 Subsequently,
Judge Waldron began practicing law for pay, provoking the Attorney
General to seek an injunction.' The trial court denied the injunction
and held that section 56(c) was unconstitutional.9 The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.' 0
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The court characterized section 56(c)'s prohibition as a legislative
attempt "to regulate the legal profession" in violation of the separation
of powers principle. " Although conceding that the legislature had a
limited authority to regulate the bar, the court maintained that permis-
sible legislative regulations are restricted to those "aid[ing] the judici-
ary" or establishing "minimum standards for admission to the [bar]."'' 2
It is not clear whether the court was claiming that judicial authority
encompasses most regulation of the bar - all except that falling within
a narrow legislative preserve - or whether it was asserting an exclusive
authority, which it shares with the legislature only as a matter of com-
ity. Under either interpretation, the court's analysis is problematic.
Had the court accurately identified the sources of legislative and judi-
cial power to regulate the bar, it would have upheld section 56(c) as a
legitimate exercise of legislative authority.
A. Legislative Authority to Regulate the Bar and Article 8
Section 56(c) arguably was an exercise of the General Assembly's
7. Judge Waldron also wanted to resume legal practice, so he sued the Employees'
Retirement System's Chairman, arguing that § 56(c) was either unconstitutional or did not
bar his practice for compensation. In Chairman of the Bd. v. Waldron (Waldron I), 285 Md.
175, 401 A.2d 172 (1979), the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgment that
§ 56(c) denied Judge Waldron equal protection under the law and construed § 56(c) to pro-
hibit the practice of law. Id at 180-81, 401 A.2d at 175.
Because § 56(c) prohibited practice only by a retired judge receiving a pension, and
because a judge may elect when to begin receiving his pension, see Appellant's Brief at 8
(quoting testimony of Retirement System official), a court plausibly could construe § 56(c) to
permit deferral of pension. Indeed, that is how the Retirement System interpreted § 56(c).
See id Judge Waldron, however, elected to receive his benefits, thus invoking § 56(c)'s pro-
hibition of practice. Because the Chairman had no authority to enforce § 56(c), the court
dismissed the action for failure to join the necessary parties. 285 Md. at 180-82, 401 A.2d at
175. The court thus did not reach the constitutional issues in Waldron I.
8. See 289 Md. at 686-87, 426 A.2d at 932.
9. See id at 687, 462 A.2d at 932.
10. As in Waldron I the Court of Appeals again granted appellant's petition for certio-
rari before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Id
11. Id at 688, 426 A.2d at 932. The court reasoned that § 56(c) was a regulation, be-
cause it purported to prescribe "additional prerequisites" for "otherwise qualifed practition-
ers." Id
12. Id at 700-01, 426 A.2d at 939.
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police power. The Court of Appeals has broadly defined the police
power as the authority to prescribe "reasonable regulations, which are
necessary to protect the public health, comfort, order, safety, conven-
ience, morals and general welfare."' 3 The legislature's power derives
not from any particular provision of the Maryland Constitution,' 4 but
from the governmental structure that document creates. The constitu-
tion creates the legislature and then defines the limits of legislative
power. The court has described legislative power as plenary except as
limited by the constitution.' The legislature thus has full power to reg-
ulate in any area, absent a constitutional prohibition.' 6
Policy arguments supporting the legislative power to regulate the
bar stem from the central premise of democratic rule - that public
policy decisions should be made by the public's representatives. The
decisionmaking process is more acceptable if members of the public
can participate in the process, and the legislature has the institutional
machinery to gauge public sentiment, hold hearings, call witnesses, and
develop "tailor made" regulations.' 7 Finally, normal political
processes make it easy to check legislative power.
13. Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 564, 214 A.2d 775, 779 (1964); accord
Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 636, 69 A.2d 471, 474 (1949).
14. MD. CONST. art. III, § 1 merely provides "[t]he Legislature shall consist of two dis-
tinct branches; a Senate, and a House of Delegates, and shall be styled the General Assem-
bly of Maryland."
15. See, e.g., Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 257,
196 A.2d 621, 625 (1963), cited in Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 652, 366 A.2d 21, 40
(1976); Maryland Comm'n for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 439, 180 A.2d
656, 670 (1962), rev'don other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1963); Hennegan v. Geartner, 186 Md.
551, 555, 47 A.2d 393, 394 (1946).
16. "(Pilenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a
prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some
constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it." Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252, 260, 141 A.
714, 717, afed, 279 U.S. 392 (1928); accord Hennegan v. Geartner, 186 Md. 551, 555, 47 A.2d
393, 394 (1946).
17. Regulation is preeminently a legislative function because it is lawmaking - enacting
general rules to effectuate public policy. In a democracy, the primary authority for formu-
lating public policy belongs to the representative branch because the framers designed it to
receive public input from diverse sources and then balance society's numerous competing
and interrelated interests. See, e.g., Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists,
268 Md. 32, 47-48, 300 A.2d 367, 377 (1973). The judiciary, on the other hand, is poorly
suited to the task of regulation. See, e.g., Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits on the Decisional
Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 414, 432 (1976)
("The subordination of judge-made law to statutory law on nonconstitutional questions re-
flects the superior capacity of the legislative branch to resolve questions of expediency and
public policy in the course of declaring the law."); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 742-43 (1979) (Powell, J. dissenting) (judicial resolution of public policy ques-
tions violates separation of powers principles). Courts do, of course, develop the common
law, in the absence of controlling precedent or statutes, according to the judge's view of
social goals and needs. Id
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Waldron relied upon Maryland's separation of powers provision
- article 8 of the Delcaration of Rights - to limit legislative authority
to regulate the bar. Article 8 provides: "That the Legislative, Execu-
tive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate
and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of
one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other."'" On its face this provision appears to forbid usurpation of one
branch's power by another.'9 Additionally, because each branch must
18. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. 8.
Although article 8's language appears to require a government of watertight com-
partments, the court has stated that "the separation of powers concept may constitutionally
encompass a sensible degree of elasticity and should not be applied with doctrinaire rigor."
Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 220, 334
A.2d 514, 521 (1975). The court has acknowledged that the complexities and exigencies of
modem life have required a looser application of the separation of powers doctrine. See
Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 47, 343 A.2d 521, 527 (1975).
The court has concluded that the separation of powers provision was designed to
apply "'only so far as comported with free government.'" Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15
Md. 376, 460 (1860) (quoting Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (Md. 1829)). Although
most state constitutions expressed a strict separation of powers similar to Maryland's, "the
full potentialities of a system of sharply divided powers were never realized." M. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 143 (1967). "If we look into the
constitutions of the several States, we find that. . . there is not a single instance in which the
several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct." THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 47, at 141 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981). The federal Constitution was
likewise not designed to forbid the departments from exercising 'artial agency in, or...
control over, the acts of each other." Id at 140 (emphasis in original). Moreover, a theory
requiring a governmental system of sharply defined spheres of power would prove unwork-
able. In addition to conceptual problems inhering in vague terms like "power," modem
government's complexity and need for collectivist activities requires the combined and coor-
dinated efforts of all three branches. Indeed, a "pure" separation of powers doctrine would
foreclose judicial review. The real principle at work is a system of checks and balances that
preserves liberty while achieving the flexibility vital to effective government. See M. VILE,
supra at 7-8, 14; see also Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Crimi-
nal Contempis in "Inferior" Federal Courts - a Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010, 1012-16 (1924) (practical demands of government preclude separation of powers'
doctrinaire application). The need for overlap of governmental activities is evident in the
development of administrative agencies. For a review of this development, see County
Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 428-36,312 A.2d 225, 239-45 (1973). The
interrelationship of functions between coordinate branches demonstrates that the court
should develop a workable separation of powers analysis, and resist the temptation to resort
to rigidity and literalism.
19. The court has described the purpose of this provision as
to parcel out and separate the powers of government, and to confide particular classes
of them to particular branches of the supreme authority. That is to say, such of them as
are judicial in their character to the judiciary; such as are legislative to the legislature,
and such as are executive in their nature to the executive. Within the particular limits
assigned to each, they are supreme and uncontrollable.
Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852). The decision in Wright predates the 1851
amendment of article 8. In Board of Supervisors v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 262-63, 54 A. 963,
965 (1903), the court regarded the 1851 amendment, which prohibits persons exercising the
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remain independent, no branch may constitutionally inhibit another's
exercise of its constitutional powers. Otherwise, all power would gravi-
tate to the branch imposing the greatest interference, subjugating the
other branch.2" Legislation affecting the judiciary, then, does not vio-
late the separation of powers principle unless it usurps or inhibits judi-
cial authority.2" The question whether article 8 prohibits section 56(c)
thus turns on the nature of judicial authority to regulate the bar.
B. Judicial Authority to Regulate the Bar
In analyzing the source of judicial authority to regulate the bar,
functions of one department from discharging the duties of another, as emphasizing the
division of functions between the departments. That construction, however, would render
the amendment surplusage. The amendment's sponsor, Robert J. Brent, suggested that the
framers were concerned more with preventing individuals from holding offices across de-
partmental boundaries than with division of function. In response to one delegate's concern
that the amendment might prevent the Maryland Senate from sitting as a court of appeals,
Mr. Brent said that "[hie had offered his amendment, because the old article. . . did not
prevent a member of the Legislature from being a judge, or even the executive." I DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION 187 (Annapolis 1851).
Nonetheless, the "separation of persons" concept serves the same goal of protecting liberty
from the despotic concentration of power. See M. VILE, supra note 17, at 17.
20. The concept of checks and balances grew out of the need to provide each branch
with the means to resist encroachment and interference by the other branches. Each branch
possesses power, albeit limited, to exercise a measure of direct control over the others as a
positive check; for example, the executive possesses veto power over the legislature and the
legislature may impeach the executive. See M. VILE, supra note 17, at 18. Just as the sepa-
ration of powers provision limits the legislature, it also limits the judiciary. According to the
Court of Appeals, "'all judicial authority is only such as is provided for by Article 4 of the
Maryland Constitution, and it has been decided that only judicial functions can be exercised
which find their authority in that article.'" Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester
Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 223, 334 A.2d 514, 522 (1975) (quoting Dal Maso v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200, 205, 34 A.2d 464, 466 (1943)) (holding that a
statute authorizing de novo review of an administrative finding is an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative authority to the judiciary); see also Maryland Comm'n for Fair Repre-
sentation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 425-26, 180 A.2d 656, 663 (1962) (article IV vests all
judicial power in the judiciary), rev'don other grounds, 337 U.S. 656 (1963). The court also
has held that article 8 prohibits it from performing nonjudicial functions. See, e.g., Reyes v.
Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 295, 380 A.2d 12, 21 (1977) (advisory opinions at the
request or order of the legislature or executive cannot be required).
21. See 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 305, 310 (1978). The Attorney General identified three
categories of article 8 violations: (1) usurpation of the essential functions and powers of
another branch, see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 46-47, 343
A.2d 521, 527 (1975); (2) actions that destroy or inhibit the essential functions and powers of
another branch, see, e.g., Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500-01, 331
A.2d 55, 64-65 (1975); and (3) delegation of one branch's essential functions and powers to
another branch, see, e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel
Co., 274 Md. 211, 221-22, 334 A.2d 514, 521-22 (1975); see also State v. Clemente, 166
Conn. 501, 507, 353 A.2d 723, 727 (1974) (separation of powers violations take the form of
legislative interference by imposing nonjudicial functions on the court or legislative attempts
to exercise judicial power).
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the Waldron court claimed (1) that authority to regulate the bar is in-
herent in, or ancillary to, the court's adjudicatory power;22 and (2) that
regulation of the bar is essentially a judicial function and thus included
in article IV's grant of judicial power.23 The court correctly concluded
that Maryland's governmental structure supports its first claim; analysis
shows, however, that judicial power is narrower than the court main-
tained. The court primarily relied on history to support its second
claim, but that foundation is weak.
1. The Inherent Judicial Power to Regulate the Bar - Article IV
of the constitution vests "judicial power" in the Maryland courts.24 Al-
though the Maryland Constitution does not define "judicial power,"
the judiciary's "core power" 25 is nonetheless identifiable - it is the
power to adjudicate.26
Many courts and commentators have reasoned that ancillary to27
or inherent in a separation of powers provision and the constitutional
22. 289 Md. at 694-95, 426 A.2d at 935-36.
23. Id at 692, 426 A.2d at 934.
24. MD. CONST. art. IV,
25. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 305, 310 (1978); see also Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial
Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 689-91 (1980) (separation of powers by analysis of
"core functions").
26. Of course, the function generally associated with the judicial branch is adjudication,
i.e., finding facts and applying law. In view of the acknowledged constitutionality of dele-
gating factfinding and law applying authority to administrative agencies, further refinement
of "judicial power" is necessary. Cf. County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md.
403, 441, 312 A.2d 225, 245-46 (1973) (quasi-judicial powers exercised by the Commission
on Landlord-Tenant Affairs were only incidental to regulatory powers and therefore not a
violation of article 8). The Court of Appeals has determined that "the essence of judicial
power is the final authority to render and enforce a judgment." Attorney Gen. v. Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 286, 385 A.2d 57, 64, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). In Dal Maso v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200, 206, 34 A.2d 464, 467 (1943) the court distin-
guished legislative from judicial functions. The legislative function concerns the prospective
"'formation and determination of future rights' "; the judicial function is to determine "'ex-
isting facts and resultant and controverted rights and duties.' " Id (quoting Judge Miller of
Iowa's brochure on ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION).
Other jurisdictions have also described the judicial power. See Eastin v. Broomfield,
116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (1977) (judicial power is the power of the court to
decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev.
13, 20, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967) (" 'Judicial Power' is the authority to hear and determine
justiciable controversies"); In re Opinion of the Justices, 115 Vt. 524, 529, 64 A.2d 169, 172
(1949) (the judicial power is limited to deciding cases or controversies; advisory opinions are
thus outside its scope). But see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 18, at 1017 ("judicial
power" is not a "technical term of fixed and narrow meaning").
27. Although the Waldron court, like most courts and commentators, used the term "in-
herent power," this Recent Decision calls "ancillary" that power arising out of the court's
need to discharge effectively its constitutional duties. See 289 Md. at 691 n.6, 426 A.2d at
934 n.6 (difference between "inherent" and "implied" powers is one of name only); Note,
The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law- 4 Proposed Delinea-
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grant of judicial power is the power to engage in nonadjudicatory activ-
ities necessary to perform the judiciary's constitutional duties.28 This
theory, then, would sanction judicial regulation of the bar if such regu-
lation was necessary to enable a court to perform its adjudicatory
responsibilities.29
The Waldron court, like many courts, reasoned that the structure
of the justice system entails an ancillary judicial power to regulate the
bar.3 0 The Court of Appeals also concluded that such regulation is an
exclusively judicial prerogative except for a narrow area of legislative
tion, 60 MINN. L. REv. 783, 785 n.8 (1976) ("implied," "incidental," and "necessary" powers
are the same).
28. Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 21, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440
(1969), mod#Fed and opinion substituted, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 923 (1972). See generally C. BAAR, SEPARATE BuT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDG-
ETING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 150-56 (1975); J. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE
COURTS 14-15, 21 (1980). Baar distinguished two separation of powers concepts: functional
differentiation and checks and balances. Functional differentiation segregates the branches
by the activities each performs: legislation (lawmaking), execution (law-applying), and ad-
judication (law deciding). Checks and balances contemplates that each branch, by perform-
ing its respective function, should prevent arbitrary or excessive exercise of power by
another branch. C. BAAR, supra, at 151. Baar concluded that a combination of both con-
cepts yields criteria for ensuring judicial independence while serving the underlying princi-
ple of the separation of powers: a constitution of balanced governmental power and the rule
of law. Id at 155. Thus a "twilight" area of overlapping functions exists. Springer v. Phil-
lipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. See generally J. CRATSLEY, supra note 28, at 2. If a legislature refuses to appropriate
sufficient funds for court administration, the judiciary may need to rely on its ancillary
power. Unless the judiciary is fiscally secure and independent it will not be able to perform
its constitutional function free of legislative or executive control. See Note, Judicial Finan-
cialAutonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975, 986-87 (1972); see also In re
Clerk of Court's Comp. v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 177, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784
(1976); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569 (1974); Commentary, Inherent Power and Administrative
Court Reform, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 133, 136-44 (1974) (inherent power applied to appoint-
ment, dismissal and compensation of court personnel).
Courts have recognized that inherent judicial power is limited to self-preservation.
See In re Clerk of Courts' Comp. v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 177, 241
N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976) ("At bottom, inherent judicial power is grounded in self-preserva-
tion."); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 20, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967) (a court's inherent
"power must relate back and be directly derived from the basic judicial power and the basic
judicial function."). For a concise analysis of a court's inherent or incidental power in the
nonadjudicatory areas of rules of procedure, contempt of court, jurisdiction, and judicial
administration, see Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation ofPowers, 7 UTAH L. REV.
82, 91-94 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, Admission to the Bar]; see also J. CRATSLEY,
supra note 28, at 37-44 (application of inherent power doctrine to non-fiscal court needs).
30. 289 Md. at 695, 426 A.2d at 936. See, e.g., Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422
A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 1751 (1981); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 609, 194 N.E. 313, 316 (1935); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 476-77,
101 S.W.2d 977, 981 (1937); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 525, 109
S.E.2d 420, 437 (1959). See generally Note, supra note 27, at 784-85; Comment, Separation
of Powers." Who Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 713, 716-18 (1969).
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control. The court's major premise is certainly supportable, but the
court's conclusion does not follow.
A competent and trustworthy bar is crucial to effective judicial
functioning. A court depends upon the adversary system, and hence a
competent bar,31 to discharge its duties of deciding cases and of devel-
oping the law. Moreover, a court's strength lies in the public respect
accorded it.32 An inept or unscrupulouss3 bar thus could devastate the
integrity of the justice system.3" Furthermore, attorneys, as officers of
the court, plainly share in the responsibility for administering justice
beyond their role as advocates.3 5 Because a regulated bar is essential to
the administration of justice, the judiciary has the ancillary power to
regulate it to the extent necessary to perform its constitutional duties.
This structural argument does not demonstrate, however, that the
judiciary possesses an exclusive power to regulate. Each branch of gov-
ernment, indeed organized society itself, depends upon attorneys as
counselors, planners and advocates.36 More importantly, the court
failed to explain why the legislature, which is responsible for regulating
other professions, is incapable of adequately supervising the bar.37 Of
course, in the absence of adequate legislative regulation, a court may
provide the necessary supervision. Because legislation significantly re-
ducing the availability of qualified attorneys would impair the judici-
31. See, e.g., In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 219, 67 S.E.
597, 599 (1910) (quoting In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 240 (1875)).
32. See W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 151 (1980); Comment, State
Court Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
1187, 1204 (1972).
33. For discussion of the importance of public reliance on an attorney's honesty, see
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974).
34. The legal profession's impact on the administration of justice and the development
of the law is far-reaching. Without the assistance of an able bar, an appellate court's ability
to render well-crafted opinions would suffer considerably. The law thus would develop in a
haphazard fashion depriving future courts and the bar of coherent caselaw. Predictability
and stability in the law would be lost. Moreover, because the parties would perceive that the
issues had not been litigated fully and fairly, public confidence in the judicial system would
wane. See Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of Maryland" Roles, Work and Peformance Part
II- Craftsmanship and Decision-Making, 38 MD. L. REV. 148, 184-85 (1978).
35. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); cf. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo.
467, 476, 101 S.W.2d 977, 981 (1937) (the bench and bar share an intimate relationship).
36. Indeed, most attorneys never see the inside of a courtroom. See Beardsley, The
Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A. J. 509, 510 (1933). The relevance
of this fact has been disputed, however. See, e.g., Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 481, 101
S.W.2d 977, 983 (1937); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 516, 109 S.E.2d
420, 431 (1959); Dowling, The Inherent Power ofthe Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635, 640 (1935).
But cf. Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips, 239 Ala. 650, 659, 196 So. 725, 733 (1940) (court
contempt citation did not extend to unauthorized practice out of court).
37. See 1 E. THORNTON, ATTORNEY AT LAW 33 (1914); Note, Admission to the Bar,
supra note 29, at 90-91.
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ary's ability to function, the court legitimately could declare such
legislation invalid under article 8. The court did not suggest, however,
that section 56(c) threatened efficient judicial functioning. Rather, the
court seemed to regard section 56(c) as an usurpation of judicial au-
thority. The judicial authority that is ancillary to the court's adjudica-
tory power, however, is only the authority to regulate the bar in the
absence of adequate legislative regulation. Accordingly, unless the ju-
diciary's authority to regulate is more than an incident of its adjudica-
tory power - i.e., unless the authority is essentially judicial - section
56(c) was not an usurpation. 38
2. Regulation of the Bar as an Essentialy Judicial Power - The
Waldron court claimed that regulation of the bar is "essentially judicial
in nature and, accordingly, [is] encompassed in the constitutional grant
of judicial authority to the courts of this State."' 39 The court based this
claim on historical evidence that regulation of the bar was an
"uniquely judicial responsibility" in England and in the early years of
American history." The court seemed to reason that the power to per-
form a task is "essentially judicial" if the task is one for which the
courts traditionally have had exclusive responsibility. Regardless of
whether this is a reliable test, regulation of the bar does not satisfy it.
In fact, a thorough examination of the historical record 4' reveals that
courts often have shared this responsibility with the legislative branch.
In England,42 first the Crown and later Parliament set standards for the
38. The distinction between ancillary and essential judicial power is not always clear.
See Note, The Inherent Power of Judicial Review and Constitutional Restrictions on Arbitrary
and Capricious Administrative Action - State Department of Assessments and Taxation v.
Clark, 38 MD. L. REV. 242, 250 (1978); see also Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County,
383 Mich. 10, 21, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1969) ("The inherent power of the judiciary is a
judicial power, but only in the sense that it is a necessary concomitant to the judicial
power."), mod#7ed and opinion substituted, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 923 (1972).
39. 289 Md. at 692, 426 A.2d at 934.
40. Id at 693, 426 A.2d at 935; cf. LeRoy v. Special Indep. School Dist., 285 Minn. 236,
241-42, 172 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1969) ("A recognized test of whether a function is judicial is
whether it is one that courts have historically been accustomed to perform.").
41. The history is recounted in, e.g., In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 384-92, 240 N.W. 441,
445-48 (1932); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 83-85, 54 N.E. 646, 648-50 (1899); Note, Admission to
the Bar, supra note 29, at 83-84; Comment, supra note 30, at 720-21.
42. English legal practices are distinguishable from American practices. The English
legal profession historically consisted of two general groups: attorneys and barristers. An
attorney substituted for the party to a suit, usually when the litigation occurred a long dis-
tance from the party's home. The barrister appeared with a litigant as an advocate to plead
the case. See Note, Admission to the Bar, supra note 29, at 83; H. COHEN, HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH BAR 126 (1929 & photo. reprint 1967). The bifurcation persists today. The attor-
ney's modern counterpart is the solicitor. Clients consult him directly on such matters as
contract and will drafting, conveyancing and incorporations. The client retains a barrister if
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legal profession and directed the courts to implement them.43  Of
course, courts also developed standards on their own.44 Thus, although
courts were certainly involved in this regulation, the responsibility was
not solely judicial. It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding judicial
responsibilities from English history, however, because the English
Parliament is the supreme repository of power.45 It thus is difficult to
characterize any responsibility as exclusively judicial in England.46
litigation is necessary. He drafts the pleadings and conducts the litigation. See id at 326 &
n.p; A. KIRALFY, POTTER'S INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 82 (4th
ed. 1962).
43. Until the thirteenth century, an attorney could appear only upon a writ from the
King. In response to a proliferation of unqualified individuals representing clients, Edward
I issued an ordinance in 1292 limiting the number of attorneys and placing their appoint-
ment under supervision of the justices. 1 Rot. Panl. 84 (1292); see 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194 (2d ed. 1923). Note, Admission to the Bar, supra
note 29, at 83. The problem of unqualified and unscrupulous individuals appearing in court
persisted. In 1402 Parliament required the justices to examine all attorneys before entering
their names into the roll, 4 Hen. IV, c. 18 (1403); see Note, Admission to the Bar, supra note
29, at 83, to remove any attorneys lacking in virtue or good fame, and to replace those who
died or were removed, see 1 J. ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES 279-80 (W. Coe ed. 1912).
Subsequent statutes established conditions for a prospective attorney's admission and au-
thorized the courts to appoint examiners to determine his fitness for practice. 6 & 7 Vict. c.
73; see Comment, supra note 30, at 720. The nature and origins of judicial control over
barristers are less clear. A barrister's admission to appear and argue in court is governed by
the Inns of Court, which are independent, voluntary educational associations. To attain the
rank of barrister, one first must become a member of an Inn, residing there until the Bench-
ers (the governing body of the Inn) summon him to the bar. The Inns generally are not
regulated by statute. The court's relation to the Inns and appointment of barristers is less
definite than in the case of attorneys. However, the practice of visitation by the judges sug-
gests some influence. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 434-35 (3d ed.
1923 & photo. reprint 1966).
44. See supra note 43.
45. Although early English law recognized distinct governmental agencies and tasks, all
power was regarded as judicial in nature as late as the seventeenth century. The medieval
mind considered law an "unchanging pattern of divinely inspired custom." M. VILE, supra
note 18, at 24. The law giver - first the King and his council, and later Parliament - was
viewed as clarifying rather than making law. Id at 24-25. Distinct legislative and executive
powers were not recognized until after the English civil war, when Parliament emerged as
the supreme repository of power. Id at 73-74; Kaufman, supra note 25, at 677-78.
46. A judiciary distinct from the crown did not develop until the eighteenth century.
See C. BAAR, supra note 28, at 151-52; W. GWYNN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 7 (1965). Unlike Maryland's governmental structure, however, the English judici-
ary was never a branch coequal with Parliament. See Sharp, The Classical American Doc-
trine of "The Separation fPowers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385, 391 (1935); c f J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 (1978) (no judicial review
in British judicial practice).
Due to the differences between American and British government structures, com-
mentators have disagreed over the historical evidence's applicability to the separation of
powers question. Compare, e.g., Note, Admission to the Bar, supra note 29, at 83-85 ("Ex-
treme caution is required in applying the facts of early professional evolution to the separa-
tion of powers concept" in America; history inconclusive) with Comment, supra note 30, at
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Maryland history is likewise inconclusive.47 Although courts un-
720-21 (Because Parliament exercises judicial as well as legislative power, history shows
regulation is judicial in nature.). See also Dowling, supra note 36, at 638 (History is unsatis-
factory; although courts exercised control, much of it was pursuant to statute. Parliament is
supreme and the judiciary is a branch of the legislature). Some courts, however, have relied
upon the distinction between Parliament's unlimited power and American constitutional
legislatures to buttress the historical argument. In In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W.
441 (1932), quoted in Waldron, 289 Md. at 691, 426 A.2d at 934, the court compared Parlia-
ment with a constitutional convention. The court considered the English statutes directing
the court to manage the legal profession, see supra note 43, a constitutional mandate. 206
Wis. at 385, 240 N.W. at 446. In In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), the Illinois court
took a different approach. Acknowledging the difference between Parliament and American
legislatures, the court reasoned that the English history demonstrated that admission to the
bar was a judicial function. Because the court viewed its constitutionally granted power as
exclusive, it concluded that separation of powers principles required the judiciary to control
admission to the bar. Id at 83-84, 54 N.E. at 648-49.
In contrast to Day's formalistic approach, In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860) was sensi-
tive to the distinction between power and function. Cooper first considered whether the
admission of attorneys was a judicial proceeding. The court held that the essential nature of
a judicial act is to rule on the existence and enforcement of rights; admission to the bar met
that jurisdictional test. Id at 98. In addressing the constitutional issue, the court concluded
that appointment of attorneys historically was not a judicial power in America or England.
Id at 91. The court pointed out that the legislature had not deprived the court of its juris-
diction over the question but merely had prescribed standards for competent evidence. Al-
though Day acknowledged the cogency of Cooper's analysis, it also pointed out that the
great majority of jurisdictions had not followed Cooper. 181 Ill. at 92, 54 N.E. at 651. The
conclusion is almost irresistible that courts have rejected Cooper more for its result than its
reasoning. But see Note, Admirsion to the Bar, supra note 29, at 85 (suggesting Cooper's
analysis is shallow).
47. The Waldron court's use of history is unclear. Although the court claimed that regu-
lation of the bar was an article IV power, the opinion did not connect its historical references
to an interpretative theory of "judicial power." Prior cases, however, have provided a theory
of constitutional interpretation. In Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), the
Court of Appeals said "'[i]n interpreting the Constitution the first thing to be got at is, what
was the purpose of the framers?'" Id at 639, 366 A.2d at 33 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ.
v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 387, 86 A.2d 892, 894-95 (1952)). Perkins indicates that Maryland
follows an "intent theory" of constitutional construction: i.e., a court should construe the
document in accordance with the intention of the framers. "Intent theory" is distinguished
from "ongoing history," which views the past as demonstrating the "currents and lessons of
experience." C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 26 (1969). The
court has, however, expressed a willingness to adapt its theory of interpretation to account
for changing times. See Perkins, 278 Md. at 639-41, 336 A.2d at 33-34.
Waldron fails to place article 8 in accurate historical context. See supra notes 38-46
and accompanying text; infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. Furthermore, reliance on
historical practices as evidence of the framers' intentions regarding article 8 is questionable:
scholars disagree over the degree to which colonial and post-revolutionary American courts
recognized and enforced the separation of powers. Compare, e.g., Corwin, The Progress of
Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Phila-
delphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 514-21 (1925) (frequent legislative interference
in judicial proceedings and judgments; the legislatures adjudicated rights) and L. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 36 (1973) ("As in England, separation of powers was
notably absent. Functions were assigned to institutions without regard to the idea that
courts ought to be independent bodies, distinct from the legislature and the executive.") with
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questionably have played an important role in admitting, supervising
and disbarring attorneys in this state since its founding, the evidence
demonstrates that the legislature had always shared this responsibil-
ity.4 8 Beginning in 1666, the colonial legislature issued a series of stat-
utes regulating attorney's conduct, duties and fees.49 These statutes
were consolidated in the Act of 1715, providing comprehensive regula-
tion and directing the "Justices of the several Courts. . .to admit and
suspend [attorneys]."5 Later pre-Revolution acts also regulated attor-
neys, especially attorneys' fees.5 The first major post-Revolution de-
velopment was the Act of March 10, 1832, standardizing educational
requirements and providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
a lower court's denial of admission to practice. 2 Finally, in 1898 the
General Assembly created the State Board of Bar Examiners and re-
quired all applicants to petition the Court of Appeals for admission to
the bar. 3 Some courts have attempted to dismiss such statutes as
merely "declaratory" of a pre-existing judicial authority to regulate the
M. VILE, supra note 18, at 134 &passim (disagreeing with Corwin's conclusions). In Mary-
land, the legislature interfered directly with specific cases as late as 1841. See C. BOND, THE
COURTS OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY 133 (1928).
48. See I A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 241-42
(1965). 1657-1670 was a formative period for the Maryland legal profession, and during this
period the first regulations of attorneys appeared. Pursuant to statute, Maryland courts be-
gan to "denominate" or admit attorneys to practice. Id at 245-46. Judicial control was far
from exclusive, however. For example, in 1669 John Morecroft, a denominated attorney,
was brought before the Upper House of Delegates to be impeached. He challenged the
House's authority, maintaining that "as Attorny [sic] and Minister of the Provincial Court
the Matter was & is only examinable & punishable by the honorable Justices of the Provin-
cial Court Who are his Masters and to which Court he is a Minister." Id at 248. The House
implicitly rejected Morecroft's defense. Furthermore, in 1669 the Provincial Court consisted
of the Governor and his Council - the executive; the judiciary did not become independent
until 1694. Id at 241-42.
49. See I A. CHROUST, supra note 48, at 249-50; 52 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MARYLAND
BAR ASS'N 152, 154-55 (1947); 4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MARYLAND BAR ASS'N 87, 90-93
(1899).
50. See 1 A. CHROUST, supra note 48, at 253; see also 52 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MARY-
LAND BAR ASS'N 152, 155 (1947); 4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MARYLAND BAR ASS'N 87, 93
(1899).
51. See 1 A. CHROUST, supra note 48, at 254-55.
52. Ch. 268, 1831 Md. Laws (frequently cited as the Act of 1831); see 52 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE MARYLAND BAR ASS'N 152, 156 (1947).
53. Act of Apr. 14, 1898, ch. 139, 1898 Md. Laws 599; see 52 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
MARYLAND BAR ASS'N 152, 157 (1947). Two developments preceded the 1898 statute. In
1872, the legislature passed a statute admitting University of Maryland School of Law grad-
uates without examination. Act of Mar. 28, 1872, ch. 91, § 3, 1872 Md. Laws 134. In 1876,
the General Assembly authorized the court to appoint a board of at least three attorneys to
examine applicants before the court. Act of Apr. 7, 1876, ch. 264, § 3, 1876 Md. Laws 469.
See Adkins, What Doth the Board Require of Thee?, 28 MD. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (1968).
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bar.14 That argument lacks force, however, because it fails to provide
independent evidence of such judicial power.
Regulation of the bar therefore does not satisfy the court's test for
a constitutionally vested judicial power. The historical evidence shows
that such regulation has not been an "uniquely judicial responsibil-
ity."' 55 The historical evidence does not suggest, then, that the judici-
ary's authority to regulate the bar is any greater than that which it
possesses as an incident of its adjudicatory power. Legislative regula-
tion cannot usurp that power, because that power arises only in the
absence of effective legislative regulation.
3.' Precedentfor a Judicial Power to Regulate the Bar - The Wal-
dron court relied primarily on two prior Maryland cases to support its
assertion of judicial power. In 1969, the court decided Public Service
Commission v. Hahn Transportation, Inc. 56 and Maryland State Bar As-
sociation v. Boone,57 claiming for the first time that regulation of the
bar was an essentially judicial function. Hahn involved a challenge to
a Public Service Commission regulation requiring counsel to represent
the parties when the Commission operated in its quasi-judicial capac-
ity. Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the court asserted that
defining and regulating the practice of law "is, and essentially and ap-
54. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 546, 318 A.2d 811, 813 (1974)
(statutes declarative of court's "inherent common law power to regulate the conduct of...
attorneys"); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845,
852 (1969) (in many jurisdictions the legislature "cannot constitutionally exercise that judi-
cial function [of regulating the bar] although it may make implementing regulations"); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 609, 194 N.E. 313, 316 (1935) (courts have inherent
power to control the practice of law).
55. Although one early case refers to regulation of the bar as a judicial power, its eviden-
tiary weight is doubtful. State v. Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160 (Md. 1786). In Johnston, the
General Court quashed a writ of certiorari in an appeal by the Attorney-General protesting
the county court's admission of an attorney who had refused to take loyalty oaths during the
Revolution. The court did not issue an opinion, but reprinted the argument of counsel.
Counsel contended that the court was limited to powers vested by the statutes of 1715 and
1783. "[Blecause there is no power given by the law" to review the lower court's decision,
counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction. Id at 170-71 (emphasis in original).
Counsel went on to say, "Upon the whole, the several Courts have, time out of mind, exer-
cised the power of determining who were qualified to be attorneys of their respective Courts.
The several statutes and acts of assembly confirm the same." Id at 171. The quoted lan-
guage appears more a recognition of the court's historical practice of admitting and disbar-
ring than a claim of essential constitutional power, especially when considered in light of the
argument that the court's jurisdiction was limited to the remedies authorized by statute. Id
at 168.
56. 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969). See also In re Application of Allan S.,
282 Md. 683, 689, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978), in which the court noted that "the primary and
ultimate responsibility for regulating the practice of law" falls on the court.
57. 255 Md. 420, 429, 258 A.2d 438, 443 (1969).
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propriately should be, a function of the judicial branch of govern-
ment.""8 The Commission's quasi-judicial status was held sufficient to
empower it to issue the regulation 9.5  Hahn did not identify the source
of judicial power to regulate the bar, and the opinion does not illumi-
nate the nature of that power. Hahn described the judiciary and legis-
lature as enjoying a "comfortable accommodation" in regulating the
bar.60 This language suggests that either (1) the court was claiming
that the judiciary's role in regulating the bar is preeminent and any
legislative regulation is at the judiciary's grace; or (2) the court was
simply noting that both branches share in the responsibility for regulat-
ing the bar, without specifying the boundaries of their respective
responsibilities.6
Boone aggravated the confusion over the source of judicial power
to regulate the bar. In granting the bar association standing to appeal a
circuit court's decision to reinstate an attorney,62 the court said that
"[s]ince the passage of Ch. 139 of the Laws of 1898 . . . the Court of
Appeals in the exercise of its inherent and fundamental judicial powers
has supervised, regulated and controlled the admission of lawyers
.... ,63 Despite the reference to inherent powers, "fundamental judi-
cial powers" suggests that the court thought regulation of the bar was
within the constitutional grant of judicial power.
Although Waldron relied on Hahn and Boone to support its claim
that regulation of the bar was essentially a judicial function, neither
case justified that position.64 Furthermore, Hahn and Boone are not
58. 253 Md. at 583, 253 A.2d at 852. Judge Barnes' dissent criticized the court for its
implicit departure from the court's recognition of delegated powers in Bastian v. Watkins,
230 Md. 325, 329-30, 187 A.2d 304, 306 (1963). He reminded the court that the General
Assembly delegated the power to admit applicants to the bar, but not the power to define the
unlawful practice of law; in fact, the legislature "has exercised this power itself, beginning
with Chapter 48 of the Acts of 1715." 253 Md. at 594-95, 253 A.2d at 858; see MD. ANN.
CODE art. 10, §§ 1, 32 (1981).
59. 253 Md. at 580-81, 253 A.2d at 850.
60. Id at 583, 253 A.2d at 852.
61. In Hahn the court stated that the judiciary shall decide "what does and what does
not constitute the practice of law." The court noted that the statute prohibiting the unau-
thorized practice of law used broad language and thus intended to leave it to the courts to
make the final determination of what constituted practice, thus leaving the source of the
courts' power obscure. 253 Md. at 583, 253 A.2d at 852.
62. 255 Md. at 431-32, 258 A.2d at 443.
63. Id at 429, 258 A.2d at 443.
64. 289 Md. at 692-93, 426 A.2d at 934-35. Cases have followed Boone on varying
theories. See, e.g, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 331, 379 A.2d 171,
176 (1977) (court has inherent and fundamental power to act in attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Andresen, 281 Md. 152, 159, 379 A.2d 159, 163
(1977) (duty of the court to protect the public from unscrupulous attorneys). In Boone the
court cited 52 TRANSAcTIoNs OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR AS'N 152, 154-59 (1947),
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precedent for striking down legislative regulation of the bar as violating
the separation of powers provision. Neither case involved a direct con-
flict with legislative authority. Hahn upheld the Commission's statu-
tory rulemaking power, albeit in terms of inherent or ancillary judicial
power. Boone dealt with the respective roles of the circuit court and
Court of Appeals in attorney reinstatement proceedings.
The Waldron court also attempted to reconcile its decision with
the court's prior acceptance of legislative regulation of the legal profes-
sion.65 All of those regulations, explained the court, were permissible
because they were calculated to aid the court in performing its constitu-
tional duties or because they established minimum standards for ad-
mission to the bar.66 This explanation, of course, does not justify the
limits that the Waldron court imposed on legislative authority. At best,
it suggests that the legislature has never before enacted a regulation like
section 56(c); it does not establish that section 56(c) was beyond the
limits of legislative authority.
The Waldron court noted that the courts of most other jurisdic-
Adkins, What Doth the Board Require of Thee?, 28 MD. L. REv. 103 (1968), and Bastian v.
Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 329-30, 187 A.2d 304, 306 (1963) to dispose of history before the 1898
Act granting to the Court of Appeals the authority to admit and disbar. 255 Md. at 429, 258
A.2d at 443. Citing State v. Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160 (Md. 1786), discussedsupra at note
54, Adkins suggested that the Act of 1715, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, estab-
lished the right in courts to admit and disbar attorneys. Hahn also cited 52 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASS'N 152, 152-81 (1947) and Bastian for its "comfortable
accommodations" standard. 253 Md. at 583, 253 A.2d at 852.
65. In re Maddox, 93 Md. 727, 50 A. 487 (1901) relied on the General Assembly's power
to regulate admission to the bar in denying a woman's petition under a statute construed as
limiting membership to males. Id at 730, 50 A. at 488. Maddox quoted from In re Taylor,
4 Md. 28 (1877), in which the court had refused to admit a black man under a statute limit-
ing applications to free white citizens: "The privilege of admission to the office of an attor-
ney ... is governed and regulated by the Legislature, who may prescribe the qualifications
required and designate the class ofpersons who may be admitted." 93 Md. at 728, 50 A. at 487
(emphasis in original). See also Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 330, 187 A.2d 304, 307
(1962) (admission to the bar is a "legislative, not a judicial function" and the right "may
constitutionally be regulated by statute"). Bastian involved a challenge to the Montgomery
County Circuit Court's local rule regulating who may file pleadings. Attorneys were re-
quired to maintain a bona fide local office, address and telephone listing. The court noted
that the rule "has the effect of disbarring some duly qualified Maryland attorneys from
practicing law in Montgomery County." Nevertheless, the court upheld the lower court's
authority to issue such restrictions to the extent the restrictions did not conflict with existing
general public law and rules of the court. Id at 331-32, 187 A.2d at 307-08. See also
Comment, Discipline of Attorneys in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 236, 237-41 & n.15 (1975)
(reviewing Maryland cases that recognize judicial power to regulate the bar).
66. 299 Md. at 703, 426 A.2d at 940; see Hahn, 253 Md. at 583, 253 A.2d at 852; see also
Lukas v. Bar Ass'n, 35 Md.App. 442, 447, 371 A.2d 669, 672, cert. denied, 280 Md. 733 (1977)
(power to regulate and define practice of law vested solely in judiciary; statutes providing
sanctions for unauthorized practice were merely in aid of and not a substitute for court's
right to regulate).
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tions also claim a judicial power to regulate the bar.67 When the legis-
lature has failed to supervise the bar adequately, many courts have
asserted an ancillary power to regulate.68 The limits most courts set on
legislative authority, however, often correspond with the definition of
adjudication. For instance, many courts will draw the line where a
statute seeks to admit or disbar an individual.69 To the extent admis-
sion or disbarment constitutes adjudication, legislative pronounce-
ments on the rights of individual attorneys amounts to usurpation.7 °
Waldron, although purporting to follow the majority rule, extended the
concept of fundamental judicial power beyond the point justified by
separation of powers principles.7'
67. 289 Md. at 694, 426 A.2d at 935-36. Commentators have thoroughly discussed the
majority position. See Comment, supra note 30, at 718-19, 721-27; Note, Admission to the
Bar, supra note 29, at 86-88; Note, supra note 27, at 784-86; see also, e.g., Brydonjack v.
State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 442, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929); Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho
297, 315, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (1949); In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 609, 194
N.E. 313, 316 (1935); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W, Va. 504, 522, 109 S.E.2d 420,
430 (1959). A minority of courts, however, have considered regulation of the bar the exclu-
sive province of the legislature. See, e.g., In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 7-10, 55
S.E. 635, 637-38 (1906); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 109, 250 S.E.2d 279, 299
(1978), appeal dismissed, 296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 183 (1979).
68. See, e.g., In re Greathouse, 189 Minn, 51, 55, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (1933) (although
legislation does not prohibit disbarred attorney's "unethical" practice, court can regulate
because of its inherent self-protective power); In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 287, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937) (court has inherent power to promulgate
rules for the integration of the bar without legislative action). Because an unsupervised bar
or attorney misconduct embarrasses a court's functioning, the judiciary should invoke its
inherent power in the face of legislative inaction. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
69. See, e.g., In re Cannon 206 Wis. 374, 397-98, 240 N.W. 441, 450 (1932) (statute
reinstating disbarred attorney held unconstitutional).
70. The Court of Appeals has distinguished disbarment and disciplinary proceedings
from the trial of an action at law as "an exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction which a
court has over its officers." Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 336, 121 A.2d 473, 477
(1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956). Even if admission or disbarment is not adjudica-
tion, however, a court's interest in a competent and reliable bar arguably suggests that the
court should have the final word whether an individual is admitted or disbarred.
71. Waldron's result resembles the minority of jurisdictions who expressly claim an ex-
clusive power to regulate the bar. Those jurisdictions regard any legislation purporting to
regulate attorneys as usurping judicial power. The weakness of this position has been ex-
posed. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. In Wajert v. State Ethics Comm'n,
491 Pa. 255, 261-62, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (1980), the Pennsylvania court struck down a statute
analogous to § 56(c), which prohibited a former official from representing a person in any
matter before the governmental body with which he had been associated for one year after
he left that body. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(e) (Purdon 1980). As applied to a former
judge, the court held the statute an unconstitutional infringement on the court's "inherent
and exclusive power to govern the conduct of those privileged to practice law in this Com-
monwealth." 491 Pa. at 262, 420 A.2d at 442. The court did not elaborate on its holding,
resting solely on its asserted power. In a footnote, however, the court did suggest that the
statute could impair its functioning if applied to attorneys. The statute could have the effect
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Analysis of governmental structure, history and judicial precedent
thus indicates that the judicial authority to regulate the bar is narrow in
scope. Judicial power to regulate the bar derives only from the judici-
ary's need to ensure effective performance of its adjudicatory duties. A
broader power would arguably constitute an usurpation of legislative
power,72 because legislative power to regulate is plenary, and is limited
only by constitutional prohibitions.
C. Did Section 56(c) Violate Article 8?
The court held that section 56(c) violated the separation of powers
provision because it neither aided the courts nor set minimum stan-
dards for admission to the bar.73 The court's analysis was incomplete
even on its own terms, because the court did not explain why a statute
designed to preserve the appearance of judicial impartiality was not an
aid to the court.74 In any event, the court applied the wrong standard.
Because regulation of the bar is neither an exclusive nor essential judi-
cial power, separation of powers principles do not forbid unhelpful leg-
islative regulations, only harmful ones. Unless section 56(c)
adjudicates or inhibits judicial functioning, it does not violate the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Section 56(c) did not usurp the court's tradi-
of deterring law school graduates from seeking judicial clerkships if it would bar them from
practice for a year after the clerkship. Id at 261 n.5, 420 A.2d at 442 n.5.
Some courts, although paying lip service to principles of "comity," have invalidated
statutes solely on the basis of an absence of legislative power to regulate the bar. In Sharood
v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973), a statute transferred attorney registration
fees from a previously earmarked fund to the general revenue fund. The court apparently
regarded any legislation modifying the fund as an unconstitutional usurpation of inherent
judicial power. Id at 427-28, 210 N.W.2d at 281-82, d rcussed in Note, supra note 27, at
793-95; see also, e.g., Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash.2d 624, 632-33, 548
P.2d 310, 315-16 (1976) (postaudit of bar association funds held unconstitutional interfer-
ence); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 476-77, 101 S.W.2d 977, 981 (1937) (definition of the
practice of law is an exclusive judicial power). Mechanical jurisprudence of this sort has
been criticized: "Given such premises, the conclusion is inevitable." B. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 72 (1924).
Three state constitutions, however, expressly vest authority to regulate the bar in the
judiciary: ARK. CONST. amend. 28; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 23; and N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,
para. 3. See Comment, supra note 30, at 713 n.l, 723 n.37.
72. See supra note 20.
73. 289 Md. at 700-01, 426 A.2d at 939. The court stated that § 56(c) is defective be-
cause it revokes an attorney's license based on criteria unrelated to character or education -
recognized areas of legitimate legislative concern. Id at 703, 426 A.2d at 940. This state-
ment appears to conflict with the court's prior assertion of an exclusive power because it
implies that a statute revoking an attorney's license would be acceptable if it related to those
areas.
74. The court recognized that § 56(c) was intended to prevent the appearance of judicial
impropriety. 289 Md. at 703, 426 A.2d at 940.
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tional function of deciding individual cases,7" as it did not admit,
disbar, or adjudicate the rights of any individual. It did prohibit cer-
tain persons from practicing law; but it did so by defining a class, mem-
bership in which caused legal consequences to attach. Moreover,
section 56(c), like typical legislative regulations, attempted to balance
legitimate competing interests, viz., encouraging a reputable bench
while maintaining a palatable retirement system.7 6 Nor did section
56(c) handicap the judiciary by drastically reducing the availability of
qualified attorneys; the section applies to a relatively minute fraction of
all Maryland lawyers,77 and its prohibition apparently was at their elec-
78tion anyway.
D. Implications
Waldron's ultimate impact is difficult to gauge. Taken at face
value, the court's broad language leaves very little to legislative control
- only the establishment of minimum standards for admission to prac-
tice.79 Because the court's assertion that section 56(c) "cannot realisti-
75. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
76. Whatever the legislature's intention, § 56(c) was an improvement over its predeces-
sor, § 55(e), discussed supra at notes 4-5 and accompanying text. Both statutes plainly pro-
scribed concurrent remunerative practice and pension receipt. Under § 56(c), electing to
receive a pension foreclosed the option of practice for compensation; practice under § 55(e)
sacrificed any further pension benefits. Although § 56(c) may have appeared more rigorous
to a judge contemplating retirement, it presumably provided the option of deferring pension
benefits if the retiring judge desired to return to practice, but was willing to forego immedi-
ate receipt of benefits. See supra note 7. Section 55(e), on the other hand, is less flexible.
Section 56(c) thus balanced several competing interests. A retired judge may have chosen to
practice following retirement (when he is more likely to be so inclined) although the state
would not support his choice by paying him a pension at that time. On the other hand, the
legislature may have wished to avoid § 55(e)'s draconian consequence of total pension for-
feiture in later, post-practice years. Waldron even acknowledged the distinction between the
legitimate establishment of minimum standards and the court's need to retain the power to
adopt additional requirements. See 289 Md. at 699, 426 A.2d at 938.
77. The number of judicial vacancies for each of the six preceding fiscal years are: 1981
- 13; 1980 - 25; 1979 - 20; 1978 - 30; 1977 - 21; 1976 - 24. See JUDICIAL PROJECTS,
RESEARCH & PLAN. SERVICES UNIT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY 29
(1980-1981).
78. See supra note 7; see also Case Comment, The Speedy Trial Act and Separation of
Powers. United States v. Howard, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1925, 1929 & n.46 (1978) (potentially
coercive impact of legislation conflicting with U.S. CONST. art. III's guarantee of reliable
compensation). The problem of inducing qualified attorneys "to make the enormous sacri-
fice of disbanding a carefully nurtured practice" to seek a judgeship has become increasingly
serious. The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 5, 1982, at A8, col. 4. Nevertheless, § 56(c) represents, if
anything, a step towards remedying this situation. See supra note 76. Moreover, the court
has recognized that pension benefits are "usually predicated on a condition that the pen-
sioner should not resume the practice of law." Walker v. Montgomery County Council, 244
Md. 98, 102, 223 A.2d 181, 183 (1966).
79. See 289 Md. at 700-01, 426 A.2d at 939.
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cally be considered a provision to aid the judiciary""° conflicts with the
statute's acknowledged purpose - preserving judicial integrity8' -
Waldron does not define Hahn's "comfortable accommodation" be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary. 82 A subsequent opinion sug-
gests that Waldron does not herald a broad judicial redefinition of the
court's powers; rather, the court appears eager to limit Waldron to reg-
ulation of the legal profession. In Commission on Medical Discipline v.
Stillman,83 Dr. Stillman challenged, under the separation of powers
provision, legislative authority to prohibit judicial stays of Commission
orders revoking medical licenses. Although the issue became moot
prior to decision, the court nevertheless made a point of discussing an-
cillary judicial powers. The court cited Waldron, noting that ancillary
judicial power is self-protective in nature." The court went on to state:
"'[Ancillary power] comprehends all authority necessary to preserve
and improve the fundamental judicial function of deciding cases ....
The test is not relative needs or judicial wants, but practical necessity in
performing the judicialfunction. The test must be applied with due con-
sideration for equally important executive and legislative functions.' "85
Although it is difficult to see how regulation of the legal profession is
more inherently an exercise of judicial power than issuance of a stay
pending appeal,86 Stillman suggests that Waldron is unlikely to have
much effect on the overall balance of power between the legislature and
the judiciary beyond regulation of the bar.
Despite Waldron's apparently limited reach, it remains a dis-
turbing precedent. Because section 56(c) did not interfere with judicial
functioning, the court's holding did nothing to preserve the integrity of
a tripartite governmental system; rather, it only frustrated representa-
tive government. The court appeared to invalidate section 56(c) be-
cause it did not like the statute, thus substituting its own wishes for
80. Id
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
83. 291 Md. 390, 435 A.2d 747 (1981).
84. Id at 400, 435 A.2d at 752-53.
85. Id at 401,435 A.2d at 753 (emphasis in original) (quoting Clerk of Court's Comp. v.
Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 180-82, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976)).
86. The court in Stillman concluded that "[t]he power to issue a stay is not an inherent
judicial power in the sense that it may never be limited or denied by legislative enactment.
A stay is simply a tool that a court may use in the proper exercise of its authority." 291 Md.
at 402, 435 A.2d at 753. One other Maryland case citing Waldron is In re Barton, 291 Md.
61, 432 A.2d 1335 (1981). In granting a disbarred attorney's petition for reinstatement, Bar-
ton cited Waldron for the proposition that it is the court's "ultimate responsibility to super-
intend the conduct of the Bar," although no constitutional question was raised. Id at 63,
432 A.2d at 1336.
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those of the public's representatives. Furthermore, the court actually
may have damaged the judicial institution. Although insulating the ju-
diciary from responsibility to the public aids the impartial decision of
cases, Waldron actually could undermine public confidence in the judi-
ciary because it smacks of self-interest. 7
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
Waldron also held that section 56(c) violated the equal protection
component of both the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.88 In
so ruling, the Court of Appeals laid down new law. Considering it set-
tled that the due process provision of article 24 has an equal protection
component,89 the court concluded that both the state and the federal
equal protection components require a statute regulating "important"
rights to relate substantially to its purposes. 90 The court apparently
classified the right to pursue one's chosen profession as an important
right warranting an intermediate standard of review.9'
A. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Rationalefor Equal Protection - The fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause demands that legislators treat similar persons in
similar ways.92 The legislature must determine that people are similar
in relevant respects before it legitimately can treat them as a class for
the purpose of pursuing a state goal. When reviewing a statute under
equal protection, the court questions whether the statutory classifica-
tions are based on characteristics relevant to furthering legitimate state
goals. In other words, the court asks how closely the statutory means fit
the statutory ends.93
Only occasional statutes achieve a perfect fit between the statutory
means and any particular state goal. Most are under-inclusive, over-
87. See Kaufman, supra note 25, at 692-93 (impartial judiciary is the "hallmark of every
true judicial tribunal"); Comment, supra note 27, at 800.
88. 289 Md. at 728-29, 426 A.2d at 954.
89. Id at 704, 426 A.2d at 940-41. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24 states: "That no
man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land."
90. 289 Md. at 713-14, 426 A.2d at 946.
91. Id at 717-22, 426 A.2d at 948-50.
92. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949).
93. Perry, Modem Equal Protection.- A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1023, 1068 (1979).
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inclusive, or both,94 because the legislature often has subsidiary goals
such as administrative convenience. An under-inclusive classification
includes only those individuals who are similarly situated, but does not
include others who are also similar for the statute's purposes.95 Con-
versely, over-inclusive laws affect all persons who are alike under the
law, plus people who lack the relevant characteristics.96
2. Statutory Regulation of Classes and Rights - The Court sub-
jects a law regulating "suspect classes" to "strict scrutiny."9 7 Suspect
classes are those groups who have "experienced a 'history of purposeful
unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."98
The Supreme Court has recognized race,99 alienage,' ° and ancestry as
suspect classes.' 0 '
Laws subject to strict scrutiny violate the equal protection clause
unless the state demonstrates that such laws are "necessary to promote
a compelling governmental interest."' 10 2 Because the state carries such a
heavy burden in these cases, very few statutes survive strict scrutiny. 10 3
Several Supreme Court decisions have suggested that a statute
may warrant an intermediate standard of review if it burdens certain
classes that, though not "suspect," share some of the characteristics of
suspect classes."° Thus the only classes to qualify for this middle tier
scrutiny are those based on gender and illegitimacy. 0 5 A statute satis-
94. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 92, at 344-53.
95. Id at 348.
96. Id at 351.
97. The Supreme Court coined "suspect" class and "rigid scrutiny" in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
98. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
99. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
100. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
101. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
102. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original).
103. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945), is one of the few instances where
the Court upheld a state classification based on race.
104. These classes generally are defined by immutable traits, are underrepresented in the
political branches, and are the victims of stereotypes that have nothing to do with their
actual ability. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976).
105. See cases cited and discussed in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 16-23 to -28 (1978). Most recently, Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Ct., 450 U.S.
464, 468 (1981) (plurality opinion) adhered to a middle standard for gender-based classifica-
tions by adopting the "sharper focus" test of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring). Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980), avoided discussing de-
gree of focus, but still used the "important governmental interest" requirement in reviewing
sex-based discrimination. In addition, the court recently upheld an illegitimacy-based clas-
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fies intermediate scrutiny when the statutory means substantially pro-
mote important state ends."°6
Most classes, however, merit only "rational basis" scrutiny.
Courts find a rational basis if the statutory means further the state
ends. ' 7 The court will invalidate the statute only if the legislative
means are "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive," 0 or if the statute has no legitimate purpose."°  Such laws are
presumed valid and the party challenging the statute has the burden of
proving it unconstitutional."10 The court defers to the legislature as the
more appropriate body to determine the choice of means in pursuing a
legitimate state goal."' In Waldron, for example, the burdened class
- state judges - bore more of the traits that suspect or near suspect
classes share.
The Supreme Court conducts a similar review of statutes imping-
ing on certain rights. Like suspect classes, "fundamental rights" are
subject to strict scrutiny." 2 The Court defines fundamental rights as
those found explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution." 3 Rights thus
sification as "substantially related to the important state interests the statute is intended to
promote." Lali v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978).
106. The Supreme Court has not articulated a consistent rationale for invoking interme-
diate review. It is probably still true, however, that administrative convenience is an insuffi-
cient state interest to survive middle tier review. See, e.g., Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268, 281 n. 12
(1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
656 (1972).
107. See Perry, supra note 93, at 1068.
108. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); see also New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (noting that statutory discriminations are presumed consti-
tutional unless a classification invades fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inher-
ently suspect distinctions).
109. E.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The Court
maintained that the statute lacked a rational basis, because the classification was irrelevant
to the alleged purpose. Id at 534. The Court also rejected the state end of precluding
hippies from receiving welfare benefits as an illegitimate state end. Id at 534; see also Perry,
supra note 93, at 1068-69 (classification "must be intelligible as an effort to serve a legiti-
mate governmental interest").
110. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 48-49, 300
A.2d 367, 377-78 (1973).
111. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("IThe intractable eco-
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance pro-
grams are not the business of this Court.").
112. "Fundamental" rights originated with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
113. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973):
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether
education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
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far deemed fundamental are first amendment rights," 14 the right to vote
in state elections," 5 the right of interstate travel,"16 the right of equal
access to a criminal appeal," 7 and the right to procreate."'
The Supreme Court subjects non-fundamental rights to "rational
basis" scrutiny. In contrast to its treatment of classes, the Court has not
created an intermediate tier for quasi-fundamental or important
rights. 19
Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions seems to reject all at-
tempts to identify additional rights deserving special protection. 20 The
Court's reluctance to identify "important rights" triggering heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection clause may be based on a careful
reading of that clause. On its face, the clause contemplates equal treat-
ment of various classes, not special treatment for certain rights. The
fourteenth amendment was designed to insure that rights extended to
whites would also extend to blacks. It did not guarantee blacks any
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer
lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.
While some fundamental rights do not easily fit this dichotomy, Rodriguez does indicate that
the Court will not search for new rights.
114. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (explicitly guaranteed by
Constitution).
115. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966) (implicitly guaran-
teed by Constitution).
116. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (arguably implicitly guaranteed
by Constitution).
117. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (difficult to ground in the Constitution;
more understandable as historically fundamental in American society).
118. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (difficult to
ground in the Constitution; more understandable as historically fundamental in American
society).
119. Professor Tribe claims that the Court has treated "preferred" interests with interme-
diate scrutiny. L. TRIBE, supra note 105, § 16-31, at 1089-90. He characterizes Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), as a case that warranted intermediate scrutiny, because
"ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy" is a preferred interest.
However, Hampton was invalidated under strict scrutiny because it involved a suspect classi-
fication. Id at 102-17. Tribe describes Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1971), as
protecting the important right of the individual "in retaining drivers' licenses." However,
Bell stands for the proposition that a licensee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard
on the question of his liability for an accident before losing his driver's license. Id at
539-40. Tribe describes Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), as a case supporting the right
to obtain "a higher education at an affordable tuition." While Justice White discussed this
in his concurrence, the majority opinion invalidated the statute under rational basis on the
grounds that an irrebuttable presumption is arbitrary and unreasonable. Id at 445-54. Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), was also couched in rational basis language, though a
more demanding standard was actually employed. The Waldron court described this collec-
tion as "Professor Tribe's amorphous characterization." 289 Md. at 711, 426 A.2d at 944.
120. See supra note 113.
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specific rights, though it has forced states to afford blacks the same
rights they afford whites. 121
Although commentators generally favor some form of intermedi-
ate scrutiny, 122 critics of intermediate scrutiny agree that the courts are
pre-empting legislative prerogatives when they use this standard, which
is less sharply defined than those involved in strict or rational basis
scrutiny. As Justice Rehnquist said:
Even assuming that a court has properly accomplished the difficult
task of identifying the "purpose" which a statute seeks to serve, it
then sits in judgment to consider the so-called "fit" between that
"purpose" and the statutory means adopted to achieve it. In most
cases, and all but invariably if the court insists on singling out a
unitary "purpose," the "fit" will involve a greater or lesser degree
of imperfection. Then the Court asks itself: How much "imper-
fection" between means and ends is permissible? In making this
judgment it must throw into the judicial hopper the whole range of
factors which were first thrown into the legislative hopper ....
The fundamental flaw. . . is that there is absolutely nothing
to be inferred from the fact that we hold judicial commissions that
would enable us to answer any one of these questions better than
the legislators to whose initial decision they were committed.
Without any antecedent constitutional mandate, we have created
on the premises of the Equal Protection Clause a school for legis-
lators, whereby opinions of this Court are written to instruct them
in a better understanding of how to accomplish their ordinary leg-
islative tasks.
123
In any event, the Supreme Court consistently has relegated statutes af-
fecting the right to employment to rational basis review. 124  Accord-
121. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Barrett,
Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classfcations - A More Modest Role for Equal Protec-
tion?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 108-21; Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1060-75 (1979); Perry, supra note 93, at 1074-83; Wes-
ton, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 560-64 (1982).
122. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword- In Search ofEvolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 20-24, 37-48 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards ofReview Under the Equal Protec-
tion Guarantee - Prohibited, Neutual and Permissive Classifcations, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071,
1079-82 (1974); Perry, supra note 93, at 1024, 1083; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945,
1017-18 (1975).
123. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 784 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 32-33 (1980) (neither
the constitutional text nor the intent of the framers tell us anything about which equal pro-
tection tier to adopt).
124. In Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 108-09 (1979), the Court upheld a statute that
required people in the Foreign Service to retire at age 60, even though Civil Service employ-
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ingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals wrongly concluded that, because
section 56(c) could not withstand heightened scrutiny, it was void
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
B. Equal Protection Under Article 24
Although the Maryland Constitution does not include an express
equal protection clause, Waldron "deem[ed] it settled that this concept
of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Arti-
cle 24 of the Declaration of Rights."' z The court relied upon two
sources. First, the court cited earlier Court of Appeals decisions that
purportedly agreed that article 24 has an equal protection component.
Yet none of those cases are dispositive because the court avoided the
issue by either assuming for the sake of argument that Maryland has an
equal protection clause, 126 or by declining to say precisely which consti-
tutional provision invalidated the statute.'2 7  Second, Waldron cited
ees have no mandatory retirement age, including those who serve abroad. The right to
employment, as in Murgia, was not deemed fundamental. Consequently, even though the
statute was both under- and over-inclusive, the Court deferred to Congress' judgment and
held that such deficiencies did not invalidate the statute:
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treat-
ment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combina-
tion of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislatures actions were
irrational.
Id at 97; see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
Waldron cites Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), as advocating protec-
tion of the right to work, 289 Md. at 721, 426 A.2d at 950, but the focus of protection in Roth
was a due process claim of a property right in having a one-year, nontenured job renewed.
The "liberty" interest in Roth was the freedom to seek other employment opportunities.
Roth stated that "there might be cases in which a state refused to reemploy a person under
such circumstances that interests in liberty would be implicated. But this is not such a case;"
and "[i]t stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he
simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another." 408 U.S. at
573. The Court concluded that "respondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty or
property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 579.
125. 289 Md. at 704, 426 A.2d at 940-41; accord Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md.
553, 558 n.4, 431 A.2d 663, 667 n.4 (1981) ("Although the Maryland Constitution contains
no express equal protection clause, it is settled that the concept of equal protection is embod-
ied in the Due Process Clause, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." (empha-
sis added) (citing Waldron)).
126. Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 293 n.7, 396 A.2d 1033,
1040 n.7 (1979); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 n.8
(1977), aft'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
127. Bruce v. Director, Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 607, 276 A.2d 200, 211
(1971) ("A student of constitutional law will no doubt be disappointed that we chose to
ignore the issue of whether §§ 322 and 700 violated the due process or equal protection or
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Maryland cases suggesting that article 24 and the fourteenth amend-
ment apply in like manner and to the same extent.128 The significance
of this analogy was suggested in a footnote, 129 where the court ex-
plained that the process of incorporating an equal protection compo-
nent into article 24 due process was "similar" to the analysis in Boiling
v. Sharpe,130 in which the Supreme Court implied an equal protection
element in the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Thus the court seemed to rely on the following syllogism: article
24 contains a due process requirement; Boiling v. Sharpe established
that the fifth amendment's due process clause has an equal protection
element; therefore, article 24, like the fifth amendment, has an equal
protection component that will invalidate legislation affecting impor-
tant rights unless the legislative means are substantially related to an
important state objective.
The court's major premise is difficult to evaluate. Although prior
Maryland cases construed article 24's "law of the land" clause as the
equivalent of a due process clause, that construction is questionable. 131
Yet even if article 24 is equivalent to the fifth amendment's due process
clause, that equivalence does not justify the Waldron decision.
privileges and immunities of non-residents of this State .. "). Although the court in Wal-
dron claimed that Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951), rested on
equal protection under article 24 alone, Cohen did not involve equal protection issues.
128. 289 Md. at 704-05, 426 A.2d at 941. Earlier case law was careful to limit the similar-
ity to its effect on property. See, e.g., Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co.,
272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974).
129. 289 Md. at 704 n.8, 426 A.2d at 941 n.8.
130. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
131. There is some doubt whether a court properly may equate article 24's "Law of the
land" clause with the fifth amendment's due process clause. See Corwin, The Doctrine of
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372, 464 (1911); Jurow,
Untimely 7houghts. A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 265, 278-79 (1975); see also Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J.
365, 412 (Md. 1838) (Although construing "the Law of the land" to mean "by the due course
and process of the law," the court envisioned strictly procedural "due process" under article
24). Furthermore, commentators have criticized the notion that due process has a substan-
tive element. See, e.g., Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REy. 197 (1976) (pro-
cedural due process can ensure a democratically accountable government, but it is
misdirected to give it substantive content). There is also evidence that the framers attempted
to draft precise, easily interpreted provisions that do not lend themselves to expansive
constructions.
[A]bstractions are dangerous things to insert in the great organic law. Upon them new
theories may be built, and around them novel doctrines generated, which may, in time,
destroy all the fair proportions and harmony of the law itself, and finally war with its
very vitality .... [T]he instrument... submitted for ratification, should be clear and
explicit - free from all abstraction - free from all doubt and obscurity - so plain that
he "who runs might read," and at a glance comprehend all its simple provisions.
1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION 161 (Annapolis
1851).
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The court's minor premise is true, but controversial. The Supreme
Court decided Boiling v. Sharpe 32 and Brown v. Board of Education133
on the same day. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause prohibited the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools. Bolling involved com-
parable discrimination in the District of Columbia school system, a
federal organ exempt from the fourteenth amendment.1 34 Bolling held
that the fifth amendment's due process clause, which governs the fed-
eral government, has an implicit equal protection element. The
Supreme Court did not analyze available constitutional evidence, but
said simply that "the concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness are not mutually
exclusive."1 35 The Court apparently reasoned that due process has an
equal protection component because, in guaranteeing fairness, it re-
quires that similarly situated people be similarly treated.' 36 Thus, the
Court concluded that discrimination may be "so unjustifiable" that it is
tantamount to a denial of due process.
Commentators have criticized the Bolling decision for its unprinci-
pled constitutional analysis. 37 But even if the Supreme Court properly
132. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. 347 U.S. at 498-99.
135. Id at 499.
136. For discussion of the emptiness of the concept of treating similar people similarly,
see Weston, supra note 121.
137. See J. ELY, supra note 123, at 32-33; Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an Imperial Judici-
ary, 40 MD. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1981); Lupu, supra note 121, at 994-95; Monaghan, Of "Lib-
erty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 417 n.79 (1977). But see J. ELY, supra note
123, at 34-41 (arguing that Boiling should have based its equal protection holding on the
ninth amendment); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 92, at 361-65 (suggesting that substan-
tive due process and equal protection have much in common).
A literal reading of the fifth amendment indicates that due process emphasizes "pro-
cess," not substantive rights. Even Professor Brest, a staunch defender of the result in Boil-
ing, admits that it "is not supported by even a generous reading of the fifth amendment."
Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 233
(1980). Professor Ely has said:
I therefore confess I would have strained sorely to side with the Chief Justice had the
language of the Fifth Amendment been able to bear his construction.
It's hard to see how it can, however. What is more, the fact that "due process,"
read responsibly, means due process is something we may be able to shrug off in the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contains other phrases that do seem to
mean what "due process" has wrongly been read to mean. In the Fifth Amendment,
however, the Due Process Clause stands alone.
J. ELY, supra note 123, at 32.
Although in Boiling, the Supreme Court stressed that the phrases "equal protection
of the laws" and "due process of law" are not interchangeable, 347 U.S. at 499, the Court
has since treated them as virtually interchangeable. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94
(1979); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973).
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implied an equal protection element in the fifth amendment's due pro-
cess clause, the Supreme Court never has subjected the right to work to
heightened scrutiny. Thus, Waldron's conclusion that article 24 con-
tains an intermediate equal protection standard is questionable.
C. The Waldron Court's Equal Protection Analysis of Section 56(c)
Waldron indicated that certain classes of rights are subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny. The opinion suggests that "when important personal
rights, not yet held to merit strict scrutiny but deserving of more protec-
tion than a perfunctory review would accord, are affected by a legisla-
tive classification, a court should engage in a review consonant with the
importance of the personal right involved."' 38 Although the court did
not explicitly acknowledge that it was using an intermediate standard
in reviewing section 56(c), the court's analysis demonstrates that it was
using such a standard.
In defense of section 56(c), the Attorney General cited three state
objectives, the satisfaction of any one of which would have enabled the
statute to survive rational basis scrutiny. 139 First, the Attorney General
compared the judicial pension system to the Social Security system and
argued that both systems were designed to replace earnings lost after
income only if the beneficiary lacked outside income (substitute earn-
ings rationale)." ° Second, he argued that section 56(c) promoted the
state interest in saving money (saving money rationale).' 4 ' Third, he
noted that section 56(c) prevented the appearance of, and actual impro-
priety that may result from an ex-judge practicing before, his former
138. 289 Md. at 713, 426 A.2d at 946. Middle tier language appears throughout the opin-
ion. See, e.g., id at 704, 426 A.2d at 940 ("However, when an enactment invades protected
rights to life, liberty, property or other interests secured by the fundamental doctrines of our
jurisprudence, there is reason to be especially vigilant in the exercise of our constitutional
duty."); id at 709, 426 A.2d at 943 ("important private interests or burdened classes;" court
will "not speculate as to hypothetical justifications" for the statute); id at 717, 426 A.2d at
948 ("vital personal interests ... [that] are substantially affected by statutory classifica-
tion"); id at 718, 426 A.2d at 948 ("preferred status"); id at 727-28, 426 A.2d at 953
("When, as here, the burden created by the enactment denies persons a basic and important
personal right, the inequality resulting from patchwork legislative demarcations expands to
constitutional dimensions and cannot be sanctioned under the equal protection guaranties
[sic]"). But see id at 717, 426 A.2d at 948 ("We accordingly consider the statutory classifica-
tion before us ... under that broad generality of equal protection analysis already referred
to as rational basis review."); id at 727, 426 A.2d at 953 ("the General Assembly has drawn
distinctions between persons which simply bear no relationship to the provision's
objective.").
139. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465 (1981).
140. 289 Md. at 722-23, 426 A.2d at 950.
141. Id at 724, 426 A.2d at 951.
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colleagues (prevention of impropriety rationale). 142
The Court of Appeals rejected these ends as insufficient to sustain
section 56(c). The court rejected the substitute earnings rationale be-
cause: (1) section 56(c) did not reduce benefits in proportion to the
judge's outside income (so it did not in fact operate like Social Secur-
ity), and (2) section 56(c) prevented judges from receiving their pen-
sions while they practiced law or were employed by the federal, state,
or local government, but did not limit income from other private
sources.' 43 However, this did not make the statutory scheme irrational,
merely under-inclusive. The Supreme Court has yet to invalidate a
statute involving the right to employment, much less the right to prac-
tice law, on the grounds that it was under-inclusive."' A legislature
may draft an under-inclusive statute rather than sacrifice a subsidiary
objective such as saving money or administrative convenience.
The court next rejected the saving money rationale as requiring a
"virtual abdication [of] our duty to exercise judicial review."' 45 The
court said that when important interests are involved, it would evaluate
only "those purposes that are obvious from the text or legislative his-
tory of the enactment, those plausibly identified by the litigants, or
those provided by some other authoritative source."'" The court re-
fused to accept the saving money rationale as anything other than a
justification after the fact, and hence, neither "plausible" nor "authori-
tative." Arguably, that rationale is "obvious from the text," because
states generally do not want to spend more money than necessary. 4 1
Although saving money alone does not justify line-drawing, section
56(c) is arguably rational because its limits on a pension are triggered
only if the judge elects to practice. 48
The court also rejected the prevention of impropriety rationale.
The court argued that section 56(c) was under-inclusive because it
neither prevented judges from practicing before the bench without
compensation, nor barred from practice those judges who declined
their pension. As long as those two groups continued to practice, the
142. Id
143. Id at 723 & n.21, 426 A.2d at 951 & n.21.
144. See supra note 124.
145. 289 Md. at 724, 426 A.2d at 951.
146. Id at 722, 426 A.2d at 950. But see J. ELY, supra note 123, at 127 (to make legisla-
tures accountable, a court should only look to what that body articulates; however, the costs
of such a requirement outweigh the benefits).
147. Courts have recognized that limiting expenditures is a legitimate state goal. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234,
240-41 (D. Minn. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
148. See supra note 7.
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court contended, there was no rational basis for barring judges who
practice for compensation and wish to receive their pension. 149
There are, however, legitimate distinctions between the two classes
sufficient to survive a deferential analysis. Although section 56(c) can-
not prevent a judge from practicing for free, by proscribing compensa-
tion, it discourages such practice and therefore avoids the appearance
of impropriety. Section 56(c) also eliminates the appearance of impro-
priety by severing a judge's financial ties with the state.
Finally, the court reasoned that the statute was under-inclusive,
because it did not prohibit other attorneys who receive state pensions
from appearing before the court, 50 and over-inclusive because it pre-
vented those judges who will never practice in the courtroom from
practicing at all if they accept the pension.' 5' Neither under-inclusive-
ness nor over-inclusiveness would have been fatal under rational basis
scrutiny. When reviewing legislation under that more deferential stan-
dard, the Supreme Court has held that a legislature may choose to
eliminate an evil one step at a time. 52 Also, it may choose overbroad
means rather than abandon an end entirely, 5 3 because of the undue
sacrifice of subsidiary goals.
The Waldron court denied the legislature the power to balance
goals. Although the legislature could have tailored section 56(c) to
eliminate its over-inclusiveness, it would have sacrificed the goals of
saving money and administrative convenience. The court prevents the
best balancing when it intervenes on behalf of only one of the interests
that the legislature considered when drafting the statute.
The court's treatment of section 56(c) demonstrates that the court
adopted an intermediate scrutiny. Waldron apparently presumed the
statute invalid, and placed the burden of proof on the state. 54 In a
thorough analysis, Professor Tribe characterized intermediate scrutiny
149. 289 Md. at 724-25, 426 A.2d at 951-52.
150. Id at 725-26, 426 A.2d at 952.
151. Id at 726-27, 426 A.2d at 953.
152. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)).
153. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979). It is arguable that section 56(c) satisfies
even a heightened review, because its means are less restrictive than its predecessor section
55(e), discrussedsupra at note 4-5 and accompanying text. The state interests in exact com-
pensation and the prevention of impropriety are greater than mere administrative conven-
ience, and are arguably "important governmental interests." It may well be that the degree
of fit between the means and the ends is not "fair and substantial," but the court does little to
explain its basis for invalidating the statute.
154. See 289 Md. at 717-22, 426 A.2d at 948-50. But see Charles County v. Board of Ed.,
48 Md. App. 339, 352-53, 427 A.2d 1025, 1032 (1981) (even after Waldron, the burden of
proof remains on the party assailing a statute).
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as demanding (1) that the state end be important, (2) that there be a
close fit between legislative means and ends, (3) that a statute be justi-
fied on the basis of a current articulation of legislative goals, and
(4) that the state objective not be merely a post-hoc rationalization of
the legislation.155 As the above discussion indicates, Waldron's equal
protection analysis conforms to Tribe's description of intermediate
scrutiny.
Tribe also suggested that courts using intermediate scrutiny may
require "that the legal scheme under challenge be altered so as to per-
mit rebuttal in individual cases even if the scheme is not struck down
altogether."' 5 6 This technique could have accommodated Judge Wal-
dron in the instant case. The court could have said that in view of the
tenuous fit between section 56(c) and the impropriety rationale, for ex-
ample, the legislature must either eliminate the classification or adopt
procedures to determine whether Judge Waldron will commit the mis-
chief at which the impropriety rationale is actually aimed (i.e., whether
he will later argue before the courts). The Court of Appeals may adopt
this approach in future cases.' 57
D. Does Article 24 Provide Greater Protection Than
the Fourteenth Amendment?
Although the court was not justified in subjecting section 56(c) to
intermediate scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, it might have
been justified in employing a heightened scrutiny if article 24 provides
greater protection to Maryland residents than the fourteenth amend-
ment does.' 58 Federal interpretations of the federal Constitution do not
restrict state courts in construing their own constitution. 59 Although
the Court of Appeals stated that article 24 may extend more protection
than the fourteenth amendment does, it claimed in Waldron to be pro-
viding parallel protection. No prior Maryland case has held that article
24 limits the General Assembly's action more severely than the four-
155. L. TRIBE, supra note 105, at 1082-86.
156. Id at 1088.
157. Cf. Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 635-46, 366 A.2d 21, 29-35 (1976) (state con-
stitutional provision confficting with federal Constitution may be construed "to remove the
flaw and yet preserve our organic law to the fullest extent possible").
158. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 495-502 (1977).
159. A state court does remain bound to its state constitution. See Beauchamp v. Somer-
set County Sanitary Comm'n, 256 Md. 541, 547, 261 A.2d 461, 464 (1970).
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teenth amendment does. 160 In fact, prior cases suggest that article 24
demands only that legislation not be arbitrary, i.e., that it have a ra-
tional basis. 16  Although some Maryland cases purported to require a
"fair and substantial relation" between legislative ends and means, the
Court of Appeals has said that it used the phrases "rational relation-
ship" and "fair and substantial relation" interchangeably. 162 Accord-
ingly, the Maryland court has never before subjected a statute to
heightened scrutiny under article 24. The court did not justify its deci-
sion to do so now.
Even if article 24 has an implied equal protection element that
justifies an intermediate standard of review, the right to pursue one's
chosen profession does not warrant heightened scrutiny. Other state
courts have gone beyond the scope of federal protection because their
state constitutions endowed interests with special importance. 63 Mary-
160. Waldron held that section 56(c) violated the equal protection requirements of both
the state and federal constitutions. 289 Md. at 728-29, 426 A.2d at 954.
161. Maryland courts have consistently followed the rational basis test of Lindsley v. Nat-
ural Carbonic Gas Co.:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
State the power to classify. . . but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); accord Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md.
279, 286, 396 A.2d 1033, 1037 (1979); Montgomery County v. Fields Rd. Corp., 282 Md. 575,
579, 386 A.2d 344, 347 (1978); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 603, 380 A.2d 1052, 1057-58
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978); Aero Motors, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 274
Md. 567, 574, 337 A.2d 685, 691-92 (1975). Maryland courts give the legislature a consider-
able degree of discretion, see McGowan v. State, 220 Md. 117, 123, 151 A.2d 156, 159-60
(1959), aff'dsub nom McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and do not require math-
ematical perfection; see Pitts v. State Bd. of Examiners, 222 Md. 224, 227, 160 A.2d 200, 201
(1960); Adams v. St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 555, 26 A.2d 377, 380 (1942). One who
assails a statute has the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity. Supermarkets
Gen. Corp. v. State, 286 Md. 611, 616, 409 A.2d 250, 253 (1979), appeal dismised, 449 U.S.
801 (1980); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. at 603, 380 A.2d at 1058, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997
(1978); In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 373, 325 A.2d 398, 403 (1974); Pitts v. State Bd. of Exam-
iners, 222 Md. at 227, 160 A.2d at 201.
162. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 310-11, 385 A.2d 57, 78 (1978); see also
Detroit Automotive Purchasing Servs. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 969-70 (1978) (distinction
between Maryland's "real and substantial relationship" test and the federal "rational basis"
test "may not be entirely meaningful").
163. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (dic-
tum); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (dictum); Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386,
401-02 (Alaska 1970) (extending right to jury trial for more types of offenses); Serrano v.
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land's constitution contains no special provision concerning the right to
work. The court suggested that Maryland case law has been especially
solicitous of the right to work,164 yet the court cited only five cases from
the last half-century, all of which applied a rational basis standard, not
intermediate scrutiny.165 It is difficult to see how the solicitous dicta of
prior Court of Appeals decisions can create a right "vital to the history
and traditions" of Marylanders or justify invalidating rational legisla-
tive value choices. Furthermore, statutes affecting the right to work
involve issues of great complexity; they rest on a balancing of diverse
values and legislatures can appropriately perform this balancing.
There are no judicially manageable standards for balancing these val-
ues.1 66 Thus, rational basis scrutiny is the appropriate standard for re-
viewing statutes affecting the right to work.
Finally, Waldron's brand of intermediate scrutiny raises significant
problems. Strong dicta suggest that the court adopted a sliding scale
for determining the standard of review. This requires the court to
fashion ad hoc standards of review commensurate with the importance
of the infringed liberty, thereby maximizing the potential judicial usur-
pation of legislative choices. The court's standard for defining rights
warranting some intermediate level of review is equally vague: "Arti-
cle 24 acts to vindicate important personal rights protected by the Ma-
ryland Constitution or those recognized as vital to the history and
traditions of the people of this State."' 6 But what standards will guide
the court in identifying these rights? How long must a tradition exist?
How many people must follow the tradition? What are the proper
Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 765-66, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976) (wealth
held a suspect class and education a fundamental right), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369-70, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974) (greater protection from
searches and seizures).
164. 289 Md. at 720-21, 426 A.2d at 949-50.
165. See Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216
(1973) (statute treating female cosmetologists different from barbers held invalid); Bruce v.
Director, Dep't of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971) (unreasonable
to forbid Maryland crabbers and oystermen to practice throughout state waters), construed
in Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 60-61, 300 A.2d
367, 384 (1973) ("[A]ppellants'. . . reliance upon our holdings in Bruce .. .is misplaced.
In Bruce, we held.. . that the statutes in question were invalid in that they represented 'an
unreasonable exercise of police power'.. . ; we nonetheless recognized that 'the constitu-
tional need for equal protection does not shackle the Legislature. It has the widest discretion
in classifying those who are regulated and taxed. Only if the group is without any reason-
able basis, and so entirely arbitrary, is it forbidden .. ' "); Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251,
183 A. 534 (1936) (unreasonable to restrict paperhanging licenses geographically when occu-
pation does not involve health or other valid exercise of police power).
166. See Gunther, supra note 122, at 24.
167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
168. 289 Md. at 715, 426 A.2d at 947.
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sources for determining traditions? Why does an historical practice not
found in the constitution justify the anti-democratic act of invalidating
the legislative will of the majority? Waldron does not provide answers
to these questions.'69
E. Implications of Waldron's Equal Protection Analysis
By construing article 24 to include an equal protection component
that will sometimes invoke an intermediate standard of review, Wal-
dron clearly invites litigants to pursue equal protection claims. 170 In a
footnote, the court even reminded parties to raise both state and federal
constitutional claims. 17 1 Future litigation will likely revolve around
which rights warrant heightened scrutiny under article 24.
The task of discerning those rights warranting special protection
under article 24 may well prove Herculean. The most likely candidates
are those grounded in the Maryland Constitution or Declaration of
Rights. 72 For instance, Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment quali-
fies gender for suspect class status. 173 Although a dictum in Waldron
suggests that the right to education is not fundamental, 74 it may be
eligible for intermediate scrutiny17 5 because article III, section 1 of the
Maryland Constitution provides for "a thorough and efficient system of
Free Public Schools."' 17
6
Another possibility is welfare rights. Article 43 of the Declaration
of Rights provides "[tihat the Legislature ought to encourage . . . the
169. For a further discussion of the problems surrounding a traditional values test, see J.
ELY, supra note 123, at 75-78.
170. See J. ELY, supra note 123, at 32 (a litigant can frame nearly any suit as a federal
equal protection action). The court's reminder that article 24 and the fourteenth amend-
ment rarely vary, see 289 Md. at 704-05, 714, 426 A.2d at 941, 946, will control some of the
potential litigation because parties are more likely to litigate when their rights are uncertain.
171. 289 Md. at 714 n.20, 426 A.2d at 946 n.20.
172. See supra note 113. Rights grounded in the Declaration of Rights are probably more
supportable than the provisions in the Maryland Constitution, since the constitutionper se
only creates a government. See Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 628 (1865).
173. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. 46.
174. 289 Md. at 724, 426 A.2d at 951.
175. See Somerset County Bd. of Educ. v. Hornbeck, No. 119A (Md. Baltimore City Cir.
Ct. May 19, 1981) (wealth held sensitive or suspect, education held fundamental or impor-
tant), cert. granted, No. 93 (Md. Oct. 14, 1981). But see 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 338, 347
(1977) ("An examination of the history underlying [the 'education clause'] reveals that the
framers of the 1867 Constitution were concerned with ensuring local control over the educa-
tional process and envisioned a system in which the quality of educational opportunity
might vary according to the wishes of residents of different localities.").
176. MD. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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general melioration of the condition of the People.""' This may be
read more as an exhortation to the legislature, however, than a
command.
Problems are likely to arise with regard to article 45 (Maryland's
"little ninth amendment") of the Declaration of Rights, which states:
"This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the People." Although the framers deemed it a
"mere assertion that there were rights not enumerated in the declara-
tion of rights . . . that . . . were retained by the people,"'"" article 45-
may well keep any imaginative claimant in court. Thus far, Maryland
courts have not questioned whether article 45 is a source of substantive
rights.'79 Article 45, however, might justify a heightened scrutiny for
statutes affecting a "right" of privacy. 8 °
If article 45 does not prove to be a Pandora's box, Waldron will.
Waldron based the right to follow one's chosen profession on past
Court of Appeals dicta, not on the constitution or earlier substantive
law. The only limits suggested by Waidron are expressed in a single
sentence: "Article 24 acts to vindicate important personal rights pro-
tected by the Maryland Constitution or those recognized as vital to the
history and traditions of the people of this state.''
CONCLUSION
With the resurgence of federalism, the Court of Appeals is under-
standably concerned with establishing its identity. Unfortunately, the
Waldron decision was a poor mechanism for achieving this goal. One
can sympathize with a state court that champions its state constitution,
but not with a state court that exceeds its constitutional powers and
thereby frustrates representative government.
177. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. 43; see, e.g., Rees, State Constitutional Lawfor Ma-
ryland Lawyers." Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 299, 323 & n.186 (1978).
178. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION 225 (An-
napolis 1851) (paraphrasing Mr. Joseph M. Parke).
179. See, e.g., Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981) (suggesting in dictum
that a court can imply protected rights in the Maryland Constitution); Montgomery County
v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975) (although the trial court relied inter alia on article
45 to strike down an ordinance, the Court of Appeals relied on other constitutional provi-
sions to overturn the statute). Recent scholarship suggests that despite a history of neglect,
the ninth amendment can be a source of substantive rights. See J. ELY, supra note 123, at
34-41.
180. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), the Court based the right to privacy on the
fourteenth amendment, although the district court relied on the ninth amendment.
181. 289 Md. at 715, 426 A.2d at 947 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has aban-
doned the practice of looking beyond the Constitution for important or fundamental rights.
See supra note 113.
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The dual holding was both unnecessary and dangerous. A mis-
taken constitutional holding cannot be corrected unless the constitution
is amended or the court later overrules itself. In contrast, when a court
invalidates a statute or changes the common law, the legislature can
correct these errors in the ordinary course of business. Because consti-
tutional error is more difficult to correct, courts should restrict them-
selves to one constitutional ground for any decision.
The court is under a duty to make no more law than the case re-
quires. The separation of powers holding is arguably narrower be-
cause: (1) it rests on an express clause in the Maryland Constitution;
and (2) it is confined to a closely circumscribed area - regulation of
the bar. By relying only on the narrower holding, the court would have
minimized the impact of any constitutional error.182
182. See, e.g., W. REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 148, 157-63.
XEROX CORP. V COMPTROLLER--STATE INCOME
TAXATION OF MUL TISTA TE CORPORA TIONS
In Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller,I the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that Maryland had properly taxed Xerox's royalty income and its
interest income from loans to subsidiaries,2 even though the agreements
providing for the payments were entered into and administered outside
of Maryland.3 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
two recent Supreme Court cases - Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes4 and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue.5 Like
Xerox, both Mobil and Exxon involved challenges to state taxation of
income arguably earned outside of the taxing state.
Xerox Corporation is incorporated in and has its principal place of
business in New York.6 During the years in question, its activities in
Maryland were confined to selling and renting xerographic equipment
and providing maintenance services. From its offices in New York and
Connecticut, Xerox licensed the use of some of its patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and business know-how to non-American subsidiaries and
to nonaffiliated corporations in return for royalties. The Connecticut
headquarters and Xerox's non-American subsidiaries also entered into
interest bearing loan agreements whereby Xerox loaned the subsidiar-
ies money when they were otherwise unable to secure loans.7 Xerox
administered the royalty and loan agreements from its New York and
Connecticut offices.'
Xerox excluded the royalty and interest income from its Maryland
income tax base,9 but the Comptroller of the Treasury disallowed the
exclusion, assessing $102,559 additional tax for the years 1972, 1973 and
1. 290 Md. 126, 428 A.2d 1208 (1981).
2. Id. at 13L 428 A.2d at 1212.
3. Id. at 148, 428 A.2d at 1220.
4. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
5. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
6. 290 Md. at 130, 428 A.2d at 1211. The parties stipulated the facts and the Court of
Appeals ordered the record sealed on October 24, 1980. All facts relating to Xerox's activi-
ties come only from the court's opinion. Brief of Appellee at 7.
7. 290 Md. at 132, 428 A.2d at 1212. There was no allegation that these loans were not
legitimate, arm's-length transactions.
8. Id. at 131-32, 428 A.2d at 1212.
9. Id. at 131, 428 A.2d at 12li. Xerox filed Maryland Corporation Income Tax Return
(Form 500). MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288(b), (c) (1980) imposes an annual income tax on
the net income of every corporation having income allocable to Maryland. Art. 81, § 295
requires that a return be filed. Art. 81, § 280A(a) provides that Maryland taxable income is
based on federal taxable income, modified by certain additions and subtractions set forth in
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1974.11 Xerox unsuccessfully appealed the assessment to both the Ma-
ryland Tax Court" and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After
Xerox had appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari before hearing by the intermediate appellate
court.
Xerox argued, among other things,' 2 that in taxing the royalty and
interest income Maryland violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment 3 because the income was not related to Xerox's
copier operations in Maryland. 14  This argument was premised on
Xerox's claim that the royalty and interest income did not stem from
Xerox's interstate activity as a unitary business.
In taxing corporate income, Maryland, like most states,"' distin-
guishes between unitary and non-unitary businesses.' 6 A "unitary
business" is one business conducted by the same corporation in several
states.17 Problems arise in determining exactly what constitutes a uni-
§ 280A(b) and (c). Art. 81, § 316 determines the allocation of net income between Maryland
and other states in which a corporation carries on business.
10. 290 Md. at 132, 428 A.2d at 1212.
11. Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, [2 Md.] ST. TAX. REP. (CCH) 200-897 (T.C. Oct. 15,
1979).
12. This Recent Decision will deal only with Xerox's challenge regarding the nexus be-
tween a state and a corporation required by due process. In addition, Xerox argued that
former MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A(c)(4) (repealed 1976), allowed subtraction of the
interest income; that art. 81, § 316(c) intended there be a stronger nexus between Maryland
and a corporation than the nexus required by federal due process; that the Maryland appor-
tionment formula was "grossly inappropriate"; and that the Comptroller had abused his
discretion in failing to make additional modifications to the apportionment formula as per-
mitted by MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980). See 290 Md. at 134-35, 428 A.2d at 1213.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added) states in part: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A
corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
14. 290 Md. at 134, 142-46, 428 A.2d at 1213, 1217-19.
15. See P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 523
(1981).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980). For an excellent detailed history of state
income taxation, see J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1978); Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multiurisdic-
tional Corporations. Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113
(1980); see also L. HALE & R. KRAMER, STATE TAX LIABILITY AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL
(1981) for a practical discussion of the mechanics of state income taxation.
17. Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 42, 46 (1960). The unitary business principle was first developed to value interstate
railroad systems for purposes of assessing ad valorem property taxes. The theory was that
"a railroad must be regarded for many, indeed for most purposes, as a unit. The track of the
road is but one track . . . and, except in its use as one track, is of little value. . . .It may
well be doubted whether any better mode of determining the value of that portion of the
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tary business, however, because there is no one generally accepted defi-
nition of the term.' 8 There are, instead, two generally accepted tests for
identifying unitary businesses.' 9
The first, called the "three unities test," classifies an interstate busi-
ness as unitary if it reflects "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of opera-
tion as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and
management divisions; and (3) unity of use in its centralized executive
force and general system of operation."20 According to the second test,
"[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is
dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without
the state, the operations are unitary."21
Most states have developed special formulas for taxing unitary
businesses operating within their borders.22 These formulas reflect the
realization that theprofits a unitary business earns in a particular state
track within any one county has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole road,
and apportion the value within the county by its relative length to the whole." State R.R.
Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 608 (1876).
For a discussion of the development of the unitary concept in the area of ad valorem
property taxes, see Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate- Mul-
tinational Businesses, 10 URB. L. 181, 184-92 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318-19 (1978); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN
supra note 16, at 520. The property tax concept was adopted to justify apportionment of
income taxes.
18. See Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 148-51; see also Peters, Sup. Ct. "s Mobil Decision on
Multistate Income Apportionment Raises New Questions, 53 J. TAX'N 36, 38 (1980) ("These
conflicting and overlapping definitions of a unitary business have led the person most re-
sponsible for developing the concept to cast doubt on its meaningfulness as a means of
limiting the applicability of an apportionment formula.") (citing Keesling, A Current Look at
the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42 3. TAX'N 106, 109 (1975)).
19. Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 149. For a discussion of additional tests, see Dexter,
supra note 17, at 192-98.
20. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941), a 'd., 315 U.S.
501 (1942).
21. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 176 P.2d 697, 702 (Cal.), afd on rehearing, 30
Cal. 2d 472, 481,183 P.2d 16, 21 (1947). Although the "contributes to or depends upon" test of
Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan is often applied to determine whether one corporation
is unitary, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md. at 139, 428 A.2d at 1216, the Edison
Stores case involved parent and subsidiary corporations. 30 Cal. 2d at 474, 183 P.2d at 18.
For a discussion of the "depends upon or contributes to" test, see G. ALTMAN & F.
KEESLtING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 101 (2d ed. 1950). But see Keesling
& Warren, supra note 17, at 48 ("If the activities within a given state are only dependent
upon the activities out of the state, and do not contribute to the earning of income, they
should not be credited with any portion of the income derived from productive activities
outside the state."). For an application of the test, see Chase Brass & Copper Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1970) (California Court of Appeal
discussed specific aspects of a business showing the existence of a unitary business.), afld on
rehearing, 70 Cal. App. 3d 457, 138 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1977).
22. Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 117-18; see J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 16, at 399.
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may not reflect fairly the income arising from its in-state activities. For
example, if a corporation manufactures goods in state A but sells all of
its goods in state B, state A would receive no income tax if the measure
of income were the profits earned in the state, even though state A pro-
vides all of the services connected with manufacturing.23 Similarly, if a
corporation has its headquarters and factory in state A, warehouses the
finished product in state B and sells the goods in states A, B, C and D,
it is difficult to determine where the sales take place - in state A where
the orders are accepted, state B from which the orders are shipped, or
states A, B, C and D where the goods are delivered?24
The impossibility of otherwise determining the fair share of in-
come allocable to each state prompted states to apportion income from
a unitary business by formula.2 5 The theory behind this allocation is
that certain factors, such as property, payroll, and sales, accurately re-
flect the portion of income allocable to each state.26 Although the
formula applies to all of the corporation's income, formulary appor-
tionment does not seek to tax income earned outside the state. Rather,
the formula is designed to utilize in-state and out-of-state factors to
measure the income earned in the taxing state.2 7
The Maryland apportionment formula is typical.2" It is based on
three factors, each given equal weight29 and requires a corporation to
calculate the ratios of property, payroll and sales values within Mary-
land to those of the corporation as a whole. These three ratios are aver-
23. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that state taxation imposed such a burden on
interstate commerce that it should be free from taxation. Northwestern States Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321 (1918). The Court recognized that state taxes represented payment for the serv-
ices provided by the states, Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940), and were
necessary to make interstate "'commercg bear a fair share of the cost of the local govern-
ment whose protection it enjoys,'" National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)). See also
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 0977), which overruled Spector Motor
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), thereby eliminating Spector Motor's distinction be-
tween taxes imposed on the privilege of doing business and those imposed on income.
24. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 398.
25. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920) first approved
the use of an apportionment formula by a state in taxing corporate income. Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282 (1924) first endorsed use of an appor-
tionment formula in taxing a unitary business.
26. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 399.
27. A state may not give its tax laws extraterritorial effect. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 695-96. But "income which cannot be taxed directly may be
used as a tax measure." Id. at 525.
28. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 321; General Motors
Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 559 n.9 0965).
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980).
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aged to yield the "Maryland Apportionment Factor,"30 which is then
multiplied by the total income of the corporation (the "income base")
to produce the amount of income allocable to Maryland.31 To illus-
trate: suppose a corporation with an income base of $250,000 has prop-
erty with a value of $3x located in Maryland, total property everywhere
(including the property in Maryland) of $6x, payroll in Maryland of
$3x, total payroll for all operations of $4x, sales in Maryland of $lx,
and total sales of $10x. The property factor would be $3x/$6x, or 0.5;
the payroll factor, $3x/$4x, or 0.75; and the sales factor, $lx/$10x, or 0.1.
The average factor (0.5 + 0.75 + 0.10 = 1.35, divided by three) would
be 0.45. Income allocable to Maryland would be $112,500 (0.45 multi-
plied by $250,000 income base).
The Supreme Court has held that taxation by apportionment is
consistent with due process if (1) there is "a rational relationship be-
tween the income attributed to the State and the interstate values of the
enterprise," and (2) there is "a 'minimal connection' between the inter-
state activities and the taxing State."32 Thus the amount of income
taxed cannot be arbitrary33 and there must be a "nexus" to give the
state jurisdiction to tax the corporation.34
To prove that a state has not fulfilled the "rational relationship"
requirement, a taxpayer must show "'by clear and cogent evidence'[351
that the income attributed to the State is in fact 'out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted. . . in that State.' ",36 The Court
does not demand mathematical precision,37 allowing states considera-
ble latitude in selecting their apportionment formulas.38
30. The term "Maryland Apportionment Factor" can be found in COMPTROLLER OF
THE TREASURY, FORM 500 MARYLAND CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 2 (1980).
31. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § .04.01.03 (1977).
32. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 0980) (quoting
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)); see Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980). See also P. HARTMAN, supra note 15, at 1-379, for a
discussion of other constitutional challenges to apportionment formulas.
33. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920); see J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 322.
34. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967);
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 0954) (there must be "some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax").
35. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936).
36. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978) (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)). An apportionment formula is
presumed valid because of the impossibility of otherwise determining the amount of income
attributable to the state. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121(1920).
37. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979).
38. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978)(upholding a one-factor formula
based only on sales made within the state). An income tax apportionment formula has been
1982] 439
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The nature of the nexus required to satisfy the second prong of the
due process test is not entirely clear. The Supreme Court frequently
has said the nexus is satisfied "if the corporation avails itself of the
'substantial privilege of carrying on business' within the State."' 39
However, two recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the unitary
business principle supplies the requisite nexus between the state and
the corporation's interstate income, even when the corporation con-
ducts some facet of its business entirely outside the taxing state.40
The Supreme Court examined the nexus required by due process
in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue.4 Exxon divided
its operations into functional departments and separately determined
the profits of each.42 The corporation conducted only marketing in
Wisconsin, not exploration and production, refining, or any activities of
the other functional departments. 3 Exxon conceded that the requisite
nexus obtained between Wisconsin and the income from the corpora-
tion's marketing activities. It argued, however, that such nexus was in-
successfully challenged only once as attributing to the state a disproportionate amount of
income. In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), the
taxpayer proved an average of 17% of its income was attributable to the state, while 66% to
85% was attributed by the formula. Id. at 127-28. See also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri
State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326-27 (1968), in which a property tax formula was found
to have produced a disproportionate amount of tax.
39. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980) (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)). Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444-45, stated:
The sole constitutional test. . . is whether the state has given anything for which it can
ask return. The substantial privilege of carrying on business . . . here . . . given,
clearly supports the tax, and the state has not given the less merely because it has condi-
tioned the demand of the exaction upon happenings outside its own borders. The fact
that a tax is contingent upon events brought to pass without a state does not destroy the
nexus between such a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is an
exaction.
Although what constitutes "carrying on business" is determined under state law, 15
U.S.C. § 381 (1976) limits state taxation when the only activities within the state are "solicita-
tion of orders. . . sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled
by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State." For a discussion of 15 U.S.C. § 381,
see P. HARTMAN, supra note 15, at 479-86; Hartman, "'Solicitation" and "Delivery" Under
Public Law 86-272: An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1976).
40. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 225 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439-40 (1980); see Hellerstein, supra note 16,
at 121-22; see also 66 CORNELL L. REV. 805, 808 (1981) ("The unitary business concept en-
ables states to establish the requisite minimum connection to a multistate integrated corpo-
ration, and hence to subject both its in-state and out-of-state income to taxation.").
41. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
42. Id. at 211-12.
43. Id. at 212-13. Exxon Corp. was incorporated in Delaware and its general offices were
located in Texas. Id. at 210-11.
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sufficient to subject all of its operating income to apportionment."
Exxon sought to use its separate accounting records (showing profits for
each functional department) to establish that part of the income attrib-
uted to Wisconsin by formula was not in fact attributable to the state.45
The Supreme Court rejected Exxon's argument, noting that "a com-
pany's internal accounting techniques are not binding on a State for tax
purposes. ' 46 The Court pointed out that separate accounting failed
"'to account for contributions to income resulting. . . from the opera-
tion of the business as a whole, [so that] it becomes misleading to char-
acterize the income. . as having a single identifiable "source."' "947
To exclude income from the apportionment formula, the Court
held, a corporation must prove the income was derived from an "'un-
related business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business enter-
prise.' "48 In other words, the court must find that the disputed
activities and the business conducted in the state are not unitary. If, on
the other hand, a corporation is a unitary business, the taxing state ap-
parently may apportion the entire income. Exxon thus suggests that
the unitary business principle provides the nexus to those activities not
conducted in the state.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, the Supreme Court
held that Vermont could apply its apportionment formula to dividends
paid by subsidiaries and affiliates that formed "part of Mobil's inte-
grated petroleum enterprise. 49 Mobil Oil Corp. engaged in a world-
wide petroleum business, handling its overseas business through
subsidiaries.50 Mobil conducted only retail sales activities in Vermont"'
44. Id. at 220. All of the disputed income in Exxon was operating income. During the
years in question, Wisconsin did not include dividends in the tax base of a nondomiciliary
corporation. Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 141 (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 71.07(l)-.07(2) (West
1969 & Supp. 1980)).
45. 447 U.S. at 220. Separate accounting means the company determines its gross profits
by (1) computing the actual cost of, e.g., manufacturing, and then adding a "reasonable"
profit (based on comparisons with other corporations, or simply on estimates), or (2) using
prices at which the manufactured goods could be purchased from other corporations. Ac-
tual in-state costs and a percentage of general out-of-state costs are then subtracted from
gross profits. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 433-34. For a
criticism of separate accounting, see Helerstein, The Unitary Business Princile and Mul-
ticorporate Enterprises: An Examination of the Major Controversies, 27 TAx EXECUTIVE 313,
315-17 (1975).
46. 447 U.S. at 221.
47. Id. at 222 (citation omitted) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. at 438); see Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942)("centralized
purchasing results in more favorable prices being obtained than if the purchases were sepa-
rately made for the account of any one branch.").
48. 447 U.S. at 222.
49. 445 U.S. at 435, 439.
50. Id. at 428.
51. Id. Mobil is incorporated in, and has its commercial domicile in, New York. Id. at
427.
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and excluded from its Vermont tax return dividends paid to the parent
corporation by the non-American subsidiaries,52 arguing in part that
the dividends should be allocated to the state of its commercial domi-
cile because the dividends lacked sufficient nexus to Mobil's business
activities in Vermont. 3
The Court first considered whether the income's foreign source
precluded Vermont from including the income in the apportionment
formula. It observed that assigning income to a "source" in the case of
a unitary business was "misleading" because it failed to take into ac-
count "contributions to income resulting from functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale."54 Noting that
the "linchpin of apportionability in the field of state taxation is the uni-
tary business principle,"" the Court reasoned that because Mobil had
not proven that the income was derived from a discrete business enter-
prise, the "income's foreign source did not destroy the requisite nexus
with in-state activities."56
The Court then questioned whether the form of Mobil's dividend
income precluded Vermont from taxing it. Mobil had included all of
what it considered to be its operating income in the Vermont tax base. 7
Operating income is defined as income from the trade or business con-
ducted by the corporation. Mobil excluded dividends received from
its non-American subsidiaries, contending they represented nonbusiness
income,5 9 or income derived from property not used in connection with
the trade or business.6 0 Typical examples of nonbusiness income in-
clude rental income, dividends, interest, and gains and losses on sale of
52. Id. at 430.
53. Id. at 436; see Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 118. Mobil's state of commercial domi-
cile, New York, imposed no tax on the dividends. 445 U.S. at 444. New York taxes divi-
dends only to the extent the payor corporation conducts business in the state. Peters, supra
note 18, at 38.
54. 445 U.S. at 438. The Court cited Bass, Ratciff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'r,
266 U.S. 271, 282 (1924) as foreclosing any argument that the non-American source of the
income was sufficient to exclude the income from the apportionment formula. 445 U.S. at
438-39.
55. 445 U.S. at 439.
56. Id. at 439-40.
57. Id. at 437.
58. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 490. "Operating income" and
"business income" are synonomous and used interchangeably.
59. 445 U.S. at 436, 437; see Keesling, The Impact of the Mobil Case on Apportionment of
Income, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 87, 90.
60. Keesling, supra note 59, at 91.
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capital assets.6' Traditionally, operating income has been apportioned
among the states in which the corporation conducts its business, while
nonbusiness income has been allocated to the state of commercial
domicile.62
The Supreme Court suggested that there is some continuing vital-
ity to this distinction between operating and nonbusiness income by
saying Mobil could not exclude the dividends unless it could "demon-
strate something about the nature of this income that distinguishes it
from operating income. ' 63 Although the dividends represented income
from stock arguably not used by Mobil in its petroleum operations, the
Court saw no reason to treat the dividends differently from operating
income in this case. It said,
[slo long as dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates reflect profits
derived from a functionally integrated enterprise, those dividends
are income to the parent earned in a unitary business. One mustlook principally at the underlying activity, not at the form of invest-
61. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 490-91.
62. The distinction between operating (or business) income and nonbusiness income
stems from early twentieth century notions of jurisdiction based on situs within the state.
Each state was deemed to have the power "to tax income from property located and business
done within their borders." J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 490. Op-
erating income (or business income) was earned by the business carried on in the state and
was therefore apportionable among the states in which the unitary business was conducted.
Nonbusiness income, on the other hand, was derived from property not used in the business,
and could only be taxed by the state having jurisdiction over the property. Nonbusiness
income from real or tangible personal property was allocated to the state in which the prop-
erty was physically located. Intangible assets were deemed to have their situs at the domicile
of the owner (the business headquarters, or "commercial domicile") and the income from
the intangible assets followed the situs of the assets pursuant to the maxim, "mobilia se-
quuntur personam" (movables follow the person). Hence nonbusiness income was allocated
to the state of commercial domicile. Id. at 490-92; see Appellant's Brief at 29, Mobil; Kees-
ling, supra note 59, at 88-89; L. HALE & P. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 31-33; see also Dexter,
Taxation of Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corporations, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 401, 421 (1976) (concluding that income from intangibles should be apportioned).
The UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT (UDITPA), 7A U.L.A. 93
(1978), reprinted in [I All States Unit] ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1017-19 (1980), codifies the
distinction between business (operating) and nonbusiness income. See L. HALE & P.
KRAMER, supra note 16, at 106-41. Text of Multistate Tax Compact is reproduced in [1 All
States Unit] ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 351 (1980); text of Multistate Tax Commission Appor-
tionment Regulations, at 352. Maryland has not adopted UDITPA. See [I All States
Unit] ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1019 (1980) for a list of states that have adopted UDITPA.
63. 445 U.S. at 437. Mobil argued its "foreign source dividends" were nonbusiness in-
come since dividends were typically thought to be nonbusiness income. Keesling notes: "In
determining whether income. . . should be specially allocated as nonbusiness income, the
usual criterion has been whether the property producing the income is used in the conduct of
a business . . . . The Court did not follow this approach in Mobil. Instead, it inquired
whether the income from which the foreign dividends were paid constituted unitary business
income." Keesling, supra note 59, at 91.
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ment, to determine the propriety of apportionability. 6
Apparently the Court viewed the subsidiaries' activities as the
source of the income, for it observed that "these foreign activities [of
Mobil's affiliates and subsidiaries] are part of appellant's integrated pe-
troleum enterprise."65 It might have viewed Mobil's ownership and
management of the subsidiaries as the source of the dividend income.
Mobil argued that the income stemmed from holding company activ-
ity66 and that, as such, it should not be subject to apportionment be-
cause the holding company was not part of the unitary business
operating in Vermont. The Court, however, did not pay much attention
to this argument, saying simply, "[n]or do we find particularly persua-
sive Mobil's attempt to identify a separate business in its holding com-
pany function."67 Without deciding the question, the Court noted that
"[wihere the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to
do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State, due process
considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there
would be no underlying unitary business."68 The Court then con-
cluded that Mobil had failed "to sustain its burden of proving any un-
related business activity on the part of its subsidiaries and affiliates that
would raise the question of nonapportionability."69
Aobil's treatment of the due process issue implies that a parent
corporation and its subsidiaries must be unitary for a state to include
income received from a subsidiary in the parent corporation's appor-
tionable income. Several commentators7 ° and the New Mexico
64. 445 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 439.
66. A holding company is "a company that confines its activities to owning stock in, and
supervising management of, other companies. A holding company usually owns a control-
ling interest in... the companies whose stock it holds." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865
(5th ed. 1979).
67. 445 U.S. at 440.
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id.
70. See Keesling, supra note 59, at 91 ("The Court ... concluded that the dividends
... were declared from worldwide unitary business income."); Peters, supra note 18, at 37
("The Court found that many of the subsidiaries and affiliates ... were engaged in business
enterprises that formed part of Mobil's integrated petroleum business. Apparently, this was
sufficient to establish a unitary business relationship, or, at least, to find that Mobil had not
sustained its burden of [proofl .... "); Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 125 ("As the Court
approached the case, then, Vermont's power to include Mobil's foreign source dividends in
the company's apportionable tax base turned on the question whether such dividends consti-
tuted income from a worldwide unitary business .. "); Rudy, The California Unitary Tax
Concept as Applied to the Worldwide Actiwities of Foreign Corporations. A Modem Com-
merce Clause Analysis, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 37L 390 (1981) ("The Court regarded the entire
business of the taxpayer as an integrated unit .. "); 66 CORNELL L. REv., 805, 805 (1981)
("Mobil ... minimizes the importance of corporate form.").
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Supreme Court7" have so interpreted Mobil. However, other commen-
tators72 and the Idaho Supreme Court7 3 have viewed Mobil's language
regarding the relationship of the parent and subsidiaries as dicta. In
their estimation, the Court's holding was based upon a determination
that Mobil (i.e. the parent corporation) was unitary. The dispute as to
the meaning of Mobil is central to the question whether the Maryland
Court of Appeals properly decided Xerox .7 4
THE XEROX CASE
Relying on Exxon and Mobil, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected Xerox's claim that Maryland lacked sufficient nexus to its roy-
alty and interest income.7" The court determined that Xerox's Ameri-
can operations were unitary, but did not examine the relationship
between the parent and subsidiary corporations. The court saw no need
to conduct such an examination because it interpreted Mobil's holding
as applicable only to "certain kinds of investment income, such as divi-
dend income."76 Because Xerox did not involve dividend income, the
court concluded that, as in Exxon, "[t]he appropriate due process in-
quiry here centers around the relationship between the activities that
produced the royalty and interest income and Xerox's business activi-
ties in Maryland rather than on the relationship between Xerox and the
71. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 95 N.M. 519, 531, 624 P.2d 28,
37 (1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 86 (1981).
72. Dexter, Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitary Business: An Examination of
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 116 ("Al-
though some of the language in Mobil clouds the resolution of these questions ... Mobil
does not support the proposition that the apportionability of dividend income depends upon
the income being received from payor corporations conducting businesses related to the
payee corporation."); Corrigan, Mobil-izing Interstate Taxation, TAX NOTES, Oct. 12, 1981, at
803, 805 n.6 ("The Court found it easy to consider the dividends in Mobil to be apportiona-
ble business income because they were received by Mobil from other corporations with
which it was engaged in a unitary business. But Mobil provides no basis for thinking that
dividends received by Mobil would not have been considered to be apportionable business
income even if they had been received from corporations with which Mobil was not engaged
in a unitary business.").
N. BORDEN, R. ROMBRO, C. SHELTON, MARYLAND TAXES (Md. Inst. for Continuing
Professional Educ. of Lawyers, Inc. 1981) seems to support this interpretation of Mobil. Id.
at 4-13 ("The Court in Xerox [Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md. 126, 428 A.2d 1208 (1981)]
relied upon ... Mobil ... where, in the absence of proof of a discrete business enterprise,
unrelated to the unitary business of the parent corporation, foreign source dividend income
of the parent was held subject to Vermont apportionment.").
73. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 102 Idaho 38, 38,
624 P.2d 946, 946 (1981), cert. granted sub nom. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r,
102 S. Ct. 87 (1981), diacussedsupra at notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
75. 290 Md. at 145, 428 A.2d at 1219.
76. Id. at 143, 428 A.2d at 1218.
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payor corporations."77
In finding that the activities conducted in Maryland were part of
the unitary business conducted by Xerox in America, the Court of Ap-
peals looked first to the "three unities test."78 The court noted that the
copier operations and the activities producing the royalty and interest
income were not the activities of separate corporate entities, but the
activities of one corporation. It pointed out that the royalty and interest
producing activities were not even conducted by a separate corporate
division. Hence there was unity of ownership and operation. In addi-
tion, the court found that Xerox had failed to show there was no unity
of use: it dismissed Xerox's arguments that the copier operations gen-
erated income in excess of its business needs so that income from the
royalties and loans was not used to meet operational needs, and that
there was no economic interdependence between the copier operations
and the activities resulting in the licenses and loan agreements.7 9
Turning to the "contributes to or depends upon test,"80 the court
reasoned that some of the know-how licensed to the subsidiaries must
have been used in Xerox's domestic copier operations and that Xerox's
domestic operations were enhanced by treating the intangibles giving
rise to the royalties as assets on balance sheets. 8' The court also ob-
served that at least a portion of the money used both to develop the
intangibles and to provide the principal loaned to the subsidiaries must
have come from the copier business.82 Finally, the court pointed out
that Xerox made the loans to its subsidiaries when they were otherwise
unable to secure financing, and this arrangement benefited Xerox be-
cause the "continued vitality" of the non-American subsidiaries was of
obvious importance to Xerox.83 The Court of Appeals then concluded
that Maryland properly had included Xerox's royalty and interest in-
come in the apportionment formula because Xerox had failed to
77. Id. at 144, 428 A.2d at 1218.
78. Id. at 140, 428 A.2d at 1216, discussed supra at note 20 and accompanying text. The
term "unitary business" as used in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980) is not defined in
either the statute or the regulations.
79. 290 Md. at 140, 428 A.2d at 1216.
80. Id. at 140-41, 428 A.2d at 1216-17, discussedsupra at note 19 and accompanying text.
81. 290 Md. at 140-41, 428 A.2d at 1216; accord Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 276 Minn. 479, 151 N.W.2d 294 (1967); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v.
Commissioner of Taxation, 272 Minn. 403, 410, 138 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1965) (credit standing of
company improved by showing investments as assets), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 718 (1966).
82. 290 Md. at 141, 428 A.2d at 1216; see also Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266
Ark. 207, 216, 585 S.W.2d 18, 25 (1979)("The funds for loans ... come from Ward's working
capital cash.").
83. 290 Md. at 141, 428 A.2d at 1217. See Giant Food, Inc. v. Comptroller, [2 Md.) ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 200-604 (T.C. July 2, 1970).
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"prove that the income was derived from unrelated business activity
that constituted a discrete business enterprise. '8
4
The Court of Appeals interpreted Mobil as based on the "finding
that the foreign payor corporations and Mobil were part of a unitary
business."85 However, the court read Mobil as requiring an examina-
tion of the relationship between a parent corporation and subsidiary
only in cases involving "certain kinds of investment income such as
dividend income."86 Xerox's royalty and interest income were not con-
sidered by the court to be this kind of investment income, so the court
did not examine the underlying relationship between Xerox and its
non-American subsidiaries.87 The court should have questioned more
carefully whether there was any reason to distinguish Xerox's interest
income from Mobil's dividend income.88
The dividends in Mobil superficially appeared to be nonbusiness
income, as they represented income from stock not used in the petro-
leum business. Similarly, Xerox's interest appeared to represent in-
come from loans not used in its copier business (whereas the royalties
were income from know-how used in the copier business).89 To deter-
84. 290 Md. at 145, 428 A.2d at 1219. The Court of Appeals could have cited Comptroller
v. Diebold, Inc., 279 Md. 401, 369 A.2d 77 (1977), aft'g, Diebold, Inc. v. Comptroller, [2 Md.]
ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 200-750 (T.C. Apr. 24, 1975), as an example of a "discrete business
enterprise." Diebold, which manufactured and sold bank and office equipment, acquired
Young and Selden, an existing company that printed checks and business forms. The Tax
Court held that the two did not form a unitary business because Young and Selden contin-
ued to maintain separate accounting, sales and management functions, and the two compa-
nies manufactured and sold different products. Diebold, 200-750, at 10,738. The Tax
Court viewed Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, W P.2d 334 (1941), aft'd, 315 U.S. 501
(1942), as requiring such a degree of interdependence that the individual stores "could not
function" without their regional warehouses and central management. Diebold, 200-750 at
10,738. Diebold did not have "the unity of use, management, ownership and purchasing
which characterizes a unitary business." Id. The unusual facts in Diebold probably explain
the Xerox court's failure to examine Diebold. Young and Selden was purchased as an ex-
isting business, continued as a separate business, and sold as an existing business four years
later. Id. at 10,737-38.
85. 290 Md. at 143, 428 A.2d at 1218.
86. Id. The Supreme Court's opinion reveals no reason for such a limitation. See Dex-
ter, supra note 72, at 119.
87. 290 Md. at 144, 428 A.2d at 1218.
88. Keesling, supra note 59, at 97 ("the Mobil holding... should also be applicable to
...interest on loans to subsidiaries"). But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 430 n.6 (1980)("Appellant . .. no longer presses its claim that interest ...
should have been excluded from Vermont's preapportionment tax base.").
The Court of Appeals may have been persuaded by the Comptroller's argument that
"[a] dividend is not operational. It is a direct measure of profit of a subsidiary .... "
Xerox's interest and royalty income were fixed amounts, payable before the profits of the
subsidiaries were calculated. Brief of Appellee at 47-48.
89. See Keesling, supra note 59, at 91 n.12 ("Income from the sale of licensing of copy-
rights or patents developed and used in a business likewise constitutes apportionable busi-
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mine the apportionability of the dividend income, Mobil looked to see
if the parent corporation and its subsidiaries were parts of the same
unitary business.9" It would appear that the Court of Appeals should
similarly have examined the relationship between the parent and sub-
sidiary corporations involved in Xerox to determine the apportion-
ability of the interest income.
Even if Mobil means that the apportionability of income that su-
perficially appears to be nonbusiness income depends upon the rela-
tionship between the parent and subsidiary corporations, the question
remains whether the apportionability of such income should be tested
by a different standard than that applied to operating income. The dis-
tinction between the two types of income is illusive and is based on the
obsolete notion that jurisdiction to tax depends upon situs of the prop-
erty taxed in the state.9 Mobil itself suggests that, at least in certain
circumstances, nonbusiness income should be equated with income
from a non-unitary business function.92
William D. Dexter, general counsel for the Multistate Tax Com-
mission, has argued persuasively that Mobil does not require that the
payor and payee corporations be unitary.93 He pointed out that, al-
though the Supreme Court based its decision upon "the relationship
between Mobil's unitary operations and the businesses of its affiliated
corporations," '94 the Court specifically stated that it was not deciding
the issue of apportionability "[w]here the business activities of the divi-
dend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the
taxing State."95 Dexter saw "no reason to conclude Mobil would limit
the apportionability of dividends to only those cases .. .where the
payor corporations and payee corporation are engaged in related busi-
ness activities."96 Instead he argued that the determinative issue
should be whether the recipient corporation is a unitary business.97 The
cases relied on by the Mobil Court in setting forth its "general princi-
ness income because the copyrights and patents are an integral part of the business."). There
is no statutory basis for any distinction between operating and nonbusiness income in
Maryland.
90. 445 U.S. at 439, 442.
91. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 501 ("Then comes the obfus-
cating influence of situs - a notion which in its day served useful purposes in enabling the
courts to rationalize a constitutional basis for taxation. . . but which modem jurisprudence
is discarding.").
92. See 445 U.S. at 441.
93. Dexter, supra note 72, at 116.
94. Id.
95. 445 U.S. at 442.
96. Dexter, supra note 72, at 120.
97. Id. at 116 n.32, 118.
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pies" of state taxation of income earned in interstate business98 all
looked to the unitary nature of the recipient of the income. Although
all of these cases involved a single corporation, Dexter found "nothing
in Mobil that confficts with these holdings." 99 Thus
all income related to the conduct of a unitary trade or business,
irrespective of its nature or source, is subject to fair apportionment
among the states. Both the [Mobil] Court's conclusion that the
unitary concept is the linchpin of apportionability and the cases
the Court relied on specifically support this proposition. 1°°
If, contrary to Dexter's reasoning, Mobil does require a showing
that the parent and subsidiary are unitary, then the Supreme Court has
departed radically from the theory underlying apportionment, namely
that a taxpayer must be unitary. Unless a state has adopted combined
apportionment,' 0 ' only the parent is subject to state taxation, not the
subsidiary. Although dividends represent earnings of the subsidiaries,
they also represent a return on the parent's investment in stock of the
subsidiary.0 2 As such, they are income to the parent. Because divi-
dends are income to the parent, the unitary business doctrine should
give a state the right to tax dividends if the state has sufficient nexus to
the interstate activities of the unitary corporation. 0 3
98. 445 U.S. at 436-37.
99. Dexter, supra note 72, at 118-19.
100. Id. at 131.
101. If several affiliated corporations are part of a unitary business, combined apportion-
ment (combined reporting) treats them together to determine the tax liability of the corpora-
tion(s) conducting business in the state. The income base is the total net income of all of the
corporations, with inter-company transactions (such as dividends) eliminated. The prop-
erty, payroll and sales values of all of the affiliated corporations are included in the denomi-
nator of the factors. The numerator of the three-factor fractions is the value of property,
payroll and sales located in the taxing state. See Keesling, supra note 18, at 106 ("the pur-
pose of the combined report is to insure that the income of a business . . . shall be deter-
mined and apportioned in the same manner regardless of whether the business is conducted
by one corporation or by two or more affiliated corporations."); Corrigan, supra note 72, at
807-08 (illustration of computations of tax using combined reporting). See also L. HALE &
R. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 79-105; J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at
520-26.
If the state combines corporations operating beyond the continental United States,
the method is referred to as worldwide combination. See id at 538-41. Compare the Mary-
land apportionment formula, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 29-31, which taxes
only separate corporate entities. It is unlikely that Maryland courts could adopt combined
reporting because MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 295 (1980) requires affiliated corporations to file
separate returns.
102. In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 133 Vt. 132, 134-35, 335 A.2d 310, 311-12 (1975);
see American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 99 Idaho 924, 938, 592
P.2d 39, 53 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 939 (1980), reinstated, 102 Idaho 38, 624 P.2d 946 (1981),
cert. granted sub nom. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981).
103. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 99 Idaho 924, 938,
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In ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commissioner, the Idaho
Supreme Court recently adopted this reasoning, stating:
Those dividends are clearly part of ASARCO's income and it is
unquestioned that there is a sufficient connection between
ASARCOand this state to constitutionally permit the state to tax
its proper share of ASARCO's income . . . .The due process
clause. . .[is satisfied when] the acquisition, management or dis-
position of the underlying asset [i.e., Mobil's "holding company
function"] .. .is an integral or necessary part of the taxpayer's
unitary business, a part of which is conducted in this state."°
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in ASARCO and will soon
hear oral argument."°5 If the Court upholds the Idaho decision, it will
clarify its opinion in Mobil, negating any suggestion there that the par-
ent and subsidiary corporations must be unitary for a state to tax in-
come of the parent from the subsidiary. Such a decision would justify
Maryland's continuation of the practice ratified by the Court of Ap-
peals in Xerox - apportioning all income of a unitary business operat-
ing within the state.
592 P.2d 39, 53 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 939 (1980), reinstated, 102 Idaho 38, 624 P.2d 946
(1981), cert. granted sub nom. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r, 102 S. Ct. 87
(1981).
104. Id. at 938, 592 P.2d at 53 (emphasis added). The Multistate Tax Commissioner
sought to apportion only dividends from payor corporations conducting businesses related
to ASARCO's non-ferrous metals business. According to the Multistate Tax Commis-
sioner's Brief, quoted in TAX NOTES, Oct. 12, 1981, at 840, this limitation was consistent with
Mobil: "Mobil does not limit the apportionability of dividends to only those cases or cir-
cumstances where the payor corporations and the payee corporations are engaged in a single
unitary business or in similar lines of business, but rather, all 'net income' received from
stock investments held in connection with the payee's unitary business operations is subject
to apportionment." It is arguable that Mobil could be so read, and it is clear that the divi-
dend payors selected by the Multistate Tax Commission engaged in businesses connected
with ASARCO. However, the wording of the ASARCO opinion is not so limited.
105. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'r will be argued together with F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 95 N.M. 519, 624 P.2d 28 (1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 86 (1981). The New Mexico court held that Woolworth's dividends from non-Ameri-
can subsidiaries were properly included in the tax base because "Woolworth was conducting
a unitary business with its foreign subsidiaries. Woolworth, 95 N.M. at 533, 624 P.2d
at 38 (emphasis added).
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POFFENHERGER v. RISSER - THE DISCOVERY PRINCIPLE
IS THE RULE, NOT THE EXCEPTION
In Poffenberger v. Risser' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
in all civil actions the discovery rule is generally applicable to deter-
mine when a cause of action accrues under the statutes of limitations.2
In other words, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run
when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong
done to him by the defendant.3 The court also determined that actual
knowledge,' not constructive knowledge,5 of the wrong was necessary
to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.' This case represents
the final step in a long judicial process7 expanding the application of
the discovery rule' in statute of limitations controversies in Maryland.
1. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
2. The particular statute in Poffenberger was the three year statute of limitations de-
fined in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1980), which provides: "A civil action
at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of
the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced."
Nevertheless, the holding of the case apparently applies to all statutes of limitations which
allow the court to determine when a cause of action accrues. See infra note 24. Conse-
quently, other statutes of limitations, such as § 5-105 (one year limitation for libel, slander,
assault, battery) and § 3-904 (wrongful death statute with limitation of three years), appar-
ently are included in the broad Poffenberger holding.
3. 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
4. The Poffenberger opinion defines actual knowledge as direct information communi-
cated to the party or the existence of circumstances that should lead a diligent party to the
knowledge of a principal fact. Id. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681.
5. Constructive knowledge is a legal presumption that a party cannot controvert. Balti-
more v. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 235-36, 27 A. 984, 985 (1893). For example, deeds prop-
erly recorded, information in public records, judicial and probate proceedings of which a
party should be aware, and letters received by a party are considered information providing
constructive notice. See Symposium on Statutes of Limitation, 9 U. KAN L. REV. 179, 189-92
(1960-1961). Because the information from such sources creates a strong presumption of
actual knowledge, the law holds the knowledge to exist. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 6
(1971).
The Court of Special Appeals found that Poffenberger had constructive notice of the
location of his property lines because they were recorded officially in land records. Pof-
fenberger v. Risser, 46 Md. App. 600, 605, 421 A.2d 90, 93 (1980), rev'd, 290 Md. 631, 431
A.2d 677 (1981).
6. 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681.
7. Over 50 years of decisionmaking was required to expand the discovery rule gener-
ally to all plaintiffs in civil actions. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
8. The discovery rule, as defined in Poffenberger, states that a plaintiff's cause of action
arises when he has actual knowledge of the harm done to him by the defendant. 290 Md. at
636, 431 A.2d at 680.
Harm may be defined in common terms as an injury to person or property, Lauer-
man, The Accrual and Limitation of Causes ofActionfor Nonapparent Bodily Harm and Phys-
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The dispute between Poffenberger and Risser stemmed from a se-
ries of events that began in 1972. In the summer of that year, Pof-
fenberger purchased an unimproved lot subject to a development
restriction requiring that no building be located within fifteen feet of
any side lot line.9 Shortly thereafter he contracted with Risser to con-
struct a home in compliance with the side lot restrictions. The home,
which was to be located in the center of the lot, was completed in De-
cember, 1972, and the plaintiff took up residence in January, 1973.
Three years later, Poffenberger's neighbor surveyed an adjoining parcel
in preparation for building a home. As a result of the survey, Pof-
fenberger discovered that his house had been built only eight feet from
the south line of the adjoining lot. He therefore brought suit against
Risser in May, 1977, alleging negligence and breach of contract.' 0
In a motion for summary judgment, defendant Risser raised the
three-year statute of limitations as a bar to the suit. The Circuit Court
for Washington County, in granting summary judgment, held that a
reasonably diligent person would have discovered that a wrong had
occurred in January, 1973, the date Poffenberger took up residence in
his new home." Therefore, the statute of limitations barred the cause
of action which was brought four years after the date it accrued.' 2
The Court of Special Appeals found that a factual dispute existed
as to when the plaintiff could have diligently discovered the wrong,' 3
but nevertheless, affirmed the circuit court and cited three grounds sup-
porting the grant of summary judgment. First, it observed that the gen-
eral rule in Maryland was that the statute of limitations begins to run
from the time the injury occurs, not from the time the wrong is discov-
ered. ' Finding that the wrong occurred, at the latest, in January, 1973,
ical Defects in North Carolina, 8 WAKEFOREST L. REV. 327, 352-54 (1972), or it may be
defined in a legal sense as a breach of duty causing injury for which compensation is due an
injured party. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 1 (1971). How expan-
sively the Maryand courts will apply the legal definition of harm is not certain, but in dis-
cussing the discovery rule, the Maryland courts have indicated several benchmarks defining
what the plaintiff must reasonably discover. See infra note 71.
9. 290 Md. at 633, 431 A.2d at 678.
10. Id.
11. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 46 Md. App. 600, 604, 421 A.2d 90, 92 (1980), rev'd, 290
Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
12. See id.
13. Id. at 604-05, 421 A.2d at 92-93.
14. Id. at 601, 421 A.2d at 91.
Every statute of limitations case in Maryland prior to Poffenberger rested on the
premise that the statute of limitations ran from the date of the alleged wrong. See Killen v.
George Washington Cemetery, 231 Md. 337, 343, 190 A.2d 247, 250 (1963), for a discussion
of the time of injury rule dating back to 1888.
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the court held that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs suit. m5
Second, the court stated that a property owner had the burden of con-
structive notice regarding the location of his property lines.16 Thus, the
court reasoned that even if the discovery rule applied in this case, the
constructive notice provided by the plats recorded in 1972 triggered the
running of the limitation period. 7 Finally, the court noted that the
violation of the set back restriction was so obvious that a diligent plain-
tiff should have discovered it.' 8
The Court of Appeals granted Poffenberger's petition for certiorari
and explicitly rejected each of the three findings of the lower appellate
court. First, it held that the discovery rule, not the time of injury rule,
applies generally in all civil actions.' 9 Second, it determined that con-
structive notice is not sufficient to trigger the running of the limitation
period.2° Third, it remanded the case for a resolution of the factual
dispute concerning when the plaintiff knew, or through an exercise of
due diligence should have known, of the setback encroachment. 2'
If the court had simply applied the discovery rule to the facts of
this case, the decision would not have been very significant, for the
court recently has been applying that rule in an increasing variety of
cases.22 In Poffenberger, however, the court has announced a principle
of general application. 23 Thus Maryland has become one of the few
jurisdictions to pinpoint the date of discovery, rather than the date of
injury, as the accrual date24 for civil causes of action. 25 By rejecting the
15. 46 Md. App. at 606, 421 A.2d at 94.
16. Id. at 605, 421 A.2d at 93. For a discussion of constructive notice, see supra note 5.
17. 46 Md. App. at 606, 421 A.2d at 93.
18. Id.
19. 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
20. Id. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681.
21. Id. at 638, 431 A.2d at 681.
22. See cases cited infra note 56.
23. 290 Md. at 639, 431 A.2d at 681 (Rowdowsky, J., concurring).
24. "The typical statute of limitations provides that the period within which an action
may be brought is to be computed from the time the 'cause of action accrues.'" On the
accrual date there exists the necessary "combination of facts or events which permits [the]
maintenance of a lawsuit." Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1200 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Because the term "accrues" is not defined in the MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-101 (1980), it is left to the courts to. determine the accrual date. Goldstein v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684, 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1979); see Special Project, Time
Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of
Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1015 n.12 (1980).
25. Some jurisdictions apply the discovery rule in almost al causes of action. See, e.g.,
Friends Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 227 Kan. 559, 561-62, 608 P.2d 936, 939 (1980) (statu-
tory application of discovery rule in negligence actions, but limited to ten years after injury);
Dower Farms, Inc. v. Lake Country, 607 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Or. 1980) (discovery of injury and
1982]
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traditional formula for determining the accrual date, the Court of Ap-
peals has alleviated possible unfairness to plaintiffs, but it perhaps has
compromised the legitimate objectives of a statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are designed to insulate defendants and the
judicial system from stale claims.26 The time of injury rule provided
them effective protection. When triggered by the occurrence of an in-
jury, the statute precisely limited the defendant's exposure to liability,
enabling him to preserve evidence, protecting him from litigating stale
claims, and eliminating unfair surprise.2 7 Maryland courts consistently
have recognized the need to protect the defendant's reasonable expecta-
tion of repose.28
The time of injury rule, however, failed to assure fair treatment of
some plaintiffs. It forced them to bring suit within an arbitrarily deter-
mined period of time" and did not discriminate between just and un-
cause necessary to trigger statute); Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls - The Time ofDiscovery
and the Statute ofLimitations, 64 ILL. B.J. 326, 332 (1976) (time of discovery accepted rule in
Illinois, but only on case by case basis balancing competing equities); Note, Statute ofLimi-
tations - Discovery Rule Construed to Permit a Claimant Two Full Years in Which to File
Suit From Time ofActual or Constructive Discovery of Cause ofAction - Fox v. Passaic Gen '
Hospital, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 134, 149 (1976) (in New Jersey discovery rule applies
automatically absent a showing of undue prejudice by defendant).
Most jurisdictions retain the time of injury rule but apply the discovery rule as an
exception. See, e.g., Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Iowa 1981) (citing numerous
Iowa exceptions to time of injury rule); Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189, 1191-92 (Me.
1981) (discovery rule exception applies in legal malpractice); Feigelson v. Ryan, 437
N.Y.S.2d 229, 232-33 (App. Div. 1981) (discovery rule applies only when plaintiff alleges
foreign object left in body; further extension of rule a legislative matter); Harrison v. Seltzer,
268 S.E.2d 312, 314 (W. Va. 1980) (discovery rule applies in medical and legal malpractice);
Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations, California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the
Rule, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 106, 107-15, 124-25 (1980) (discussing California's patchwork of
exceptions to time of injury rule and advocating adoption of discovery rule in all cases).
A number of states seem to refuse to apply the discovery rule. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Nieman, 397 So.2d 90, 92 (Ala. 1981) (even in medical malpractice cases, discovery rule not
applicable); Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281, 290-91 (Ind. 1981) (Indiana recognizes mat-
uration of harm rule, not discovery rule); Alberts v. Giebink, 299 N.W.2d 454, 455 (S.D.
1980) (legislature specifically rejected discovery rule in malpractice actions); Locke v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06 (1981) (only the legislature can
adlopt the discovery rule). But see Holy Cross Parish v. Huether, 308 N.W.2d 575, 578 (S.D.
1981) (opening door to future acceptance of discovery rule in some tort actions).
26. See Developments, supra note 24, at 1185, cited with approval in Feldman v. Granger,
255 Md. 288, 297, 257 A.2d 421, 426 (1969).
27. See Special Project, supra note 24, at 1017-18.
28. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76, 394 A.2d 299, 304
(1978); Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363, 66 A.2d 795, 797 (1949).
Maryland courts also have recognized the protection of the judiciary as a valid pur-
pose of the statute. See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 210, 378
A.2d 1100, 1101 (1977) (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945)); see also Special Project, supra note 24, at 1016-17.
29. See W. FERGUSON, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SAVINGS STATUTES, 42-44 (1978).
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just claims, or between avoidable and unavoidable delay.30 If the
plaintiff slumbered on his rights for any reason, the suit could be
barred.3
The harshness of this rule prompted both the legislature and the
courts to create exceptions to it.3 2 Some of the exceptions may have
been mandated by Maryland's constitutional provision guaranteeing
reasonable access to the courts.33 Because every person is to be granted
reasonable access to the courts, and because the statutes of limitations
are designed to provide an adequate period of time for a person of
ordinary diligence to bring suit, 34 suspensions that recognize a plain-
tiff's diligence and allow reasonable access within a reasonable period
of time are inherently logical and necessary. Accordingly, the legisla-
ture has suspended limitations when a defendant's absence from the
state 5 or his fraudulent conduct3 6 prevented a plaintiff from pursuing a
30. Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684, 404 A.2d 1064, 1069
(1979).
31. See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 287 Md. 207, 215, 378 A.2d 1100,
1104 (1977); Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md. 423, 428, 216 A.2d 910, 912 (1966).
32. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
33. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 19 requires:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have a
remedy by the course of the Law of the land and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the land.
At least one Pennsylvania judge has intimated that without judicial discretion to
apply the discovery rule, statutes of limitations would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of
due process. Ayers v. Horgan, 397 Pa. 282, 294, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (1959) (McBride, J.,
concurring), cited in Comment, Limitations in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L.
REv. 47, 58 n.79 (1968). But see Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 364-65, 66 A. 795, 797-98
(1949) (finding a Prince Georges County statute of limitations constitutional on both due
process and equal protection grounds).
34. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76, 394 A.2d 299, 302
(1978); McMahon v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 159, 40 A.2d 313, 315 (1944).
35. Under MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-205(a) (1980), if a person, after in-
curring a debt, moves or leaves the state making it difficult for his creditors to find him, that
person cannot rely on the statute of limitations to protect him. See Maurice v. Worden, 52
Md. 283, 294-95 (1879) for an application of the statute.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105(b) (1980), provides that if a person is
absent from the state when a cause of action arises against him, the plaintiff can file suit
within three years of the defendant's return. See Osborn v. Swetnam, 221 Md. 216, 219-20,
156 A.2d 654, 656 (1959).
36. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1980), suspends the statute when a
party is kept in ignorance of his cause of action by the defendant's fraud. If the plaintiff has
exercised ordinary diligence to discover and protect his rights, the statute begins to run only
at the time of discovery of the fraud. See, e.g., Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 318, 113 A.2d
919, 923-24 (1955); Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257, 267-68 (1877).
It seems likely, as the Poffenberger concurrence suggests, that the general application
of the discovery rule will render § 5-203 immaterial in many, if not most, civil actions at law.
290 Md. at 640, 431 A.2d at 682 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). Fraudulent concealment of a
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cause of action, or when a plaintifis own disability interfered with his
bringing suit within the statutory period.37 Similarly, judicially created
suspensions of the statute - such as the continuing events theory,38 the
maturation of harm doctrine,39 and the discovery rule4° - have recog-
nized the need to provide diligent plaintiffs with reasonable access to
the courts within a reasonable time. Of these three judicial exceptions,
the discovery rule has gained the widest acceptance in Maryland.4'
The discovery rule was first applied in Maryland in Hahn v. Clay-
brook,42 perhaps the first case in the nation to embrace the discovery
cause of action may be one reason why a plaintiff does not discover the right to bring suit;
but it appears no longer necessary to plead and prove all the elements of fraud. See James v.
Weisheit, 279 Md. 41, 44, 367 A.2d 482, 484 (1977), for a description of the five elements of
fraud the plaintiff must prove in a deceit action. This burden apparently is lifted from the
plaintiff by the general application of the discovery rule.
37. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-201(a) (1980), protects minors and mental
incompetents from losing their causes of action during the time they are unable to bring suit.
See Funk v. Wingert, 134 Md. 523, 527, 107 A. 345, 346 (1919) (statute does not run against
infant or lunatic even though represented by committee).
38. The continuing events theory is applied in cases "where there is an undertaking
which requires a continuation of services, or a party's right depends upon the happening of
an event in the future. . . . [T]he statute begins to run only from the time the services can
be completed or from the time the event happens." Washington, B. & A. Elec. Ry. v. Moss,
130 Md. 198, 204-05, 100 A. 86, 89 (1917). For example, if a contract does not indicate a
period of employment, but implies continuous, although interrupted, employment, the stat-
ute will not begin to run until the work is completed. See Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365,
374, 19 A.2d 183, 189 (1941). Similarly, in medical malpractice actions when a course of
treatment runs continuously and is related to the original medical condition, the statute
begins to run when the treatment is ended. See Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 141,
215 A.2d 825, 828 (1966); see also Developments, supra note 24, at 1205-06.
The continuing events theory is also commonly applied in employment discrimina-
tion cases governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See generally Note, Title VII and
the Continuing Violation Theory.A Return to Congressional Intent, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 894
(1978-1979).
39. The maturation of harm doctrine is premised on the proposition that harm is an
essential element in a negligence action and, therefore, the statute should not run until there
is an incidence of harm. See Developments, supra note 24, at 1201.
Maryland courts have rejected the maturation of harm doctrine. Leonhart v. Atkin-
son, 265 Md. 219, 224, 289 A.2d 1, 4 (1972). In each case in which the court has considered
the doctrine it has chosen to disregard it and apply the discovery rule instead. See, e.g.,
Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 512-13, 290 A.2d 530, 533 (1972) (harm discoverable when
plaintiff's lawyer lost case, not after loss of appeal); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 294-
96, 257 A.2d 421, 423-24 (1969) (harm discoverable when plaintiff received notice of tax
deficiency, not after administrative remedies exhausted); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88,
95-96, 253 A.2d 904, 908 (1969) (harm discoverable when plaintiff noticed plot line discrep-
ancy; not after loss of subsequent court cases).
40. See supra note 8.
41. As noted above, Maryland courts have rejected the maturation of harm doctrine.
See supra note 39. The continuation of events theory is limited to cases in which the rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant continues over some period of time. See supra
note 38. Only the discovery rule is flexible enough to encompass every type of dispute.
42. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
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principle. 3 That 1917 decision involved a medical malpractice action
brought by a plaintiff whose skin became permanently discolored by an
overdose of argentum oxide. The court decided that the plaintiff's
cause of action accrued on the date she should have discovered her
injury. Thus, because the plaintiff should have known of the injury
and its cause more than four years before she initiated her suit, the
court held that the statute of limitations barred her action."
The discovery rule was not widely used in the years following
Hahn.45 In fact, it was not until 1945, in Callahan v. Clemens,' that
the court resurrected Hahn and again applied the discovery rule.4 7 Cal-
lahan involved the faulty construction of a retaining wall, and the court
ruled that the plaintiff had notice of the faulty construction in 1939
when he purchased the property. As a result, his suit, brought five
years after discovery, was barred by limitations."
Although the plaintiffs' actions in both Hahn and Callahan were
barred, the cases established precedent for the use of the discovery rule
by any diligent plaintiff. But it was not until the late 1960's and early
1970's that the Maryland courts actually began to accept and apply the
discovery rule with regularity.49
The first case to fully articulate the rule and the reasoning behind
it was Waldman v. Rohrbaugh,50 a malpractice action for negligent care
of a broken ankle. The court noted that Callahan and two federal dis-
trict court opinions" had applied the discovery rule, using Hahn as
43. See Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions for Undiscovered Malractice, 12
Wyo. L.J. 30, 34 (1957), cited in Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634, 431 A.2d at 679.
44. 130 Md. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
45. See, e.g., Consolidated Pub. Util. Co. v. Baile, 152 Md. 371, 375-77, 136 A. 825, 827-
28 (1927) (trial court applied discovery rule; Court of Appeals found discovery principle
applied only if plaintiff proved fraud). But see Chestertown Bank v. Perkins, 154 Md. 456,
461, 140 A. 834, 836 (1928) (plaintiff's mistake, not defendant's fraud, used to invoke discov-
ery rule). See Comment, supra note 33, at 60-62, for discussion of the limited use of the
discovery rule after Hahn.
46. 184 Md. 520, 41 A.2d 473 (1945).
47. Id. at 527, 41 A.2d at 476.
48. Id. at 528, 41 A.2d at 476-77.
49. From 1940 to 1960, the most frequent invocation of the discovery rule came in cases
alleging fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Giessman v. Garrett County Comm'rs, 185 Md.
350, 362, 44 A.2d 862, 868 (1946) (finding plaintiff had not pleaded sufficient facts to prove
fraud); Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 319, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955) (because replication did
not state all elements of fraud, court held it to be deficient); Gloyd v. Talbot, 221 Md. 179,
185, 156 A.2d 665, 668 (1960) (reversing lower court's application of discovery rule because
plaintiff's lack of knowledge was not induced by defendant's inequitable conduct). For a
discussion indicating that proof of fraud may no longer be necessary under Poffenberger, see
supra note 36.
50. 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
51. See Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. Md. 1962) (stating
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precedent.52 Finding further support in other jurisdictions,53 the court
held that a patient's right of action for injury from medical malpractice
accrues when the patient knows or should know he has suffered an in-
jury.54 Because it was impossible for the patient, unskilled in medicine,
to know he had been legally injured, the court reasoned that he should
have had a full three years after the date of discovery to bring suit.55
After Waldman, the court extended the discovery principle to all cases
in which negligent professionals harmed blamelessly ignorant
plaintiffs.56
Just as Hahn provided the precedent for application of the discov-
ery rule in professional malpractice cases, Callahan provided precedent
for its application in "non-professional" negligence cases. In Harig v.
Johns-Manville Products,57 a latent disease case, the initial injury was
inherently unknowable, and thus the statute of limitations did not be-
gin to run until the plaintiff learned of the nature and cause of his
injury.5 8
Two years later the court applied the discovery rule in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Ulman,5 a defamation action for a false credit report.
The court found the plaintiff could not have known until he attempted
to get credit that Sears had filed a false credit report. The court there-
fore allowed the plaintiff to bring suit more than three years from the
time the tort occurred, stating that fairness to a plaintiff who has not
slept on his rights justifies exceptions to the general rule.60
Thus Maryland case law prior to Poffenberger was replete with
exceptions to the general time of injury rule. The court's decision to
that Hahn stands for proposition that statute runs from date of discovery of first trivial
injuries); Jackson v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1960) (stating that under
Hahn, cause of action accrues when plaintiff noticed physical effects of needle left in body
after operation).
52. 241 Md. at 144, 215 A.2d at 829-30.
53. In addition to the Supreme Court decision in Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163
(1949), which applied the discovery rule in a silicosis case, the Waldman court looked to
California, Louisiana, Florida, New Jersey, and West Viginia decisions for support in apply-
ing the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions. 241 Md. at 144-45, 215 A.2d at 830.
54. 241 Md. at 145, 215 A.2d at 830.
55. Id.
56. Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 224, 289 A.2d 1, 4 (1972) (in Maryland the
discovery rule applies in all professional malpractice cases); accord Watson v. Dorsey, 265
Md. 509, 512, 290 A.2d 530, 533 (1972); Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440,
258 A.2d 177 (1969) (architects); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969)
(accountants); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969) (attor-
neys); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (1969) (civil engineers).
57. 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
58. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
59. 287 Md. 397, 412 A.2d 1240 (1980).
60. Id. at 403-04, 412 A.2d at 1244.
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replace the time of injury rule with the discovery rule now provides a
clear and concise statement of the law, which in turn, provides the pre-
dictability and consistency that was lacking under the general rule and
its exceptions. If as Justice Holmes stated, "prophesies of what the
courts will do in fact. . . are what [is meant] by the law,"'6 1 then Mary-
land statute of limitations case law should reflect how and on what
principles the court will decide when limitations begin to run. By stat-
ing that the discovery rule is applicable generally in civil actions, the
court has given each litigant, and counsel, information to accurately
judge the extent of his exposure to liability. In addition, the decision
now provides lower courts with a standard rule to apply in all cases,
further enhancing predictability and consistency. Finally, our judicial
system is based on the principle that like cases should be treated
alike.62 Thus all plaintiffs arguably should receive the same considera-
tion in statute of limitations cases. Now all plaintiffs will meet with
similar treatment.
Nonetheless, general application of the discovery rule may burden
defendants and the court system by causing both to invest time and
resources in litigating stale claims. As the Poffenberger concurrence
pointed out, the discovery rule, because it may increase the costs of
defense and of liability insurance, undercuts the protection afforded de-
fendants by the statute of limitations.63 The average length of time be-
61. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
62. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF THE LAW 165 (tent. ed. 1958).
63. 290 Md. at 640, 431 A.2d at 682 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
In addition, the concurrence finds difficulty in the fact that the decision applies both
in actions ex delicto and ex contractu. Id. It is difficult to understand how Poffenberger will
affect cases involving breach of contract for sale of goods governed by MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 2-725 (1980). The problems involved in applying § 2-725 are beyond the scope of
this paper. For illustrative cases, see Levin v. Friedman, 271 Md. 438, 317 A.2d 831 (1974)
(discussing differences in accrual dates for indemnity and regular contracts); Phipps v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (illustrating application of § 2-725 in
breach of warranty suits and comparing use of § 5-101 in strict tort liability actions).
The problem of which statute to apply is particularly acute in products liability ac-
tions. See Burch, A Practitioner's Guide to Statutes oLimitations M Product Liability Suits, 5
U. BALT. L. REV. 23, 27-30 (1975).
In addition, the concurrence points to a conflict between the legislature and the judi-
ciary in extending the discovery rule. 290 Md. at 639,431 A.2d at 682. For example, in 1975
the Maryland legislature created a special statute of limitations for health care providers
which shortened their period of potential liability. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
109 (1980) now provides that a malpractice claim must be filed within five years of the time
the injury was committed or within three years of the time the injury was discovered, which-
ever is the shorter time period. This statute was one response to the dramatic increase in the
number of medical malpractice cases during the early and middle 1970's. See generally
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INS. STUDY COMM., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE (1976). By enacting § 5-109, the legislature has repealed, in
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tween the occurrence of a tort and the initiation of suit probably will be
greater under the discovery rule than it would have been under the
time of injury rule. Thus defendants may incur greater costs in retain-
ing records for longer periods of time and in trying to locate witnesses.
In addition, insurers may increase premiums to cover the cost of de-
fendant's extended exposure to liability.'
Moreover, general application of the discovery rule may interfere
with the administration of justice and with a party's ability to defend a
claim. Because the rule will allow courts to hear claims that accrue
long after the time of injury, it will increase the danger that evidence
will be stale by the time of trial. Defendants may be unable to locate
witnesses; witnesses may forget relevant facts; records may be lost. As
the time between the injury and the trial increases, the legitimacy of the
fact finding process thus may decrease, in actuality and in the eyes of
the public.
Although prior to Poffenberger arbitrary limitations statutes un-
fairly burdened plaintiffs, now the general application of the discovery
rule may burden defendants, and concommittantly the courts. The
Court of Appeals recognized that general application of the discovery
rule would cause some hardship to defendants and the courts, but it
concluded that fairness to the plaintiff outweighed such hardship.65
But not every belated discovery should justify an application of the
discovery rule.66 To assure that defendants and the courts will not be
unduly burdened by stale claims, the Court of Appeals should carefully
part, the use of the discovery rule in malpractice actions, hoping to reduce the number of
claims burdening the profession. The legislature also extended protection from the effect of
the discovery rule to architects and professionals by enacting MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 5-108(b) (1980).
When it carved out those classes of defendants from the general three-year statute of
limitations, the legislature did not further restrict the court in defining when a cause of
action accrues in other tort actions. Conversely, the Poffenberger decision does not imply
that the legislature is deprived of its right to define when a cause of action accrues, that the
legislature cannot respond to the decision by enacting further restrictive legislation. By pro-
viding a clear statement of the law, Poffenberger permits the legislature to evaluate and
change, if necessary, the courts' general application of the discovery principle. Legislative
deference is an insubstantial reason to perpetuate confusion over whether the time of injury
or the time of discovery governs the accrual of a cause of action. Comment, Accrual of
Statutes, supra note 25, at 123-24.
64. By 1973, insurance fees in the medical malpractice field had increased from 100 to
600%, Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims.- Is It Cost Effective;, 36 MD. L.
REv. 533, 533 (1977). It is likely, however, that other factors, unique to the medical mal-
practice field, affected the increase to a much greater extent than did the discovery rule.
Abraham, MedicalMalpractice Refornm A Preliminary Analysis, 36 Md. L. Rev. 489, 501-03
(1977).
65. 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
66. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 275, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973).
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allocate the burdens of pleading and proof of discovery; in this way the
court could restore, to some extent, the balance of equities between the
parties.
Prior to Poffenberger, the defendant apparently had the responsi-
bility to both plead and prove that the statute of limitations, triggered
at the time of injury, barred the plaintiff's claim.67 Only if the plaintiff
asserted an exception to the time of injury rule did he bear the burden
of proving the facts necessary to escape the statute's bar.6" Although
Poffenberger now makes the time of discovery the general rule for ac-
crual, the decision seems to retain the traditional burdens of pleading
and proof. These burdens now should shift to the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals should rule that under the general applica-
tion of the discovery rule, there is a presumption that a reasonable
plaintiff would have discovered the injury when it occurred.69 This
presumption accurately reflects the time of discovery in most cases.
For instance, in most cases the occurrence of the injury, the knowledge
of it, and the maturation of harm are simultaneous events." Thus the
court should require a plaintiff who discovers the injury after it occurs
to plead and prove that he was reasonably diligent in discovering the
wrong.7'1
67. See Md. R. P. 342c(1)(d), 2(a) (requiring defendant to specially plead the statute); see
also Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 145, 99 A.2d 743, 746 (1953) (party declaring that statute
of limitations extinguished ground rent has burden of proof).
But see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-901-904 (1980) (Maryland wrong-
ful death statute). By enacting this statute, the legislature created a cause of action, not
existing at common law, which gives a deceased person the right to sue for injuries resulting
in death. Filing suit within three years of the death is one of the elements of the cause of
action and a condition precedent to bringing suit. Thus the plaintiff has the burden of
pleading and proving that the suit was timely filed. See, e.g., Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534,
542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1076 (1976); Donnally v. Welfare Bd.,
200 Md. 534, 541, 92 A.2d 354, 357 (1952).
68. See, e.g., Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 318-19, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955). See gener-
ally 14 M.L.E. Limitations ofActions § 108 (1961); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations ofActions
§ 485 (1970).
69. This is the current practice in California. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 26, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (3d Dist. 1975). One commentator has
indicated that this presumption of discovery at injury and effective allocations of burdens of
pleading and proof will enable a trial court to sift out unreasonable claims prior to trial.
Comment, supra note 25, at 117.
70. Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 92-93, 253 A.2d 904, 907 (1969).
This recommendation does not represent a step back toward the time of injury rule.
Presuming that discovery occurs when the plaintiff is injured does not preclude the plaintiff
from proving that discovery occurred at a later time, thus invoking the benefits of the discov-
ery rule.
71. Although the court will consider many factors in determining whether a discovery is
reasonable, previous decisions indicate that most courts find that discovery occurs when the
nature and cause of the injury are known to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville
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The Poffenberger court recognized the importance of the plaintiff's
actual knowledge and held that the statute would not run against a
plaintiff until he knew of his injury or had access to facts sufficient to
alert him to the wrong. 2 Because the court required actual notice, the
plaintiff now will be the only party with knowledge of the time and
reasonableness of discovery. It is inherently fair to allocate the burdens
of pleading and proof to the party who controls the facts."
Yet even this proposal may not adequately protect defendants.
The court should also allow a defendant to plead and prove that his
case has been prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay, albeit unavoidable, in
bringing suit. In extreme cases, the death of major witnesses or the
destruction of all written documents may make the production of
favorable evidence impossible for the defendant. Usually, however,
the delay will have a less devastating effect on the defense, simply re-
ducing a defendant's chances of success without destroying them. Of
course, prejudicial factors will vary from case to case, but certainly the
availability of witnesses and evidence should be considered by the
court.7 4
Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978); Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 513,
290 A.2d 530, 533 (1972). Courts have also found that knowledge of the essential elements
of a cause of action was necessary to trigger the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Goldstein v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 688, 404 A.2d 1064, 1071 (1979); James v. Weisheit,
279 Md. 41, 44, 367 A.2d 482, 484 (1977). It is unlikely that the court will allow a plaintiff to
delay filing his cause of action until he has knowledge of substantial damages. A cause of
action occurs when the plaintiff notes the first trivial injuries. See, e.g., Feldman v. Granger,
255 Md. 288, 292, 257 A.2d 421, 425-26 (1969); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 95, 253
A.2d 904, 908 (1969).
The level of the plaintiff's skill in ascertaining the injury may be of interest to the
court in determining the date a plaintiff should have discovered a wrong. The more knowl-
edgeable the plaintiff, the more strict the court is likely to be in determining when discovery
occurred. See, e.g., Mettee v. Boone, 251 Md. 332, 339, 247 A.2d 390, 394 (1968); Waldman
v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966).
72. 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at 680.
73. See Cleary, Pleading and Presuming. An Essay on Juritic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 5, 12 (1959).
74. At least one previous Court of Appeals decision, Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978), suggests the possibility that some late claims would
be prejudicial to defendants. Harig noted five factors to consider in determining prejudice:
1) the nature of plaintiff's injury; 2) the availability of witnesses and written evidence; 3) the
time that had elapsed since the injury occurred; 4) whether the delay in bringing suit had
been to any extent deliberate; 5) whether the delay unusually prejudiced the defendant. Id.
at 77 n.2, 394 A.2d at 303 n.2 (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 276, 300 A.2d 563, 568
(1973)). Four of the five factors, when viewed closely, are not extremely relevant. For ex-
ample, the nature of the plaintiff's injury and the time which elapsed since the injury oc-
curred are factors relevant to the inquiry concerning the plaintiff's diligence in bringing suit.
Similarly, if the delay in bringing suit is found to be deliberate, the court will likely find that
the plaintiff has been non-diligent. See mfra note 76 for a discussion of the dilatory plaintiff
problem. The final factor stated, unusual prejudice, is a restatement of the inquiry, not a
THE DISCOVERY PRINCIPLE
In deciding whether a defendant has been so prejudiced that al-
lowing a delayed claim to proceed would be unjust, the court should
note that delay also provides defendants with a hidden monetary bene-
fit. Over a period of time, inflation will lower the actual value of a
plaintiffs monetary claim." Similarly, the longer the delay, the longer
the defendant has had use of that money. In other words, a defendant
found liable on a delayed claim will suffer less of an economic loss than
he would have sustained had he been found liable in an earlier
adjudication.76
Accordingly, in deciding whether prejudice to the defendant
should bar a plaintiffs claim, the court should consider both the advan-
tages and disadvantages accruing to the defendant from delay. Obvi-
ously the court will be unable to follow a formulary approach - the
relevant factors are difficult to quantify. Because the discovery rule
evolved from equitable considerations, however,77 it should be modi-
fied so that it will be flexible enough to ensure fairness to the defendant
as well as fairness to the plaintiff.
In simply extending the benefits of the discovery rule to all plain-
tiffs, Poffenberger unnecessarily disadvantaged defendants. By requir-
ing the plaintiff to bear the burdens of pleading and proof as to the
time and reasonableness of discovery and allowing defendants to plead
and prove prejudice, the court could preserve the goals of the statute of
limitations - expediency and repose78 - while guaranteeing access to
the courts for every diligent plaintiff. Thus modified, the discovery rule
would balance more fairly the interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
factor in the inquiry. Thus only the availability of witnesses and written evidence remains
as obvious factors in determining prejudice.
75. Part of a plaintiff's claim will include a prayer for actual damages. Actual damages
can include reasonable expenses occurring as a result of the wrong, Sezzin v. Stark, 187 Md.
241, 256-58, 49 A.2d 742, 749-50 (1946), lost wages and future earnings, Adams v. Benson,
208 Md. 261, 271, 117 A.2d 881, 885 (1955), and losses from destruction or depreciation of
property, Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 270, 49 A.2d 640, 644 (1946).
76. Because the plaintiffs losses have occurred some years prior to the initiation of the
suit and because inflation has devalued U.S. currency, late payment of a pecuniary loss is
not always commensurate with the current value of his actual damages.
Although authorities cite the dilatory plaintiff problem as a reason for the harshness
of statutes of limitations, see, e.g., Special Project, supra note 24, at 1018, it is less than likely,
given the effects of inflation, that plaintiffs will, because of the latitude provided them by the
discovery rule, intentionally delay bringing suit.
77. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74, 300 A.2d 563, 566-67 (1973). The discovery
rule tempered with the right of the defendant to plead prejudice resembles the doctrine of
laches developed in courts of equity. The mere lapse of time is not sufficient to bar a suit
under the laches doctrine; there must also be a showing of prejudice to the opposing party
making it inequitable to bring suit. Miner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 309, 142 A.2d 798, 803
(1958).
78. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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POLLOKOFF v. MARYLAND NATIONAL BANK - MULTIPLE
PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT AGGREGATE THEIR
CLAIMS TO MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT
In Pollokoff v. Maryland National Bank,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland refused to let class-action plaintiffs add together their indi-
vidual claims to meet the jurisdictional amount necessary to bring an
action in circuit court. The amount in controversy, the court held, must
be "measured without aggregating separate and distinct claims of mul-
tiple plaintiffs."2 The court thus joined the federal courts and several
state courts in adopting the "general rule" against aggregation.3 Had
the court properly construed the Maryland statutes, however, the court
would have been compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.
The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article sets the jurisdictional
boundaries for the Maryland trial courts. The circuit courts are trial
courts of general jurisdiction empowered to exercise jurisdiction over
all cases unless jurisdiction has been "limited or conferred exclusively"
upon another court.4 The district courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion. They have jurisdiction over contract and tort actions if the dam-
ages claimed do not exceed $10,000, 5 but a plaintiff may elect to file suit
in either district or circuit court if the "amount in controversy" exceeds
$2,500.6 The issue in Pollokoff concerned the proper construction of
the "amount in controversy" language of the jurisdictional statute.
In 1973, Robert and Phyllis Pollokoff opened a time deposit sav-
ings account with Maryland National Bank. In 1978, approximately
two months after the account matured, the Pollokoffs withdrew the en-
tire balance. A dispute arose as to whether the bank owed the Pol-
l. 288 Md. 485, 418 A.2d 1201 (1980). A motion for reconsideration was denied. Id.
2. Id. at 486-87, 418 A.2d at 1202.
3. Id. at 491-95, 498-500, 418 A.2d at 1205-07, 1208-10. See infra notes 22 and 47-57
and accompanying text.
4. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1980) provides:
The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising
original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers
and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.. . except where by law jurisdiction has
been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.
5. Id. § 4-401 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (effective July 1, 1981). At the time that the Pol-
lokoffs filed their suit, district court jurisdiction was limited to cases involving less than
$5,000. Id. § 4-401(1) (1980) (repealed).
6. Id. § 4-402(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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lokoffs interest for the two-month interim period.7 When the bank
refused to pay any interest for the interim period, the Pollokoffs filed a
class action in circuit court.8 They maintained that the sum of the
claims of all class members exceeded the $2,500 minimum amount re-
quired for the court to exercise jurisdiction.9 The trial court, however,
refused to look beyond the Pollokoffs' individual claim, estimated by
the bank at $27.62,"° and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction." The Court of Special Appeals 12 and the Court of Ap-
peals 13 affirmed the trial court.
The Court of Appeals held that the "amount in controversy" could
not be measured by aggregating the separate and distinct claims of
multiple plaintiffs.' 4 The court initially observed that a court-promul-
gated rule of procedure does not alter the jurisdictional boundaries set
by statute. 5 Thus the class action rule, which allows several plaintiffs
to bring their separate claims in a single suit, could not convert the
separate contract claims advanced by the Pollokoffs into a single cause
of action.' 6 Noting that the Maryland trial courts' authority to hear
cases derives from the jurisdictional statutes, the court examined those
7. The original time deposit account allegedly called for the transfer of any funds from
the matured account into a regular passbook account. The bank refused to honor the inter-
est demand because, under the bank's terms for a regular passbook account, funds in such
an account earn interest only if they are deposited by the second day of January or July and
remain on deposit for a full six month term. Because the plaintiffs did not deposit their
funds until March and withdrew them by May, the bank claimed that the plaintiffs were
entitled to no interest. 288 Md. at 487, 418 A.2d at 1201. The plaintiffs argued that the time
deposit contract was printed in small type and that the language was unclear. Appellants'
Reply Brief at 2-3. They implied that their case involved a contract of adhesion and noted
further that the 4 % interest rate for a passbook account was unduly low. Id. at 3.
8. The Pollokoffs sued under the Maryland class action rule for themselves and an
indeterminate number of unnamed others who had maintained a time deposit account with
the bank for a period of time subsequent to maturity of the account and to whom the bank
had refused to pay interest. The class action rule, MD. R.P. 209(a) provides:
When there is a question of law or fact common to persons of a numerous class whose
joinder is impracticable, one or more of them whose claims or defenses are representa-
tive of the claims or defenses of all and who will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all.
9. 288 Md. at 488, 418 A.2d at 1203.
10. See id. at 487-88, 418 A.2d at 1203. The bank's estimate was based on the 4 h%
interest rate for the regular passbook account. The Pollokoffs may have expected that the
higher rate for the time deposit account would apply. Id. at 488 n.l, 412 A.2d at 1203 n.l.
11. Id. at 486, 418 A.2d at 1202.
12. Pollokoff v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 44 Md. App. 188, 407 A.2d 799 (1979).
13. 288 Md. at 486-87, 418 A.2d at 1201 (1980).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 488-89, 418 A.2d at 1203. The court cited MD. R.P. l(i) (current version at
MD. R.P. 1(h)) which states: "These rules shall not extend, limit, or affect the jurisdiction of
any court." Accord FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
16. 288 Md. at 500-01, 418 A.2d at 1210.
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statutes to determine whether aggregation was permissible. 7 Its deci-
sion turned on the meaning of the term "amount in controversy."
In analyzing the meaning of this language, the court looked first to
Maryland case law for guidance. Despite cases holding that plaintiffs
may aggregate claims in other contexts, 18 the court decided that the
question in Pollokoff was distinguishable from those involved in prior
cases.' 9 A previous Maryland case also had established that, in the
context of a taxpayers' suit, the sum of the individual monetary losses
defined the amount in controversy.2 ° Yet the court reasoned that a
small claims class action is not analogous to a taxpayers' suit, because
the latter seeks to redress a public wrong while the former is concerned
with merely enforcing private rights.2'
The Pollokoff court also heavily relied on the substantially settled
federal case law and decisions in state courts precluding aggregation of
claims.22 Echoing the federal courts, the Maryland court reasoned that
17. Id. at 488-89, 418 A.2d at 1203-04.
18. In Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670, application for stay denied, 421 U.S.
983 (1975), a landlord's action to recover possession of premises, the landlord-plaintiff was
denied a jury trial because, inter alia, he failed to satisfy the $500 "amount in controversy"
requirement. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-402(e) (1980); MD. CONST. art.
XV, § 6. If the landlord had valued his right to possession at more than $500 or claimed
money damages exceeding $500, he would have been entitled to a jury trial. 274 Md. at 347,
335 A.2d at 676.
In Purvis v. Forrest St. Apartments, 286 Md. 398, 408 A.2d 388 (1979), the statutory
provision in question required that in a case in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$500, "an appeal shall be heard on the record made in the District Court." MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401(d) (1980). The amount required was exceeded by the sum of the
landlord's two separate demands, one for back rent and the other for possession. 286 Md. at
403-05, 408 A.2d at 390-92.
19. "[T]here appears to be no decision of this Court directly on that point." 288 Md. at
496, 418 A.2d at 1207.
20. Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 159 A. 922 (1932).
21. 288 Md. at 496-98, 418 A.2d at 1207-08.
22. The court relied primarily on Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the leading case
establishing the rule that class action claims may not be aggregated to satisfy federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. For discussion and analysis of the court's reliance on federal case law, see
mfra note 47-57 and accompanying text. The Maryland court specifically endorsed the ra-
tionale of only one other state court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 288 Md. at 499-500,
418 A.2d at 1209. In Kentucky Dept. Store v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 351 S.W.2d 508
(Ky. 1961), the Kentucky court cited their uniform rule against aggregation and refused to
alter the rule in the class action context. Maryland, of course, has no such precedent. See
supra note 19. This Kentucky holding may also be explained on the theory that in 1961,
Kentucky's class action rule required that "common relief' be requested. Compare Ky. R.
Civ. P. 23.01(3) (repealed) with Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.01 (current version) (no longer requiring
common relief). Damages, varying with each class member, may not be "common relief." 1
H. NEWBERO, CLASS ACTION 334 (1977); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action - Part ZI"
Considerations ofProcedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 422 (1969). Maryland has no such com-
mon relief requirement. See MD. R.P. 209(a).
The state courts have taken every conceivable posture in response to attempts to
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allowing aggregation in class actions, and ultimately joinder actions,
would subvert the purpose of the jurisdictional amount.23 The general
rule against aggregation, the court concluded, applied to any trial
court, federal or state, with a minimal jurisdictional amount.24
There are several problems with the Pollokoff analysis. The court
concluded that aggregation was impermissible because the legislature
intended "amount in controversy" to refer to each individual claim.25
Its reasoning was circular, however, assuming the answer to the ques-
tion posed - whether the "amount in controversy" language referred
to the amount of each separate claim or to the sum total of all the
claims before the court. By using a monetary figure to identify the ju-
risdiction of the circuit and district courts, the legislature relieved the
circuit courts of less important cases involving relatively small amounts
of money. In a case involving multiple plaintiffs, however, aggregation
arguably serves the purpose of a minimum jurisdictional amount. For
instance, the Pollokoffs' individual claim was small, but the sum alleg-
edly at stake in their class action was substantial.26 All class members
would have been bound by any judgment the Pollokoffs obtained;27
moreover, from the defendant's viewpoint, the amount in controversy
was the aggregate of all the claims. Similarly, in joinder actions,28
aggregate claims. See Starrs, supra, at 411. Some courts have rejected aggregation in the
context of joinder. Lewis v. Rosen, 149 Conn. 734, 181 A.2d 592 (1962); Boiling v. Old
Dominion Power Co., 181 Va. 368, 25 S.E.2d 266 (1943); Smaby v. Shrauger, 9 Wash. 2d
691, 115 P.2d 967 (1941). Other courts have rejected aggregation in a class action. Albion
Elevator Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co., 254 N.W.2d 6, 12 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 904 (1977) (relying upon Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969)); Berberian v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 117 R.I. 629, 369 A.2d 1109 (1977) (dicta). Florida rejected aggre-
gation in Curtis Pub. Co. v. Bader, 266 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 271
So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1972). But see State ex rel. W. Palm Beach v. Chillingworth, 100 Fla. 489,
491-92, 129 So. 816, 817 (1930) (If the claims are "joint or composite or in some way related
to each other or arise out of the same transaction, circumstances or occurrence, they may be
aggregated to confer jurisdiction.").
For decisions supporting aggregation of class action claims, see infra note 58.
23. 288 Md. at 495, 501, 418 A.2d at 1207, 1210. The court noted that aggregation of
class action claims is "logically indistinguishable" from aggregation of claims joined under
MD. R.P. 313 (joinder of claims).
24. 288 Md. at 495, 418 A.2d at 1207.
25. Id. at 486-87, 418 A.2d at 1202.
26. The Pollokoffs claimed $3,000,000 for the class as a whole. Id. at 486, 418 A.2d at
1202.
27. See Wright, ClassActions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 183 (1969). Rule 209 does not say explic-
itly that the judgment binds all class members. Nor has any Maryland case addressed this
question. However, Rule 209(b) does provide that a trial court may "declare the nonrepre-
sentative character of the action" and determine that "only the parties to the action are
bound." This would imply that were the suit representative, the judgment would bind the
whole class (and not just the named parties).
28. Several plaintiffs may join their claims in one action against a defendant "whenever
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when the claims of the multiple plaintiffs pose common questions of
law or fact, the court disposes of all the plaintiffs' claims in a single
action. The combined claims, in total, may be of a significant amount.
Cases involving multiple plaintiffs, therefore, may qualify as the rela-
tively significant cases that the legislature would consider appropriate
for the circuit court. At the very least, then, the statutory "amount in
controversy" language is ambiguous and could be construed to mean
either the amount of each individual claim or the sum of all the plain-
tiffs' claims to be adjudicated in a single action.
The structure of the jurisdictional statute resolves any ambiguity
in the "amount in controversy" language. Section 1-501 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article designates the circuit courts as the
highest trial courts with original subject-matter jurisdiction in all cases
except where jurisdiction has been limited by law.29 The district courts,
on the other hand, are courts of limited jurisdiction.3" They have juris-
diction only if the statute expressly provides for it.3 The statute, then,
establishes a presumption that the circuit court, the state's primary trial
court and a court of general jurisdiction, is to hear all cases brought
before it, unless the statute specifically confers jurisdiction on another
court. The presumption cuts in favor of the circuit court's retaining
jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, in favor of interpreting the
amount in controversy language to refer to the entire sum at stake, the
aggregate of the claims.
The court's treatment of prior Maryland cases was somewhat puz-
zling. Faced with decisions holding that jury trial and appeal provi-
sions are triggered when an individual plaintiff's aggregated claims
exceed the requisite "amount in controversy,"32 the court noted that
those cases did not apply to cases involving multiple plaintiffs.33 Al-
though those cases were not concerned with aggregating the claims of
multiple plaintiffs, 4 they did suggest that "amount in controversy" re-
any substantial question of law or fact common to all the claims will arise in the action."
MD. R.P. 313(d).
29. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1980); see supra note 4.
30. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-201 (1980).
31. See id. §§ 4-401 to -405. (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
32. See supra note 18.
33. 288 Md. at 488-91, 418 A.2d at 1204-05.
34. The Pollokoff court seemed to suggest that Purvis v. Forrest St. Apartments, 286 Md.
398, 408 A.2d 388 (1979), was support for denying aggregation of the claims of multiple
plaintiffs. 288 Md. at 490-91, 418 A.2d at 1204-05. The Polok/off court noted that Purvir
cited Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933), in support of the proposition that the aggregate
of a plaintifis several claims determined the amount in controversy. See Purvir, 286 Md. at
403, 408 A.2d at 390-91. In Bullard, bonds of several individual holders were bound by an
express trust of which the plaintiffs were trustees. Because the plaintiff trustees together held
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fers to the total amount at stake in the particular action. Nevertheless,
the Pollokoff court refused to read these decisions to suggest that sev-
eral plaintiffs with common claims could aggregate to reach amount in
controversy.
Another Maryland decision also provides support for this interpre-
tation of the statutory language. In Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud,a" several
taxpayers sued on behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers to en-
join a public referendum, alleging that the expense of the referendum
would illegally increase their individual tax burdens. The circuit
court's equity jurisdiction is limited to suits in which the "debt or dam-
ages" totalled at least twenty dollars, 6 which was more than the dam-
age to any single taxpayer.37 The court held, however, that when one
taxpayer sues "in representation of all," the amount involved is the ag-
gregate loss to all the taxpayers.38
The Pollokoff court distinguished Sun Cab as a taxpayer's suit,3 9
but the distinction is elusive. As Pollokoff noted, a taxpayer's suit is
a single legal title and had a common interest in recovery on the bonds, the amount in
controversy was measured by the total value of the bonds in trust. Focusing on dictum in
Bullard, 290 U.S. at 187-88, the Pollokoff court noted that the suit would not have suc-
ceeded if each bondholder had been the legal owner of his own separate bond; the value of
each separate claim would have fallen below the jurisdictional minimum and separate
claims would not have been aggregated. 288 Md. at 491, 418 A.2d at 1205. Contrary to the
Pollokoff court's suggestion, however, Purvis did not deal with the issue whether separate
claims of multiple plaintiffs might be aggregated. Purvir did not adopt the Bullard dictum;
therefore, neither Purvis nor Bullard were grounds for rejecting aggregation of the claims of
multiple plaintiffs.
35. 162 Md. 419, 159 A. 922 (1932).
36. The Sun Cab court cited MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 109 (1924). 162 Md. at 427, 159
A. at 925. The Code remains unchanged today. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 118 (1973).
37. 162 Md. at 426-27, 159 A. at 925.
38. Id. at 427, 159 A. at 925. One commentator has suggested that the aggregation of
claims in a taxpayer's class action was a method for surmounting the minimum jurisdic-
tional requirement. Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L. REV. 427,
439-40 (1980).
39. 288 Md. at 497, 418 A.2d at 1208.
The Pollokoff court also distinguished Sun Cab as "directed to the question of stand-
ing and not to jurisdiction over the subject matter." 288 Md. at 497, 418 A.2d at 1208.
Indeed, as the Pollokoff court noted, "Sun Cab has been viewed as addressing the issue of
requisite special damage or special interest." Id. (citing Citizen Planning & Housing Ass'n
v. County Executive, 273 Md. 333, 339-40, 347, 329 A.2d 681, 684-85, 689 (1974)). But the
Sun Cab court clearly concerned itself with whether the class of taxpayers had sufficient
interest so that a court of equity might obtain subject-matter jurisdictign. 162 Md. at
426-27, 159 A. at 925. The Sun Cab court noted that in Kenneweg v. Comm'rs of Allegany
County, 102 Md. 119, 62 A. 249 (1905), the loss of a single taxpayer, who sued only for
himself, was "too small to come within the statutory limitations," and the suit was dismissed.
162 Md. at 427, 159 A. at 925. In Sun Cab, however, because the individual taxpayers sued
on behalf of all "similarly situated" taxpayers, the jurisdictional amount was satisfied. Id.;
see Stovall v. Secretary of State, 252 Md. 258, 263, 250 A.2d 107, 110 (1969).
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analogous to a shareholder's derivative action' - the plaintiffs in
these suits represent not themselves as individuals, but the taxpayers or
the corporation as a whole. 41 A taxpayer's suit, like a shareholder's
suit, rests on the notion that the named plaintiff represents a larger
group with a common interest in the relief sought. But class-action
plaintiffs also have a common interest in obtaining relief and in deter-
ring a pattern of wrongful conduct. And taxpayers and shareholders,
like class-action plaintiffs, have individual interests in any recovery.
Thus, just as the Sun Cab court measured the minimum "debt or dam-
ages" required at equity by aggregating the taxpayer plaintiffs' claims,
the Pollokoff court should have measured the "amount in controversy"
to allow aggregation in a class action.42
In sum, then, the court was faced with a statutory presumption
against divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction and Maryland case
law that supported construing the statutory language to allow multiple
plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to reach the jurisdictional amount.
Moreover, there was no Maryland case law4 3 or legislative history to
40. 288 Md. at 498, 418 A.2d at 1208.
41. A suit on behalf of all taxpayers is a "public proceeding" that state courts tradition-
ally allow in the interest of controlling the wrongful acts of local governments. Sun Cab, 162
Md. at 427, 159 A. at 925 (citing J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 1587 (5th ed. 1911)). For a short explanation of the historical background of the derivative
action, see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 541-48 (1948).
42. Since the court argues that the decision on aggregation of claims is one for the legis-
lature, it is interesting to note that the stockholder derivative suit remains a creature of case
law rather than statute in Maryland. In 1945, the legislature codified the derivative action,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 240A (Cum. Supp. 1947), but repealed it in 1951, 1951 Md. Laws,
ch. 136. The repealing act stated that the legislature's purpose was not to abolish the action
but to re-establish it as a flexible rule of judicial decision, subject to a "balancing of the
equities" in individual cases. See H. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE
§ 255 at 271 & n.95 (1953). Similarly, any ambiguity in the "amount in controversy" lan-
guage might indicate that the legislature has expressed a desire for flexibility with respect to
aggregation. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function ofthe Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1941) (grouping the class action and the derivative action together in
terms of purpose and procedure); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d
964, 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1971) (the underlying policies of the derivative action are
highly significant in considering the necessity and propriety of class actions).
43. The court said that the issue of aggregation by multiple plaintiffs to satisfy "amount
in controversy" had never been addressed before in Maryland. 288 Md. at 496, 418 A.2d at
1207. But the court implied that Maryland had a "traditional interpretation" of "amount in
controversy" language like the federal courts. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
The court noted that several circuit courts assumed aggregation would not be permitted. 288
Md. at 495, 418 A.2d at 1207. It cited two circuit court cases, Little v. Tinley, Daily Record,
Dec. 14, 1977, at 3, col. I (Md. Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County Nov. 9, 1977), and Siegrist v.
Continental Ins. Co., Daily Record, Nov. 27, 1972, at 2, col. I (Md. Sup. Bench Baltimore
City Nov. 10, 1972). But see Habrat v. Washington Homes, Law No. 3724 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Calvert County, July 30, 1974). The circuit court in Hlabrat stated:
It is the Court's understanding that the use of class actions should be reserved for those
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suggest the opposite result - the one the court reached.
The Pollokoff court's reliance on federal case law also presents dif-
ficulties. Although the Maryland class action rule closely resembles the
federal rule,"4 and diversity jurisdiction, like the jurisdiction of Mary-
land circuit courts, depends on a minimum monetary amount,45 the
Maryland court should not have regarded federal case law as
authoritative.46
In Snyder v. Harris,47 the leading federal case on aggregation,48 the
Supreme Court addressed the question whether class action plaintiffs
might aggregate their separate claims to satisfy the statutory require-
ment that the "matter in controversy" in diversity cases exceed $10,000.
The Supreme Court conceded that it was "linguistically possible" to
interpret the "matter in controversy" language to mean the sum of all
the claims united in a single class action.49 The Court held, however,
that the class action rule did not alter the traditional interpretation ° of
the "matter in controversy" language, an interpretation that precluded
aggregation of the separate claims of multiple plaintiffs. The Court
reasoned that Congress had ratified the longstanding judicial interpre-
tation when it amended the jurisdictional statute several times, chang-
ing only the minimum monetary figure.5 Citing judicial and
matters which involve relatively small money amounts for individual parties coupled
with. . . a large number of prospective parties. . . making it impractical [and econom-
ically infeasible] for each to seek individual redress. . . because each individual claim
involves such a small prospective recovery.
Id. at 5.
44. See Johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md. App. 122, 127, 337 A.2d 210, 213
(1975) ("Although the rules are not dissimilar, Federal Rule 23 goes into substantially more
detail than does our own.").
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) confers diversity jurisdiction on a federal district court when
the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.
46. The Pollokoff court found federal decisions a "logical, but not a binding" reference
in their "search for guidance in the application of 'amount in controversy' to the [Pollokoy]
facts." 288 Md. at 491, 418 A.2d at 1205.
47. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
48. In the companion case to Snyder, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973), the Supreme Court extended the Snyder rationale to hold that each class-action
plaintiff's separate claim, standing alone, must satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
49. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338.
50. Id. at 336, 338, 339. For discussions of the traditional interpretation, see Pollokoff,
288 Md. at 492-94, 418 A.2d at 1205-06; Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,
292-98 (1973); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 36 (3d ed.
1976). For criticism of the doctrine precluding aggregation, see id. at 139-40; Bangs, Revised
Rule 23. Aggregation of Claimsrfor Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 601 (1969).
51. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 339. But in his dissent, Justice Fortas took the Court to task for
their dubious reliance on congressional silence as manifesting Congress's adoption of a judi-
cial doctrine. 1d. at 348-50.
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congressional concern about the rising federal caseload, 2 the Court
also pointed out that a relaxed rule would "seriously undercut" the
congressional goal of limiting access to federal courts. 3 Finally, the
Court noted, allowing federal courts to hear "numerous local contro-
versies involving exclusively questions of state law" would compromise
the limited nature of federal jurisdiction.5 4
The Snyder decision should not have persuaded the Maryland
court. Maryland had no well-entrenched rule against aggregation. Ac-
cordingly, the legislature could not be said to have adopted such a rule
when it enacted the jurisdictional statute.
More important, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize funda-
mental distinctions between the federal and state court systems. The
federal trial courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, empowered to hear
only such cases as are allocated to them by jurisdictional grant. A fed-
eral plaintiff must overcome a presumption against subject-matter ju-
risdiction for his claim.55 The state circuit court, on the other hand, is a
court of general jurisdiction; it is presumed that the circuit court has
jurisdiction unless the statute has conferred it on another court.56 Fur-
thermore, the federal courts are bound to exercise restraint, particularly
in diversity cases, because those cases involve questions of state law
more appropriate for determination in a state court.57 The Maryland
circuit courts, on the other hand, are the state's primary trial courts.
Thus, the considerations that support the Snyder decision are unique to
the federal system. Quite different considerations obtain in a state
court system.
52. Id. at 341; see also The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 205 (1969)
("Limiting federal caseload.., is a cogent rationale for a restrictive interpretation of 'mat-
ter in controversy.' ").
53. 394 U.S. at 340. The Supreme Court reasoned that an exception to the aggregation
doctrine would inevitably spread to cases of simple joinder. Id.
54. Id.
55. C. WRIGHT, supra note 50, § 7 at 17, § 69 at 326. Because the federal courts have
only limited jurisdiction, jurisdiction must be affirmatively pleaded. No such requirement
exists in Maryland circuit courts; courts of original jurisdiction are presumed to have
jurisdiction.
56. See supra note 4; text accompanying note 29.
57. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("Due regard for the rightful indepen-
dence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupu-
lously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.").
Federal courts alleviate the potential problem of having to litigate in a hostile forum of a
foreign state through diversity jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 347 (1816); see Note, Expanding the Impact fState Court Class Action Adjudications to
Provide an Effective Forumfor Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1002, 1006 n.32 (1971). As
Snyder noted, "citizens of the same State ... have nothing to fear from trying the lawsuit in
the courts of their own State." 394 U.S. at 340. Congress therefore excluded from federal
court "local controversies involving exclusively questions of state law." Id. at 340.
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Other state courts have recognized this distinction and have not
regarded Snyder as dispositive5s These courts focused instead on the
nature of their two-tier trial court system when considering whether
class action plaintiffs might aggregate claims to meet the amount re-
quired to invoke the jurisdiction of the higher trial court.
Michigan's two-tier court system closely parallels the one in Mary-
land.59 In Paley v. Coca Cola Co.," the Court of Appeals for Michigan
held that the aggregate value of the claims of all the class members
determined the amount in controversy. The Paley court based its hold-
ing in part on the fact that the district courts were not designed for
sophisticated class action proceedings. The district court rules were
molded by a careful consideration of the litigation its narrowly limited
jurisdiction would attract,6 ' and indeed there was no district court rule
for class actions. The same reasoning would apply in Maryland where
the class action rule is a circuit court rule only.62 A Maryland district
court is not equipped to deal with complex class actions.63 Thus in
58. In Paley v. Coca Cola Co., 389 Mich. 583, 209 N.W. 2d 232 (1973), the evenly di-
vided Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the Court of Appeals which said:
We do not find the jurisdictional requirements in a case of Federal diversity analogous
to those of our circuit courts. . . . [T]he Federal . . . district courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. . .. [The state circuit court] conversely is the court of original juris-
diction[,] . . . the basic trial court of the State.
Paley v. Coca Cola Co., 39 Mich. App. 379, 383, 197 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972).
In considering the jurisdictional question in federal court, the Snyder court found no
"compelling reason. . . to overturn a settled interpretation" in light of the fact that the two
cases were being litigated individually or as a class action in state court. 394 U.S. at 341.
Some state courts have specifically allowed aggregation on the theory that the state courts
were to fill in the gap left by the federal courts' refusal to permit aggregation of class action
claims. Eg., Judson School v. Wick, 108 Ariz. 176, 177, 494 P.2d 698, 699 (1972); Thomas v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1979).
59. Michigan has a two-tier trial court system like Maryland's. The circuit court has
general and original jurisdiction. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 13; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.601,
600.605 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over claims
not exceeding $3,000. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.8301 (Cum. Supp. 1981). As in Maryland,
the Michigan class action rule applies only in the circuit court. Compare MICH. G.C.R. 208
with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-401 to -402 (1980) and MD. R.P. 1(h), 209.
60. 39 Mich. App. 379, 197 N.W.2d 478 (1972), a]1'd by an equally divided court, 389
Mich. 583, 209 N.W.2d 232 (1973).
61. Id. at 383-84, 197 N.W.2d at 481.
62. See MD. R.P. la(l) (providing that rules in the 100 to 600 series - which includes
the class action rule, Rule 209 - do not apply in the district courts). The Pollokoff court
would not decide whether a class action might nevertheless be maintained in the district
court. 288 Md. at 498, 418 A.2d at 1208. In the absence of a formal rule, however, the
plaintiffs would bear the burden of establishing a "common law class action." See Kirkpat-
rick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 OR. L. REv. 21, 24-35 (1970); Starrs, supra note 22, at
425-28. Even if a "common law class action" were acceptable, the district court clearly is
not equipped to handle the complexities of a class action. See infra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
63. Procedural safeguards are not as strict in the district courts. No formal pleadings are
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Maryland as in Michigan, unless the circuit court has jurisdiction over
the class action, the class action would not be heard at all.
The Paley court noted that Michigan's class action rule was in
force when the legislature created the District Court and raised the ju-
risdictional minimum for the circuit courts.64 The Michigan court rea-
soned that the legislature's action was not intended to render the class
action rule useless65 for the large number of class actions encompassing
small separate claims. Similarly, in Maryland, the class action rule pre-
dated legislation establishing statewide district courts and setting out a
uniform monetary division between circuit court and district court ju-
risdiction.66 Accordingly, the Pollokoff court should have concluded
that the legislature did not intend the amount in controversy require-
ment to make the class action rule useless.67
Because the Pollokoff rule against aggregation is not likely to be
overruled, the question remains - under what circumstances might
plaintiffs with small claims be able to proceed with a class action in a
Maryland circuit court. The Pollokoff court indicated that plaintiffs
might aggregate their claims in one situation - where, the plaintiffs
required if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or less. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 6-403 (1980). Discovery is limited. See MD. D.R. 401.
In Judson School v. Wick, 108 Ariz. 176, 494 P.2d 698 (1972), the individual claims
of the class members were below the Arizona circuit court's minimum jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of Arizona reasoned that the action could not be properly handled in the
lower trial court. They thought the "serious legal questions" which would "be determinative
of the rights of many" should be heard in circuit court. Id. at 177, 494 P.2d at 699. See also
Thomas v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 254, 257 (Ala. 1979).
64. 39 Mich. App. at 384, 197 N.W.2d at 481.
65. Id.
66. MD. R.P. 209 (adopted in 1961). But the District Court was created in 1970. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26 (1970) (current version at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-601
(1980)).
67. In affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Michigan provided an addi-
tional reason for permitting the class action to proceed in circuit court. In Michigan, juris-
diction over actions "historically equitable in nature" is retained in the circuit court by
statute. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8315 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Paley reasoned that even if a
class action is an action at law, jurisdiction is retained in the circuit court because of the
"equitable nature" of the class action procedure. The circuit court was not to be divested of
its equity jurisdiction absent a clear legislative intent. 389 Mich. at 588-94, 209 N.W.2d at
233-36.
The same argument can be made for Maryland. The Maryland statute does not
speak of actions "historically equitable in nature" but equity jurisdiction is specifically re-
served to the circuit court by statute. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-402(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1981). It is also clear that the Maryland Rules Committee regarded the class action as
a procedure grounded in equity. Letter and Memorandum from Neil Tabor, Assistant Re-
porter to the Maryland Rules Committee, to Clinton Bamberger and William Adkins of the
Rules Committee (June 5, 1961) (adopted as the Subcommittee Report in the Minutes of
Meeting of Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July
10, 1961)).
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hold a common interest in a single title or right.6" Plaintiffs might also
attempt to evade the relatively high jurisdictional minimum for con-
tract and tort claims by joining an equitable claim to a request for dam-
ages.6 9 The minimum amount required to invoke equity jurisdiction is
only $20, and the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction at equity.7 ° A
request for a declaratory judgment would evade the rule against aggre-
gation altogether. A declaration of "rights, status, and other legal rela-
tions" is available "whether or not relief is or could be claimed"71 and
without regard to the monetary amount involved. The district court
does not have the power to render a declaratory judgment,72 leaving
plaintiffs like the Pollokoffs free to bring their case in circuit court.
Ultimately, evasion of the Pollokoff rule is unsatisfactory. The
General Assembly should provide for aggregation in a class action by
statute.73 The policy considerations 74 that support aggregation espe-
cially in the class-action context are compelling. Depriving small-
claims plaintiffs of a class action in circuit court forecloses those plain-
tiffs' only effective remedy. The individual small claims action is not a
viable alternative.75 A single plaintiffs claim rarely warrants the ex-
pense of the litigation.76 The prospect of isolated and scattered parties
68. The Pollokoff court appeared to approve the result in Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U.S. 179
(1933). 288 Md. at 490-91, 418 A.2d at 1204-05. In 8ullard, bonds of individual holders
were bound by an express trust of which the plaintiffs were trustees. Because the plaintiff
trustees together held a single legal title, the amount in controversy was measured by the
total of the bonds in the trust.
69. Subsequent to the Pollokoff decision, the Maryland Rules Committee met to study
implications of the decision and to ascertain if revisions were needed. The tactic of combin-
ing an action for injunctive or declaratory relief with one at law was discussed. Judge Ross,
Chairman of the Committee, responded that a trial court would "see through such a plan
and. . . dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." Minutes of Meeting of Court of Appeals Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 14 (Nov. 1980); see Snow v. Ford Motor
Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1977).
70. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-402(a) (1980).
71. Id. § 3-403(a) (1980).
72. Id.
73. The Rules Committee has declined to address the aggregation issue, specifically
leaving it to the legislature. Minutes of Meeting of Court of Appeals Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 13-18 (Nov. 21, 1980).
74. "[T]he jurisdictional objection [is not] merely legalistic, for it too contains policy
considerations in conffict with considerations supporting a more liberal and permissive ap-
proach to class actions." Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
1554, 1558 (1968).
75. By its very nature, the small claims court has a limited capacity for vindicating wide-
spread wrongdoing. The Pollokoffs allege that there are numerous depositors who have
sustained similar damages. Potentially thousands of consumers are subjected to patterned
abuse in commercial transactions. REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 275-76 (Bantam ed. 1968). Research has shown that only informed and sophis-
ticated individuals avail themselves of such remedies, however. Id.
76. "The claim is far too small to render an individual suit economically feasible. The
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
voluntarily advancing their claims together is dim. The class action,
available "where joinder is impracticable," 77 was designed to meet this
problem. A small-claims class action may seek to affect a widespread
pattern of commercial abuse, or raise legal theories that may clarify or
redefine standards for business conduct.78 Piecemeal actions cannot
successfully deter the defendant from illegal conduct that has wide-
spread aggregate, but small individual, impact. To permit only indi-
vidual suits is to insulate the defendant from exposure to damages in
the full amount by which he is unjustly enriched.7 9 Moreover, even if
motivated plaintiffs do pursue their individual claims, the courts face a
succession of virtually identical suits. A single action would better
serve the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. Amending the
amount in controversy provision to allow aggregation of claims would
serve these important interests.80
CONCLUSION
In Pollokoff v. Maryland National Bank, the court erred in adopt-
ing the rule against aggregating the claims of multiple plaintiffs to sat-
costs of prosecuting a lawsuit far exceed any potential recovery." Weinstein, 167 N.Y.L.J. 4
(1972); see Judson School v. Wick, 108 Ariz. 176, 177, 494 P.2d 698, 699 (1972).
77. MD. R.P. 209(a).
78. See Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure. The Imperative For Compre-
hensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 326 (1980). Berry
persuasively argues that the government has a strong interest in seeing such actions main-
tained. In general, the state interests in such suits are (1) compensating injured plaintiffs and
(2) deterring illegal conduct by the defendants. Id. at 300.
79. Nothing is more destructive to a sense of justice than the widespread belief
that it is much more risky for an ordinary citizen to take $5 from one person at the
point of a gun than it is for a corporation to take $5 each from a million customers
at the point of a pen.
Address by Vice President Mondale, Second Judicial Circuit Conference (Sept. 10, 1977),
cited in Berry, supra note 78 at 299 n.2; see Starrs, supra note 22, at 410.
80. Other state legislatures have faced this task. Texas case law did not allow aggrega-
tion, Texas Employment Comm'n v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 163 Tex.
135, 352 S.W.2d 252 (1961), but the legislature subsequently allowed it by statute, TEX. CIv.
CODE ANN. § 1906(a) (1981 Cum. Supp.). Ohio case law also barred aggregation. Davies v.
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949). The Supreme Court
of Ohio instituted a rule in 1970 to allow aggregation. OHIO R. Civ. P. 23(0. Their
rulemaking authority is subject to disapproval by the Ohio legislature. OHIO CONST. art. IV,
§ 5(B).
Some statutes allow limited aggregation. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act allows a group of at least 100 consumers, with at least
a $50 claim each, and an aggregate $50,000 claim, to sue in federal district court. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1976). The limitations of the Act were designed to avoid trivial or insignifi-
cant actions. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7702, 7724. Because of the limitations, the Act has not been useful or success-
ful in aiding consumers. Note, Magnuson-Moss Federal Court Actions - Federal Right
Without a Federal Forum, I I CUM. L. REv. 133, 156 (1980).
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isfy the minimum jurisdictional amount of the circuit court. The state
circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction. The presumption against
divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction is a presumption in favor of
allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their claims. The federal rule against
aggregation is justified because the federal trial courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction and because of a longstanding federal tradition. These
considerations were not relevant in Pollokoff. Had Pollokoff been
properly resolved as a question of statutory interpretation, the court
would have concluded that "amount in controversy" referred to the
sum total of the claims before the court. Sound public policy favors
trying claims involving common factual or legal questions in one single
action. The legislature should act, therefore, to amend the jurisdic-
tional statute to make aggregation possible.
BERNSTEIN v. KAPNECK - UNAMBIGUOUS PERSONAL
INJURY RELEASE BARS SUIT FOR
SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED INJURIES
In Bernstein v. Kapneck' the Maryland Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether a court may reform or void a personal injury release
upon discovery of injuries subsequent to its execution. Refusing to fol-
low the vast majority of American jurisdictions,2 the court held that
when a release specifically includes such future injuries, plaintiffs will
be held strictly to the terms of the agreement.'
In 1975, Irene Schulman, then age five, was injured seriously in an
automobile accident,4 and her mother settled with the defendants, the
car's owner and driver,5 on Irene's behalf.6 The settlement agreement
1. 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602 (1981).
2. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960).
3. The Court of Appeals had previously held in different circumstances that the objec-
tive theory of contracts applied to releases.
In Thomas v. Erie Ins. Exch., 229 Md. 332, 182 A.2d 823 (1962), the Court of Ap-
peals first addressed whether the broad terms of a general release prohibited a releasor from
asserting his claim against a party not in privity of contract. The court found the language
comprehensive and gave the release full effect according to its plain and unambiguous
meaning. McLain v. Pernell, 255 Md. 569, 258 A.2d 416 (1969), a case perhaps closer to the
Bernstein situation involved a plaintiff who had endorsed and cashed a check in settlement
for what he thought to be exclusively property damages. The court barred the plaintiff from
suing for personal injuries because the check draft contained a general release encompassing
personal injuries as well. The Court of Appeals a year earlier in Parish v. Milk Producer's
Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 101, 242 A.2d 512, 555 (1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), declared,
"A release, however, is a contract and may be set aside for the same reasons for which any
other contract may be avoided." See also Stefan v. Chrysler Corp., 472 F. Supp. 262 (D.
Md. 1979), affdmem, 622 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1980); Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. 7, 251 A.2d 600
(1969) (construing Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50,
§§ 16-24 (1957)); Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 Md. 374, 249 A.2d 711 (1969). Regarding
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, see generally Loh v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 422 A.2d 16 (1980).
4. The child suffered severe facial injuries, nasal fracture, non-displacement of the
shoulder, and moderately severe traumatic neurosis. 290 Md. at 453-54, 430 A.2d at 603.
5. Barbara Sue Sussman, the car's owner, and Dean Raum Kapneck, the operator,
were defendants in the original action which was filed in 1977. Bernstein v. Sussman, No.
47,694 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Mar. 2, 1978).
6. Maryland law permits parents to contract for their children. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 6-405 (1981):
(a) In general - Any action, including one in the name of the state, brought by
a next friend for the benefit of a minor may be settled by the next friend.
(b) Limitation - If the next friend is not a parent or person in loco parentis of
the child, the settlement is not effective unless approved by the parent or other person
responsible for the child.
Infants' claims pose difficulties because infants normally lack capacity to contract. See
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provided:
Helen M. Bernstein, individually and as parent and natural guard-
ian of Irene Schulman, a minor, hereby releases and forever dis-
charges [defendants] from any and all claims, demands, damages,
actions, causes of action, or suits of whatsoever kind or nature, and
particularly on account of bodily injuries, known and unknown, and
which have resulted or may in the future develop, sustained by
Irene Schulman.7
The agreement became part of the record when the court enrolled judg-
ment by consent against the defendants in 1978.8
After later tests revealed additional injuries,9 plaintiffs petitioned
the Montgomery County Circuit Court to declare the release void.' 0
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Fankhanel, 29 F. Supp. 611, 619 (D. Md. 1943); McBriety v.
Spear, 191 Md. 221, 226, 60 A.2d 528, 530 (1948); Monumental Bldg. Ass'n No. 2 v. Her-
man, 33 Md. 128, 131 (1870); Fridge v. State, 3 G. & J. 103, 115 (Md. 1830); J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8-2 to -9, at 229-248 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO]; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.18 (Page Supp. 1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.060 (Supp. 1981); 47 MINN. L. REV. 123 (1963), reprinted in PER-
SONAL INJURY ANNUAL 1963, at 524. See also MD. R. P. 205c (gives parent the right to
institute suit on infant's behalf against alleged tortfeasors).
7. 290 Md. at 454-55, 430 A.2d at 604 (emphasis added).
8. Bernstein v. Sussman, No. 47, 694 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Mar. 2, 1978),
afl'd, 46 Md. App. 231, 417 A.2d 456 (1980), affd, 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602 (1981). Judge
McAuliffe stated that he had fully reviewed the terms of the agreement and had found the
amount of compensation fair. Consequently he entered judgment against defendants in the
sum of $7,500. Appellant's Record Extract at 15.
The role of consent judments in the settlement process often is unclear. See Dobbs,
Conclusiveness oaPersonal Inyury Settlements: Basic Problems, 41 N.C.L. REV. 665, 678-80
(1963) (While consent judgments have both judicial and contractual aspects, they are ordi-
narily treated as a "stronger document than a contract." Most judgments are not success-
fully attacked on mistake grounds since they represent court action and additionally are
accorded res judicata effect); infra text accompanying note 26. Professor Dobbs further sug-
gests consent judgments are upheld because plaintiff ordinarily has counsel, and the formal
procedures for entering such a judgment eliminate premature settlements. Moreover, the
parties, and frequently the judge, have considered all the variables in the case, thus equaliz-
ing the parties' bargaining positions.
For rules on entry of consent judgments, see MD. R.P. 601. For the effect of consent
decrees in Maryland, see generally Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 274 A.2d 339
(1971), Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 370 A.2d 577 (1977), Prince George's County v.
Barron, 19 Md. App. 348, 311 A.2d 453 (1973).
9. Record Extract at 22-23, 50-58.
10. See infra text accompanying note 11. The plaintiffs filed the action at law. The
Court of Special Appeals indicated that they found the case to be in a somewhat confusing
posture given the presence of equitable issues. The court stated that evidently appellants
had filed their petition at law to have the court revise the earlier judgment under Maryland
Rule 625[a]. At some point, however, the appellants sought equitable relief based on mutual
mistake. Since the parties had argued both issues before the lower court at law without
objection and had briefed and argued similarly on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals
decided to hear both issues. Bernstein v. Kapneck, 46 Md. App. 231, 238, 417 A.2d 456, 460
(1980), aft-d, 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602 (1981). See generally Brown, The Law/Equity Di-
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Plaintiffs argued that since Irene's brain disorder was unknown when
the release was executed, the parties had made a mutual mistake of fact
regarding the extent of the child's injuries. They also contended that
this lack of knowledge constituted a mistake under Maryland Rule
625[a]," thus permitting the court to revise the earlier judgment. How-
ever, the circuit court judge found the parties had deliberately intended
to settle for such possible injuries and denied relief.'2 He also noted
that plaintiff's lack of knowledge did not qualify as a "mistake" under
Rule 625[a].. 3 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on Rule 625[a]
grounds. 14
chotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L. REV. 427 (1980). MD. R.P. 515, which requires courts to
transfer cases to the appropriate division, has eliminated some of these difficulties.
Parties seeking cancellation or reformation of agreements should sue in a court of
equity. See Ridgely v. Beatty, 222 Md. 76, 85-86, 159 A.2d 651, 656 (1960); Mayor of Balti-
more v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 526, 124 A.2d 557, 561-62 (1956). Courts
also use equity as the traditional forum for mistake cases. Bernstein v. Kapneck, 46 Md.
App. 231, 238 n. 1, 417 A.2d 456, 460 n. l (1980), aff'd, 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602 (198 1). See
Dyson v. Pen Mar Co., 195 Md. 107, 114-15, 73 A.2d 4, 6 (1950); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md.
653, 665-66, 197 A. 137, 142-43 (1938); Brown, supra at 429-37.
11. MD. R.P. 625 (emphasis added) states in part:
For a period of 30 days after the entry of a judgment, or thereafter pursuant to motion
filed within such period, the Court shall have revisory power and control over such
judment. After the expiration of such period the court shall have revisory power and
control over such judgment, only in the case offraud, mistake or irregularity.
12. See 290 Md. at 455-56, 430 A.2d at 605. The Court of Appeals observed:
[S]ince Judge McAuliffe specifically found as a fact that [the parties intended to settle
all possible claims] which resulted or might develop in the future as a consequence of
the accident, even in most of the jurisdictions following the liberal view, thisfactual
finding would prevent the further pursuit of damages.
Id. at 464, 430 A.2d at 609 (emphasis added). When there is no question of law, lower
courts' factual findings bind appellate courts. MD. R.P. 886 requires the Court of Appeals to
adopt the judge's factual findings in non-jury trials unless such findings are "clearly errone-
ous." See Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 273 Md. 638, 645, 331 A.2d 313, 318 (1962);
Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 70, 215 A.2d 467, 473-74 (1965);
see also MD. R.P. 1086; Kline v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 Md. App. 133, 140, 403 A.2d
395, 399 (1979); Gosman v. Gosman, 19 Md. App. 66, 78, 309 A.2d 34, 40 (1973), modified,
271 Md. 514, 318 A.2d 821 (1974). Conclusions of law based upon facts are reviewable.
See, e.g., Clemson v. Butler Aviation-Friendship, Inc., 266 Md. 666, 671, 296 A.2d 419, 422
(1972); A.S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 265 Md. 53, 55, 288 A.2d 596, 597 (1972); Cassell v. Pfaifer,
243 Md. 447, 453, 221 A.2d 668, 672 (1966).
The trial judge further found that the child's injuries existed at the time of settlement
and that the parents had exercised reasonable care and diligence in attempting to ascertain
the full extent of the injuries. He commented, however, that application of the oft encoun-
tered injury/consequence distinction is judicially difficult, see infra note 46, and militates
against acceptance of the majority rule. He also noted that Maryland's traditional objective
approach led him to conclude that Maryland appellate courts would give such a release final
effect. Record Extract at 40-41.
13. 290 Md. at 456, 430 A.2d at 604-05.
14. Bernstein v. Kapneck, 46 Md. App. 231, 412 A.2d 456 (1980), a i'd, 290 Md. 452, 430
A.2d 602 (1981). Aware of the competing contract doctrine, the appellate court distin-
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On certiorari, 5 the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court framed
the issues as whether a court may void a release of all claims for per-
sonal injuries if the plaintiff later discovers that unknown wounds ex-
isted when he executed the agreement; and, if so, whether a court may
vacate under Maryland Rule 625[a] an enrolled consent judgment aris-
ing from the release as mistakenly entered.' 6 The court held that later-
discovered injuries are not grounds for avoidance in Maryland, where
releases qualify as contracts, and thus are governed by traditional con-
tract principles. Accordingly, the court did not reach the Rule 625[aj
issue. "7
Having concluded that traditional principles should govern the
Bernstein release, the Bernstein majority noted that Maryland contract
law requires a court to determine the parties' intentions from the actual
wording of the agreement, and to give the language its ordinary mean-
ing.' The court also observed that parol evidence is inadmissible to
interpret contracts unless the agreement's language is unclear or there
guished the case and decided the case on the narrow Rule 625[a] issue. Relying on Hughes
v. Beltway Homes, Inc., 276 Md. 382, 347 A.2d 837 (1975), the court upheld the trial judge's
ruling that the parties' lack of knowledge regarding the extent of the child's injuries did not
constitute a mistake within Rule 625[a]. The type of mistake that Rule 625[a] contemplates
is extrinsic and jurisdictional in nature. In Hughes, the court observed:
The type of situation in which mistake might be applicable is demonstrated by Miles v.
Hamilton, 269 Md. 708, 309 A.2d 631 (1973), (no valid service of process) and Ashe v.
Spears, 263 Md. 622, 284 A.2d 207 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), (a conten-
tion of no valid service of process). It is further demonstrated by two cases arising
before the adoption of Rule 625, Harey v. Slacum, 181 Md. 206, 210-11, 29 A.2d 276
(1942), (default judgment entered where there had been no valid service of process),
and May v. Wolvington, 69 Md. 117, 14 A. 706 (1888), (judgment by default entered for
lack of a plea when appropriate pleading had in fact been filed).
276 Md. at 387, 347 A.2d at 341. Accord Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 480 n.3, 431
A.2d 76, 78 n.3 (1981); Dobbs, supra note 8, at 678-79.
15. 288 Md. 732 (1980).
16. 290 Md. at 453, 430 A.2d at 603. While the contract mistake issue was technically
one of first impression, it is interesting that neither appellate court mentioned Clark v. Elza,
286 Md. 208, 406 A.2d 922 (1979). The Clark court held that defendant could use an execu-
tory oral agreement that plaintiff has breached to prevent a plaintiff from suing. The court
noted that plaintiffs had argued in their brief that a mutual mistake of fact concerning the
extent of the party's injuries justified avoiding the agreement. The court found that the
parties had not properly raised the issue but nonetheless observed: "[E]ven if it were prop-
erly before us, there would be no basis in the record for finding a mutual mistake of fact."
Id. at 219 n.4, 406 A.2d at 928 n.4. See Beall, The Settlement Which. . . Became Unstuck,
MD. B.J., Sept. 1981, at 6. With respect to executory accords, see generally 6 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 1268, at 51 (1951) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 6, § 21-4; Gold, Executory Accords, 21 B.U.L. REv. 465 (1941); Com-
ment, Executory Accord, Accord and Satsfaction, and Novation - The Distinctions, 26 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 185 (1974).
17. 290 Md. at 465, 430 A.2d at 609.
18. See supra note 3.
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is evidence of fraud, accident, or mutual mistake.' 9 Proponents of this
approach, sometimes referred to as the objective theory of contracts,
argue that it promotes judicial efficiency and ensures predictability in
business transactions. Convinced of the propriety of this approach, the
majority applied objective principles to the release at issue in Bernstein,
and concluded that the release could not possibly be "more clear, more
specific, more complete, more all-inclusive or more all embracing. It
would require turning the English language on its head to conclude
that, ... the releasors did not ... exhibit a clear desire to extinguish
the claim for damages they now seek."2
The court also noted two Maryland statutes permitting releasors to
escape the effects of personal injury releases if they sign away their
rights shortly after being injured.2' The Bernstein court concluded that,
because the legislature had not modified or avoided all personal injury
releases, the legislature "neither considered exoneration of unknown
injuries to be against public policy nor discerned that releases of this
type presented particular difficulties requiring some form of legislative
control or regulation. We perceive no compelling reasons why this
19. 290 Md. at 460, 430 A.2d at 607; see Slice v. Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md. 357,
368, 137 A.2d 687, 693 (1958); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 212-13, 428 A.2d 469,
474-75 (1981); Orkin v. Jacobson, 274 Md. 124, 128, 332 A.2d 901, 903-04 (1975); Keyworth
v. Industrial Sales Co., 241 Md. 453, 456, 217 A.2d 253, 255 (1966); Brown v. Fraley, 222
Md. 480, 489, 161 A.2d 128, 134 (1960); Schuster v. White Coffee Pot Family Inns, Inc., 43
Md. App. 550, 551-52, 406 A.2d 452, 453 (1979).
20. 290 Md. at 464, 430 A.2d at 609; see Emery v. Mackiewicz, 429 Pa. 322, 325, 240
A.2d 68, 70 (1968); ("The above-quoted general and specific release of all claims, demands
and actions for bodily injuries could not possibly be clearer or more specific, or more com-
pletely all-inclusive and all-embracing. . . . It would make a mockery of the English lan-
guage and of the Law to permit this release to be circumvented or held to be nugatory.").
Maryland's current test to ascertain contracting parties' intentions is found in Board of
Trustees v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 380, 373 A.2d 626, 629 (1977) ("[W]hen the language of a
contract is clear, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended
it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it
meant."). See Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 273 Md. 638, 642, 331 A.2d 313, 317 (1975);
Bernstein, 46 Md. App. at 244, 417 A.2d at 463.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 11 (1980) makes a release of claims for personal injuries,
or contracts for legal representation in connection with the pursuit of damages, arising out of
a tort and executed within five days of the incident voidable at the option of the injured
party any time within the next 60 days. MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 12 (1980) enables
releasors to escape the effects of releases in certain circumstances when the release is exe-
cuted within 15 days of the mishap. Accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572a (1960).
Legislation enacted in several jurisdictions provides that general releases will not cover
claims unknown or unsuspected at the time of execution, if such claims would have materi-
ally affected the settlement. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542 (West 1954), construed in
Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47.0241 (1960) (current version at id § 20-1-11 (1978)), construed in Boman v. Johnson, 83
S.D. 265, 158 N.W.2d 528 (1968).
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court should do more." 22
Finally, the Bernstein court criticized the majority of jurisdictions
for refusing to acknowledge that their decisions were based, not on con-
tract law, but on policy considerations that the Maryland court found
unpersuasive. Judge Digges, writing for the Bernstein majority, ob-
served that in these cases courts must balance the need for predictabil-
ity and judicial efficiency against considerations "largely stemming
from compassion. "23 These considerations include notions that
tortfeasors should adequately compensate victims, and that traditional
contract law is inapplicable because the human body is not an article of
commerce.24 The court concluded that the advantages of enforcing
traditional contract principles outweighed these policies, and stressed
that voiding such releases would increase litigation and discourage out-
of-court settlements. 25 The court also commented that no principled
distinction exists between the rationales underlying the doctrine of res
22. 290 Md. at 464, 430 A.2d at 608-09; see also Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 385, 421
P.2d 747, 752 (1966) (construing IDAHO CODE § 29-113 (1961) as indicative of legislative
concern for plaintiffs' protection and granting relief).
23. 290 Md. at 458, 430 A.2d at 605.
24. See generaly Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 110-11, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 315-16, 378
P.2d 579, 587-88 (1963); Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co., 229 Or. 360, 364, 366 P.2d
527, 529 (1961); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 338, 86 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1957); Clancy v.
Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 176-77, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1957). The Clancy court observed:
[In these release cases] it is not an article of commerce that is involved, but the human
mind and body, still the most complicated and mysterious of all things that are upon or
inhabit the earth. Here, mistakes are easily made and the consequences are more seri-
ous than in any other of the affairs of man. . . .Yet, a man cannot and does not live in
dread of these [dire] possibilities. He accepts assurances that all will be well, even
though ultimate consequences cannot be appraised as in matters involving property or
services.
One can argue strongly that plaintiffs uncertain condition gives rise to the inference that the
risk was expressly assumed. See Havighurst, Effect Upon Settlements ofMutual Mistake as
to Injuries, 12 DEF. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1963). Applying principles of "conscious ignorance" to
personal injury releases, Havighurst observes:
It is well known that, for a considerable period after a serious injury is suffered, it is
impossible even for medical experts to determine with certainty its nature and final
outcome, and in all but the rarest instances both parties realize that there is doubt con-
cerning the future course of the injury. It would thus appear that the releasee should
take the risk that the payment might be excessive in view of later developments and that
the claimant should take the risk that it might be inadequate.
id. at 4.
25. 290 Md. at 459, 430 A.2d at 606. Maryland courts traditionally have encouraged
settlements. See General Motors v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 726, 410 A.2d 1039, 1045 (1980);
Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 219, 406 A.2d 922, 928 (1979); Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel
Co., 251 Md. 544, 550, 248 A.2d 373, 377 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974 (1969); Sisson v.
Baltimore, 51 Md. 83, 95-96 (1879). Several other jurisdictions agree. See Dewitt v. Miami
Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1957); Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co., 229 Or.
360, 366-67, 366 P.2d 527, 530 (1969); Emery v. Mackiewicz, 429 Pa. 332, 336, 240 A.2d 68,
70 (1968).
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judicata and the principle of favoring binding settlements. Thus the
court apparently reasoned that it should not place plaintiffs who settle
out of court in a better position than plaintiffs who have expeditiously
litigated their cases only to discover additional injuries after
judgment.26
The Bernstein court unequivocally rejected the approach taken by
the majority of American jurisdictions. Generally other courts have
justified decisions voiding releases by invoking the mutual mistake doc-
trine. Although these courts carelessly attach the "mutual mistake" la-
bel to their decisions, in reality these courts are employing two distinct
contract theories. Some courts apply "classic" mutual mistake of fact
doctrine, which focuses upon the shared mistaken assumptions upon
which the contracting parties base their agreement. 27 Other jurisdic-
tions appear to focus upon the parties' conflicting understandings of the
actual contract.28
Clancy v. Pacenti29 illustrates the basic underlying assumption ap-
proach to personal injury releases. In Clancy, the Illinois Appellate
Court observed:
Releases of claims for personal injuries have frequently been held
voidable for mistake, on the ground that the claimant was una-
ware of the nature and extent of his injury when he assented to a
settlement. Sometimes advantage has been taken of his weakness
and ignorance; and the possibility of this, even though not defi-
nitely proved, has made courts readier to hold that the release was
executed on a mistaken basic assumption as to the nature of the
injury.30
The Clancy court stressed that both parties believed the injuries in-
26. 290 Md. at 463, 430 A.2d at 608..
27. Mistake in [underlying] assumptions is one of the most significant types, both
because it happens so often and because it raises the most difficult problems in the
law of mistake. . . in the typical situation, such a mistake does not affect aper-
son s awareness of what he is doing but only the reasons why he is doing it. . . . As a
useful legal category, mistake in assumptions is concerned for the most part with
situations presenting the question whether an initially valid contract may be
rescinded.
G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 13 (1962) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT]. See generaly CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 6, § 9-26; 3 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 608; 2 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION,
§§ 11.1-11.4, at 479-514 (1978); 13 WILLISTON ON COrNrrACTS, § 154 (3d ed. 1970) [herein-
after cited as WILLISTON]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981); Foulke,
Mistake in the Formation and Performance of a Contract, II COLLIM. L. REV. 197 (1911).
28. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
29. 15 I11. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
30. Id. at 175, 145 N.E.2d at 804 (quoting 3 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 598, at 3587 (em-
phasis added)); cf. 13 WILLISTON, supra note 27, § 1551.
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volved were minor when instead they were serious, and concluded that
this mutual mistake voided the general release.3
However, as the Maryland Court of Appeals observed,
[T]he "mistake" found is the fact that the parties did not know the
extent of the injuries suffered, notwithstanding that the releasor
expressly assumed the risk (as parties to all contracts inevitably
do) of the lack of omniscience as to what might develop in the
future, by an express release of all unknown claims. 2
Thus, courts that use basic assumption analysis to avoid a release
allow plaintiffs to explicitly assume risks, but then shirk this responsi-
bility when the risks are not resolved in their favor.3
Other majority jurisdictions reform releases when convinced that
the parties did not share the same understanding. They allow plaintiffs
to argue that they did not understand the agreement as a release of
claims for future and unknown injuries. This analysis differs from the
basic assumption approach because the parties' understanding of the
contract itself is at issue, not the assumptions upon which it was
based.34 Unfortunately, most courts in the majority have been preoc-
cupied with justifying the creation of "special doctrine" or have applied
principles of mutual mistake incorrectly. Only a few have realized that
the question is ultimately one of intent. 3" The Bernstein court is to be
31. See supra note 24.
32. 290 Md. at 462, 430 A.2d 607.
33. In Smith v. Loos, 78 N.M. 339, 431 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1967), the court also criticized
the mutual mistake approach. There the plaintiff testified that he fully understood the terms
of the release prior to execution. The court concluded that in such situations it is obvious
that the parties have voluntarily chosen to allocate expressly the risk that plaintiff might
have undiscovered ailments. The court correctly observed that "the law does not and cannot
operate in retrospect to relieve a party from contractual obligations, deliberately and inten-
tionally assumed, because of the development of unfortunate and unfair results." Id. at 343,
431 P.2d at 76.
34. "The distinction parallels that between the statements 'I did not intend to [mean]
this' and 'I did intend to [mean] this but it was because I mistakenly believed the facts were
thus and so."' MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 27, at 6. Palmer also notes
that when the issue turns on misunderstanding, mutual or unilateral mistake analysis is not
helpful. In misunderstanding cases each party is mistaken as to the other party's intentions.
Consequently, the question of mutual assent turns on whether the court holds one party to
the understanding of the other. 3 G. PALMER, supra note 27, § 16.1 at 458-59 (1978);
Palmer, The Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the
Restatement of Contracts Second, 65 MICH. L. REV. 33, 56 (1966).
35. Failure to distinguish mutual mistake from misunderstanding analysis has led to
confusion. For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed that a release is incon-
testable only when the parties intentionally settled for the unknown injuries. Consequently,
the court found that whether the parties "assumed as a basis for the release known injuries
or whether they intended to compromise claims for all injuries known or unknown," is a
question of fact. Larson v. Sventek, 211 Minn. 385, 388, 1 N.W.2d 608, 610 (1941). The
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commended not only for its refusal to embrace the misguided mutual
mistake approach, but for recognizing that the crux of the issue is the
parties' intent.3 6
The court apparently reasoned that the written document was con-
clusive evidence of the parties' understanding since integrated writings
presumably reflect the parties' intent under Maryland's objective the-
ory of contracts.37 Maryland courts follow Williston's approach38 and
court stated that if the circumstances indicate that, despite the wording of the release, the
parties only contracted with reference to unknown injuries and a "material, unknown injury
subsequently develops, mutual mistake exists." ld. at 389, 1 N.W.2d at 610. The opinion
suggests that the court mixed both questions of what was assented to (understanding) and
why (basic assumptions). The Minnesota court later simplified its position, holding that a
release does not bar recovery for unknown injuries that the parties did not contemplate
when they settled. Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953); see also
Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 385-86 (Colo. 1981) (court confuses misunderstanding
and mutual mistake analysis).
For examples of courts incorrectly applying unilateral mistake doctrine to deny re-
lief, see Randolph v. Ottenstein, 238 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (D.D.C. 1965), aft'd, 355 F.2d 839
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Gumberts v. Greenberg, 124 Ind. App. 138, 146, 115 N.E.2d 504, 507
(1953) (court refused to void release because of unilateral mistake). But see Wells v. Rau,
393 F.2d 362, 364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (distinguished Randolph; emphasized that Randolh
had been affirmed on misrepresentation grounds only); Beaver v. Harris' Estate, 67 Wash.
2d 621, 628, 409 P.2d 143, 148 (1965) (release will be voided only if mutual mistake is
shown).
36. 290 Md. at 461, 430 A.2d at 607.
37. A misunderstanding argument should not succeed even in the most liberal jurisdic-
tions given the Bernstein scenario. In Bernstein, plaintiffs had been represented by counsel
and had participated in the negotiation and consent decree process; thus they clearly were
aware of the document's terms. See supra notes 8 and 12 and accompanying text. A court
can correctly apply misunderstanding doctrine only when a party is ignorant or confused
about the contents of a release. Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co., 229 Or. 360, 363, 366
P.2d 527, 528-29 (1969). Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962) illustrates the distor-
tions in the majority position. In Dansby, the Arizona Supreme Court found that a plaintiff
could seek additional monetary relief although he fully comprehended the contents of the
release. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff "had signed the release with full knowl-
edge of its legal implications," id. at 8, 373 P.2d at 6, but concluded, "the parties intended to
pay and receive, respectively compensation on the basis of damages then known," id. at 9,
373 P.2d at 6. Such a position is entirely unprincipled, for it enables parties to assume
known risks and later argue that they did not intend what they originally intended. See also
Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (Alaska 1978). As one judge has observed, "True,
there was a mutual ignorance of injury to the brain,. . . but there was neither mutual igno-
rance of tenor of the release, nor any deception perpetrated upon plaintiff inducing him to
sign without reading." Larson v. Sventek, 211 Minn. 385, 389-90, 1 N.W.2d 608, 610 (1941)
(Stone, J., dissenting); accord Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 441, 237 N.W.2d 830, 832
(1976); Sanger v. Yellow Cab, 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. 1972).
38. See generally 4 WILLISTON, supra note 27, §§ 631-46; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 6, § 3-3 to -7, -10.
After determining that the writing is integrated, courts espousing Williston's ap-
proach would then interpret the contract's language as a reasonably intelligent person
would. Thus, if the language is clear, extrinsic evidence on intent is inadmissible. 4 WILLIS-
TON, supra note 27, § 603, at 344.
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admit evidence on intent only if the writing's language is unclear or if a
party alleges fraud, accident or mutual mistake.3 9 This strict version of
the parol evidence rule precludes parties from arguing misunderstand-
ing when a contract is deemed to support only one interpretation, for
that interpretation is presumed to have been mutually understood.40
There is another respected polar approach to parol evidence and
contract interpretation. Corbin's approach to parol evidence and con-
tract interpretation is very different from Williston's, and it also com-
mands considerable respect.4 Under Corbin's theory, courts always
should consider evidence on the understanding and intent of each
party. If the understandings are congruent, there is a contract; if they
differ materially, the court, after a comparative fault analysis, should
enforce the contract according to the more reasonable understanding.42
39. See supra note 19.
40. Maryland narrowly qualifies its parol evidence rule. In Binder v. Benson, 225 Md.
456, 171 A.2d 248 (1961), the court held, "A qualification of the [strict] rule is that an appar-
ent manifestation of assent will not operate to make a contract if the other party knows, or as
a reasonable person should know, that the apparent acceptor does not intend what his words
or other acts ostensibly indicate." Id. at 461, 13 A.2d at 250. While the language appears to
be broad, the court evidently will use the exception only where an affirmative act of plaintiff
or defendant demonstrates mistake. For an example of a case where the exception could
have been invoked but was not, see Gingell v. Backus, 246 Md. 83, 227 A.2d 349 (1967). The
fact that this exception was not applied to the extreme circumstances in Gingell suggests the
standard approximates fraud.
41. It is obvious . . . that there is no unanimity as to the content of the parol
evidence rule or the process called interpretation, and that the rules are complex,
technical and difficult to apply. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that
the courts follow any of these rules blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not
they choose the standard or the rule that they think will give rise to a just result in
the particular case. We have also seen that often under a guise of interpretation a
court will actually enforce a rule of "public policy" which is nothing more than an
attempt to do justice.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, § 3-14, at 126 (footnotes omitted).
42. 1 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 104; 3 id. § 599. See generally Corbin, The Interpretation
of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200, 201, 209-10, 212-15 (1981). The parol evidence rule is essen-
tially a jury control device. See Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975).
Murray discusses various arguments as to what the trier of fact should consider. He
observes,
[c]ertainly it can be argued that juries must not be permitted such leeway because they
are not sufficiently sophisticated to accord the written evidence its sacred place. Simply
put, juries may not be trusted with such a task, regardless of awesome instructions from
the court, but must be shielded from evidence of any prior agreements if the parties
intended the writing to be the final and complete manifestation of their agreement. The
security and stability of transactions demand this protection.
Id. at 1346 (footnotes omitted).
McCormick noted that in most cases involving a conflict between a writing and an
alleged oral agreement "the one who sets up the spoken against the written word is economi-
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In a jurisdiction accepting this approach, a plaintiff in a release case
could argue that he understood the release to cover only injuries known
at the time of settlement, and that this understanding is the most rea-
sonable.4 3 One can easily imagine a scenario where this understanding
is more reasonable - for instance where plaintiff receives payment and
hastily signs a standardized form without the benefit of counsel. If de-
fendant witnessed such a signing and there had been no concrete nego-
tiations, plaintiff might argue persuasively that his belief that the
release included only known injuries was the most reasonable. In other
situations, however, plaintiff's argument might not persuade the court,
particularly when he participated in negotiations or hired counsel."
In a concurring opinion Judge Davidson suggested a somewhat
different approach.45 Arguing that the special circumstances surround-
ing releases render contract doctrine inapplicable, she stressed that lay
persons lack bargaining strength and are not in the position to ade-
quately defend their interests. She advocated a special rule allowing
plaintiffs to void releases when unforeseen injuries develop after an
agreement is executed.4
cally the underdog. . . .The average jury will. . . lean strongly in favor of the side which
is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the enforcement of the writ-
ings." McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device For Control of the Jury,
41 YALE L.J. 365, 366 (1932).
43. Eg., Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 441, 237 N.W.2d 830, 832 (1976); Jeffries v.
Gillitzer, 302 Minn. 402, 404-05, 225 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1975); Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d
556, 560, 249 N.E.2d 386, 388, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 512 (1969); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich.
332, 334, 86 N.W.2d 537, 538 (1957).
To ascertain the parties' intentions, courts generally consider the amount of consid-
eration paid, the length of time between the injury and settlement, the competence of the
releasor, and the presence or absence of counsel. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103,
109-10, 216 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1974).
44. See Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 438, 237 N.W.2d 830, 831 (1976); Jeffries v.
Gillitzer, 302 Minn. 402, 403, 225 N.W.2d 17, 18 (1975).
45. 290 Md. at 465, 430 A.2d at 609.
Judge Davidson essentially adopted the reasoning of and quoted at length from
Judge Frank's concurrence in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir.
1946). Judge Frank argued that difficulties with both subjective and objective theories ren-
dered contract doctrine inapplicable to these situations. Although Judge Davidson quoted
Judge Frank's reasoning with approval, she concurred with the Bernstein majority on the
basis of Rule 625[a].
46. Apparently Judge Davidson distinguishes, as do most courts, between later dis-
covered injuries and subsequently developing consequences of known injuries, and would
grant relief only in the former case. This distinction can be partially attributed to the major-
ity's reliance on mistake doctrine. These courts generally require that the mistake be one of
isolated fact rather than a "mistaken expectation" concerning the healing of a known disor-
der. See Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 6-7, 12, 373 P.2d 1, 4, 5-8 (1962); Melvin v. Stevens, 10
Ariz. App. 357, 361, 458 P.2d 977, 981 (1969); Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 14, 165
N.E.2d 733, 740 (1960); Tewksburg v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., 319 Mass. 386, 388-89, 65
N.E.2d 918, 919 (1946); Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 246, 56 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1953);
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. Although the Bernstein decision conforms to and logically flows
from previous Maryland case law,47 Maryland's strict rules on parol
evidence and contract interpretation should be slightly modified in per-
sonal injury release cases because, as Judge Davidson argued in her
concurrence, the major rationale for the objective theory is not compel-
ling in these situations. Proponents of the strict approach contend that
it ensures predictability and stability in business transactions. Execu-
tion of a personal injury release, however, is not a traditional commer-
cial transaction. It usually is a transaction, not between two
commercial enterprises, but between an insurance company and an in-
dividual. Furthermore, releases typically are standard form con-
tracts," with which insurance companies are, but claimants are not,
Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 565-66, 249 N.E.2d 386, 393, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 515-16
(1969); Harvey v. Robey, 211 Va. 234, 238, 176 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1970).
Some courts acknowledge the injury/consequence rule but find the distinctions
diffcult to draw. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898, 900-01 (Fla. 1957);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Poti v. New England Road Mach.
Co., 83 N.H. 232, 140 A. 587 (1928); Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
Commentators attack courts for inconsistently applying the rule. See Dobbs, supra note 8,
at 708-13; Havighurst, supra note 24, at 5-6; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 27, § 12.22, at 705-08
(1978). Several courts have denied relief where plaintiffs experienced pain at the time the
release was executed, reasoning that the pain gave them notice of an injury that was incon-
sistent with their mistake claim. See Cohn v. Bugas, 42 Cal. App. 3d 381, 116 Cal. Rptr. 810
(1974); Davis v. Flatiron Materials Co., 182 Colo. 65, 511 P.2d 28 (1973); cf. Mangini v.
McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 565, 249 N.E.2d 386, 392, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 515 (1969).
Certainly the sensation of pain in the hip area cannot be considered constructive notice
of the injury to the femur. Even where a releasor has knowledge of the causative
trauma, it has been held that there must be actual knowledge of the injury. Knowledge
of injury to an area of the body cannot cover injury of a different type and gravity.
Id. at 565, 249 N.E.2d at 392, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
47. See supra notes 3 and 19.
48. The problems inherent in standardized form contracts have been frequently dis-
cussed. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, §§ 9-44 to -46, at 336-47; 1 CORBIN, supra
note 16, § 107, 3 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 559; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION 362-71 (1960); Murray, supra note 42, at 1372-89; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) ("The
contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as typical, in which both parties par-
ticipate in choosing the language of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than
historical importance."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (The draft-
ers of the Restatement observed, "A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the stan-
dard terms." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, comment b (1981)). Never-
theless, the modern world probably could not function without standardized form-pad
agreements. Still, there is no "meeting of the minds," in the traditional sense if one of the
parties did not read or understand the written terms. Courts and commentators have devel-
oped rules to protect the parties and preserve the stability of such transactions:
Standardized writings are particularly suspect in identifying the true intent of the par-
ties. Absent an understanding of most boilerplate provisions,. . . there can be no con-
scious assent to such terms. Conscious assent can be given only to "dickered" terms, the
terms reasonable parties normally and consciously negotiate. As to the boilerplate, ...
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familiar. Use of standard form contracts drastically decreases the like-
lihood that the terms conform to both parties' understanding.49 In fact,
the Maryland statutes allowing injured parties to void hastily signed
releases seem to suggest that these parties are vulnerable.5" Their vul-
nerability makes the more liberal method of interpretation attractive in
release cases.
Maryland need not completely reject its traditional approach in
these cases or adopt the "special rule" that Judge Davidson suggested
in her concurring opinion. But the court should refuse to apply the
"blanket assent" will not be presumed as to "indecent" or, in the language of the Re-
statement (Second), "bizarre or oppressive" boilerplate provisions.
Murray, supra note 42, at 1374 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Hurt v. Leatherby, 380 So. 2d
432, 434 (Fla. 1980) ("Manifestation of intent must be more explicit than signing a printed
form which happens to contain broad, general release language .. ").
For Llewellyn the problem is closely tied to traditional notions of the freedom of
contract. He argues that freedom of contract presupposes free bargaining and that in the
typical standardized form situation where bargaining is absent, "the conditions and clauses
to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but
are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper." K. LLEWELLYN,
supra, at 367 (citations omitted). Hence there are two contracts in Llewellyn's view: the
dickered agreement and the enforceable boilerplate, which reasonably supplements the
"dickered" terms.
Defendants might argue that standardized form analysis is inappropriate because
presumably there are no supplemental terms at all in releases; instead, the writing is a mani-
festation of the "dickered" agreement. This distinction is not meaningful since the risk of
misunderstanding and of binding an unknowing or confused party to oppressive terms is
still present.
49. Apparently these arguments have not impressed Maryland courts. There has been a
general trend in insurance law to honor the insured's "reasonable expectations" even when
contrary to written policy provisions. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a), at 350-61
(1971); Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance- Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981). Despite this general trend, Mary-
land continues to strictly enforce these agreements. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 704-07, 399 A.2d 877, 882-83 (1979); Government Employees Ins.
Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 720, 261 A.2d 747, 749 (1970). However, an ambiguity will be
strictly construed against the insurer. Id. The Maryland court implicity rejected this argu-
ment for a release in Gingell v. Backus, 246 Md. 83, 227 A.2d 349 (1967). In Gingell, a law
student insurance agent had an uneducated 64 year-old laborer execute a release. The court
noted the parties' disparate bargaining positions, but upheld the release, concluding:
This is simply another case in which the untutored, but literate litigant did not make
reasonable use of his intellectual attainments; meager though they might have been, but
which nonetheless were at hand and available for use, and now asks the court to undo
the harm he has brought upon himself.
Id. at 92, 227 A.2d at 354.
Llewellyn has characterized cases such as Gingell this way: "[Courts] read the docu-
ment for what it says, drop a word about freedom of contract, or about opportunity to read
or improvident use of the pen, or about powerlessness of the court to do more than regret,
• ..and proceed to spit the victim for the barbecue." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 48, at 364.
50. Presumably the Maryland legislature intended to protect tort victims from the pres-
sures of "midnight releases" thrust upon them soon after injury. See Western Md. Dairy
Corp. v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 263-64, 181 A. 468, 471-72 (1935).
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strict parol evidence rule in cases involving standard form releases un-
less (1) the releasor was represented by counsel or (2) the standard form
release highlighted a provision explaining that the release granted im-
munity from future claims." If neither of these conditions is satisfied,
the court should admit evidence that the releasor did not understand
the immunity provision and that his understanding is more reasonable.
In the face of this approach, insurance companies probably would
modify their standard forms to preserve the benefits associated with
keeping issues of interpretation from the jury. 2 The burden on insur-
ance companies would be negligible because modifying the form would
not interfere with the release process. For insurance companies to ar-
gue otherwise would be tantamount to admitting that impermissible
benefits had flowed from previous bargains. Furthermore, if the forms
were modified, the proposed approach would not interfere with judicial
efficiency. Any case involving a release with a highlighted immunity
provision would be governed by the strict parol evidence rule.
In such cases the strict approach is equitable. When the releasee
has satisfied the parol evidence rule's clarity requirement by highlight-
ing the immunity provision, the presumption of mutual intent becomes
more than a legal fiction." Courts perhaps can legitimately assume
that after signing a release with a highlighted provision, a releasor
should not be heard to argue that he did not understand the release to
include claims for future injuries.
The Bernstein court correctly refused to adopt the incorrect rea-
soning of the majority of American jurisdictions. However, the court's
preoccupation with preserving Maryland's traditional contract princi-
ples prevented the court from adopting a more equitable approach in
light of the circumstances that surround the execution of release agree-
ments. The court should have limited its holding to cases like Bern-
stein, where plaintiffs have the benefit of counsel. At the next
opportunity the Court of Appeals should distinguish Bernstein and
adopt a more flexible and equitable position in the resolution of these
cases by refusing to grant defendants the benefit of the traditional parol
evidence rules unless the releasor is represented by counsel or the stan-
dard form release highlights the provision granting the releasee immu-
nity from all potential future liability.
51. See Murray, supra note 42, at 1381. In another area of standardized agreements, the
Uniform Commercial Code requires waivers of warranty provisions to be appropriately flag-
ged. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1981), which suggests that form contracts containing terms with
potentially drastic consequences arbitrarily imposed by one party concerned the drafters.
52. See supra note 42.
53. See supra note 48.
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STATE v. PRIET - A TRIAL JUDGE MAY CONSIDER THE
RECORD AS A WHOLE IN DETERMINING THAT A
DEFENDANT UNDERSTANDS THE
NATURE OF THE CHARGE TO
WHICH HE PLEADS GUILTY
In State v. Priet' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
trial judge may consider the record as a whole in determining whether
a criminal defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he
pleads guilty.2 The court held that neither due process nor Maryland
Rule 731(c)3 requires a trial judge to explain to a defendant the nature
of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.4 Although Priet correctly
concluded that the United States Constitution does not require such an
explanation, the court's construction of Rule 731(c) is questionable.
Appellee Priet pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Baltimore
1. 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981).
2. Id. at 291, 424 A.2d at 361.
3. In Priet the court interpreted the 1977 version of Rule 731(c), which stated:
The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first questioning the defend-
ant on the record to determine that the plea is made voluntarily, with understanding of
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The court may accept the
plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the
court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. If the court refuses to accept a
plea of guilty, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
MD. R.P. 731(c) (repealed Jan. 1, 1982). The Court of Appeals amended Rule 731(c), effective
January 1, 1982, so that it presently states:
If the defendant tenders a plea of guilty, the court may not accept the plea until
it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court by the
court, by the State's Attorney, by the attorney for the defendant, or by any combination
thereof, that the plea is made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. The court may accept the plea of guilty even
though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the court is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea. If the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty, the
court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
MD. R.P. 731(c).
The language in the 1977 version of Rule 731(c) might have led one to believe that
the court must conduct the inquiry of the defendant to determine that the plea is valid.
However, that interpretation of the rule was foreclosed by the Court of Appeal's decision in
Fiet, upholding the acceptance of two guilty pleas in which the defendant's counsel and the
State's Attorney respectively had conducted the questioning. 289 Md. at 291, 424 A.2d at
361.
Amended Rule 731(c) resolves any doubt as to who may properly conduct the in-
quiry of the defendant by providing that, in addition to the trial judge, either the defendant's
attorney or the State's Attorney may conduct the questioning. The language in the amended
rule governing the method of questioning the defendant, however, does not appear substan-
tially different from that of the old rule.
4. 289 Md. at 290-91, 424 A.2d at 361.
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County and was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon.' The trial
judge did not explain the offense to Priet - nor did he ask Priet
whether he understood the nature of the charge against him - before
concluding that his plea was voluntary and intelligent.' The defendant,
however, told the judge that he had discussed the plea, the facts of his
case, and the possible defenses to the crime with his attorney.7 Priet
appealed his conviction to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
where he contended that the trial court, in accepting his guilty plea,
violated Rule 731(c) by not explaining the nature of the charge on the
record.' The Court of Special Appeals, relying on the Court of Ap-
.peals' decision in Countess v. State,9 reversed Priet's conviction and re-
manded for a new trial. 10 Countess, an interpretation of pre-1982 Rule
735(d),1 held that when a defendant elects to waive the right to a jury
5. See Priet v. State, 45 Md. App. 1, 1, 410 A.2d 1107, 1107 (1980).
6. The pertinent part of the colloquy between the trial judge and defendant Priet was:
THE COURT: Have you discussed your guilty plea fully with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Have you discussed all of the relevant facts and possible defenses
about this case with Mr. Brennan?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Transcript of Guilty Plea at 6, State v. Priet, Crim. Nos. 63118/100/69 & 63119/101/69 (Md.
Cit. Ct. Balto. County Jan. 9, 1979).
7. Id.
8. Priet v. State, 45 Md. App. 1, 2, 410 A.2d 1107, 1108 (1980).
9. 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979).
10. 45 Md. App. at 5, 410 A.2d at 1109.
11. When Countess and Priet were decided, Rule 735(d) provided:
If the defendant elects to be tried by the court, the trial of the case on its merits
before the court may not proceed until the court determines, after inquiry of the de-
fendant on the record, that the defendant has made his election for a court trial with full
knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that he has knowingly and voluntarily waived
the right. If the court determines otherwise, it shall give the defendant another election
pursuant to this Rule.
MD. R.P. 735(d) (repealed Jan. 1, 1982). Effective January 1, 1982, the Court of Appeals
modified the rule governing the procedure for accepting a waiver of a jury trial. The new
rule provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the com-
mencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an
examination of the defendant on the record in open court by the court, by the State's
Attorney, by the attorney for the defendant, or by any combination thereof, that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived a jury trial.
MD. R.P. 735(b). The new rule no longer requires that the defendant make his election with
"full knowledge of his right to a jury trial," language that Countess interpreted to mean
"basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial." 286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308. Be-
cause the Countess holding was based in part on this language, Countess may no longer
dictate how much a defendant must know about the nature of a jury trial in order to make a
valid election under Rule 735. However, the words "full knowledge of his right to a jury
trial" seemed merely to explain the requirement that the defendant "knowingly" waive a
jury trial. Thus, arguably, this language was eliminated because it was redundant. Since the
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trial, the requisite inquiry must be addressed to the defendant in open
court, be recorded, and elicit the defendant's knowledge of his right to
a jury trial.'2 Emphasizing the analogy between Rule 731(c) and
735(d), the Court of Special Appeals in Priet ruled that the trial judge
had not observed Rule 731(c) because he did not inquire, on the record,
whether Priet understood the charges to which he pleaded guilty.'3
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari' 4 to decide whether the
new rule retains the requirement that the defendant's waiver be knowing, Countess probably
still provides the yardstick for measuring the knowledge required to make a valid election
under Rule 735.
12. 286 Md. at 454-55, 408 A.2d at 1307-08.
13. 45 Md. App. at 3, 410 A.2d at 1108.
14. State v. Priet was a consolidated appeal of three criminal cases. In addition to Priet,
the Court of Appeals examined Pincus v. State, No. 813 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 29, 1980),
and Vandiver v. State, No. 743 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 22, 1980).
Appellee Pincus pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in the Criminal Court of
Baltimore City. The pertinent part of the colloquy between the Assistant State's Attorney
and the defendant prior to the trial judge's acceptance of the plea was:
MR. PREVAS: Is there anything that you don't understand that has been asked of you
today?
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. PREVAS: Do you feel comfortable that you are doing the right thing when you
are pleading guilty with Mr. Reddick's advice?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. PREVAS: And you understand the difference between first degree murder, that
you could possibly get a life sentence, and second degree murder where the maximum
could have been thirty, but the State is recommending a maximum of fifteen, do you
understand that?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. PREVAS: Is that one of the things you took into consideration when you pled
guilty to second degree murder?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Transcript of Guilty Plea at 10-11, State v. Pincus, Ind. No. 17828916 (Md. Crim. Ct. Balto.
City Apr. 30, 1979).
Vandiver pleaded guilty to robbery in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. The
following colloquy between the defendant and his trial attorney prior to the court's accept-
ance of the plea is all the record reveals of Vandiver's understanding of the charge:
Q. Gary, you're pleading guilty under Alford which is a technical plea to the offense
of robbery and I discussed with you exactly what the elements of robbery are, did I not?
A. Yes.
Q. Now you understand what the offense of robbery consist [sic], what burden the
State would have to prove against you to convict you of robbery before either a Court
or jury?
A. Yes.
Transcript of Guilty Plea at 4, State v. Vandiver, Ind. No. 57831706 (Md. Crim. Ct. Balto.
City June 12, 1979).
The Court of Special Appeals reversed both convictions, citing Priet and Countess.
The court concluded that in each case the record did not disclose the requisite inquiry of the
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Court of Special Appeals had correctly interpreted Rule 731(c).11 In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Murphy, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the lower court, holding that Maryland Rule 731(c) does not re-
quire a trial judge to inform a defendant of the legal elements
comprising the offense or to follow any fixed procedure or ritual in
determining whether a defendant understands the nature of the offense
to which he is pleading guilty.' 6 Instead, the court said that a trial
judge should make the required determination "on a case-by-case ba-
sis, taking into account the relevant circumstances in their totality as
disclosed by the record, including among other factors, the complexity
of the charge, the personal characteristics of the accused, and the fac-
tual basis proferred to support the court's acceptance of the plea."' 7
Finally, the court concluded that the record in this case provided a suf-
ficient basis for the trial judge's determination that Priet understood the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.' 8
Guilty pleas are estimated to account for more than seventy per-
cent of all criminal convictions. 9 Thus, a fair procedure for accepting
them is critical to the just and accurate administration of criminal jus-
tice. A guilty plea is an admission of the material elements of the
crime, as well as a waiver of several constitutional rights - the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the right to confront one's accusers, and
the right to a jury trial.20 Therefore due process requires that, to be
valid, a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent.2' A number of
Supreme Court decisions - most notably Boykin v. Alabama22 and
Henderson v. Morgan23 - have discussed the safeguards necessary to
ensure voluntariness of guilty pleas.
defendant mandated by Rule 731(c). Pincus, No. 813, slip op. at 4; Vandiver, No. 743, slip op.
at 3-4.
15. 289 Md. at 269, 424 A.2d at 350.
16. Id. at 287-88, 424 A.2d at 359.
17. Id. at 288, 424 A.2d at 360.
18. Id. at 290-91, 424 A.2d at 360-61.
19. In Maryland, no state-wide statistics are available. However, in 1980 the Maryland
Sentencing Guidelines Project conducted a study of circuit court cases in four jurisdictions:
Baltimore City, Harford County, Prince George's County, and Montgomery County. This
study showed that in 1979, 73.7% of convictions resulted from guilty pleas. The percentage
probably would have been higher if the study had included the district courts as well as the
circuit courts, since only the most serious cases originate in the circuit courts. Telephone
interview with Charles H. Clemens, Jr., Research Analyst, Maryland Sentencing Guidelines
Project (Nov. 9, 1981); See also DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT A-74 (prelim. ed. 1981) (81% of federal convictions were obtained pursuant to pleas
of guilty or nolo contendere during the 12-month period ending June 30, 1981).
20. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
21. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
22. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
23. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
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In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction
based on a guilty plea because the record failed to show either that the
judge had asked the defendant any questions or that the defendant had
addressed the court.24 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, ruled
that the trial judge had erred in accepting the guilty plea without an
"affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
-and voluntary. ' 25 He con-
cluded that the Court would not presume voluntariness from a silent
record.26 However, the Court provided virtually no guidance as to
what must appear on the record to demonstrate that a plea is voluntary
and intelligent.27
In Henderson v. Morgan, the Court examined the validity of a
guilty plea to a charge of second-degree murder. The defendant was
below average in intelligence, 2 and neither the court nor counsel had
explained to him that intent to cause death was an essential element of
the crime.29 The Court stated that "intent is such a critical element of
the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is re-
quired" in order to assure that a plea is voluntary.30 However, the
Court did not rule that a description of every element of the offense
always is required.3 Rather, Morgan indicated that a trial court
24. 395 U.S. at 239.
25. Id. at 242.
26. Id. at 242-43.
27. Justice Douglas listed three constitutional rights - the right to a jury trial, the right
to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination - which he summa-
rily concluded could not be presumed waived from a silent record. Id. at 243. Neverthe-
less, Boykin has not been read to require a specific waiver of these three contitutional rights.
See Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 116-17, 361 A.2d 113, 120-21 (1976).
For example, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court noted that it
has long been recognized that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be intelligent and voluntary.
Further, the Brady Court intimated that Boykin merely added the requirement that the rec-
ord must affirmatively disclose that the defendant's guilty plea was entered understandingly
and intelligently. Id. at 747 n.4. But see Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 924 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (contending that the state has the burden of demon-
strating that a defendant knowingly waived the three constitutional rights enumerated in
Boykin). See generally Note, Henderson v. Morgan, (Guilty Flea Invalid as Involuntary
Where Defendant Unaware of an Essential Element of the Crime), 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 111-12
(1977).
28. 426 U.S. at 641-42.
29. Id. at 640.
30. Id. at 647 n.18.
3 1. Id. The court suggested that acceptable alternatives are available. Referring to the
intent element of second-degree murder it said:
There is nothing in this record that can serve as a substitute for either a finding
after trial, or a voluntary admission, that respondent had the requisite intent. Defense
counsel did not purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to him that his plea
would be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or admission
necessarily implying that he had such intent.
Id. at 646. Finally theCourt stated that "it may be appropriate to presume that in most
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"should examine the totality of the circumstances and determine
whether the substance of the charge, as opposed to its technical ele-
ments, was conveyed to the accused."32
Priet seems to comply with Boykin and Henderson, for the Mary-
land court held: "Necessarily, the required determination [of whether
an accused understands the charge] can only be made on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the relevant circumstances in their totality as
disclosed by the record. . . .,3 Apparently neither Boykin nor Mor-
gan demands any further safeguard for the voluntariness required by
due process. 34 Although Boykin seems to require some record evidence
of voluntariness, Henderson explicitly rejected any suggestion that a
trial judge must explain to the defendant every element of the offense.
The Court of Appeals also implicitly held that Rule 731(c) does not
require anything beyond compliance with due process.35 In construing
the language of the rule, the court looked to decisions interpreting two
cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give
the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." Id. at 647.
32. Id. at 644.
33. 289 Md. at 288, 424 A.2d at 360.
34. See Note, supra note 27, at 110-20.
35. In Maryland, the earliest enunciated standard for accepting guilty pleas required
that the record reflect that the plea was made by a competent person, "freely and volunta-
rily, and with afull understanding of its nature and effect, and of the facts on which it is
founded." Lowe v. State, III Md. 1,15, 73 A. 637, 639 0909) (emphasis in original). However,
in applying this standard in the cases that followed, the Court of Appeals was reluctant to
invalidate a guilty plea because of an inadequate record. See Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103,
108, 361 A.2d 113, 116 (1976). In 1966, the court held that a trial judge need not follow a specific
ritual, James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 428, 219 A.2d 17, 20 (1966), nor personally address the
defendant, in order to determine that a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, Owens v.
State, 243 Md. 719, 721, 222 A.2d 838, 839 (1966). The trial court only had to satisfy itself-
as opposed to having the record reflect - that the plea was entered voluntarily with an
understanding of the offense and the consequences of the plea. James, 242 Md. at 428, 219
A.2d at 20.
It was not until Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976), that the court consid-
ered the implications of Boyk. and its progeny on the Maryland standard for accepting
guilty pleas. In Davis the court ruled that after Boykin due process requires the record as a
whole to disclose affirmatively that the defendant pleaded guilty voluntarily and intelli-
gently. Id. at 114, 361 A.2d at 119. Additionally, the court stated that "Boykin does not stand
for the proposition that the due process clause requires state trial courts to specifically enu-
merate certain rights, or go through any particular litany, before accepting a defendant's
guilty plea." Id.
Davis was decided one year before the adoption of Rule 731(c). However, it is note-
worthy that Priet, which gave the initial interpretation of the new rule, merely reiterated the
Davis standard. Hence, the court's decision in Priet suggests that the Rule 731(c) require-
ment - that the defendant plead "with understanding of the charge" - is a nullity, for in
light of Priet, this portion of the rule adds nothing to the existing common law standard for
the acceptance of guilty pleas.
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similarly worded rules - Federal Rule 11,36 which governs guilty pleas
in federal courts, and Maryland Rule 735(d), 7 which covered elections
to waive the right to a jury trial in Maryland. The Court found support
for its interpretation of Maryland's guilty plea rule in federal decisions
holding that the corresponding federal rule does not require a federal
court to explain the nature of the charge to which the defendant is
pleading guilty.3
Although these decisions ordinarily might be persuasive, they lose
much of their force in the face of Countess v. State,39 which construed
pre-1982 Maryland Rule 735(d)."° Nevertheless, the Priet court con-
cluded that the Countess construction of Rule 735(d) should not control
the construction of Rule 731(c). 41 This conclusion is questionable, how-
ever, because at the time of the decision the language of the two rules
was very similar. Rule 735(d) stated: "If the defendant elects to be
tried by the court,. . . the court may not proceed until the court deter-
mines, after inquiry of the defendant on the record, that the defendant
has made his election for a court trial with full knowledge of his right to
a jury trial . . ". 2 Rule 731(c) provided: "The court may not accept
a plea of guilty without first questioning the defendant on the record to
determine that the plea is made. . . with understanding of the nature of
the charge .... -43
In Countess the court held that a defendant has "full knowledge"
of a jury trial if he is aware that, before he is convicted in a jury trial,
all twelve jurors must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Countess held further that the inquiry required by 735(d) to determine
whether a defendant has this knowledge "must be addressed to the de-
fendant in open court and recorded. . . so as to be available for appel-
late review if the election is questioned. . . . [T]he court must not only
36. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defend-
ant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands,
... the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1).
37. See supra note 10.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 611 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911
(1980); United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1979)(en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
904 (1980); United States v. Kriz, 586 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945
(1979); United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Michaelson, 552
F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979).
40. See supra note 10.
41. 289 Md. at 289, 424 A.2d at 360.
42. MD. R.P. 735(d) (repealed Jan. 1, 1982) (emphasis added), quoted supra note 10.
43. MD. R.P. 731(c) (repealed Jan. 1, 1982) (emphasis added), quoted supra note 2.
44. 286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308.
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know what was told the defendant but be in a position to evaluate the
responses of the defendant to the information imparted. ' 45  Yet in
Priet, the court held that a trial judge need only look at the record as a
whole in determining that a defendant understands the nature of the
charge.46 Priet mandates no inquiry of a defendant regarding the na-
ture of the charge. The court did not explain why it interpreted these
similarly worded statutes so differently.
Furthermore, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, there
seems to be no justification for a stricter construction of the rule gov-
erning the waiver of a jury trial than of the rule governing guilty
pleas.47 In fact, a defendant who waives a jury trial will receive a judge
trial, while a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to any
trial.48 His need for protection is at least as great as that of a defendant
who waives only his right to a jury trial.49
Thus, although the two pre-1982 rules demanded different inquir-
ies, as the Court of Special Appeals observed in Matthews v. State,"
there seems to be no reason to suppose that they contemplated different
standards of compliance. Both explicitly required only that the trial
judge inquire on the record whether the defendant has sufficient under-
standing for his action to be knowing and voluntary. Why then should
the court have read Rule 735(d) to require more record evidence of the
defendant's understanding than Rule 731(c)? 5'
45. Id. at 454, 408 A.2d at 1307.
46. 289 Md. at 291, 424 A.2d at 361.
47. Priet v. State, 45 Md. App. 1, 3-4, 410 A.2d 1107, 1108 (1980).
48. Id.
49. It is conceivable that a flagrant violation of Rule 735(d) would harm a defendant
more than a minor violation of Rule 731(c). For example, compare a defendant who would
not have waived his right to a jury trial but for some significant violation of Rule 735(d) with
a defendant who would have pleaded guilty anyway despite a minor departure from the
requirements of Rule 731(c). Nevertheless, a defendant waives more constitutional rights
when pleading guilty than when waiving a jury trial.
50. 46 Md. App. 172, 178, 416 A.2d 1314, 1317 (1980).
51. The court attempted to justify the variance between the Priet and Countess holdings
by stating that because "the two rules are separate and distinct the specifically deline-
ated requirements of Rule 735(d) are not engrafted upon Rule 731(c)." 289 Md. at 289, 424
A.2d at 360. However, the Court of Special Appeals had applied a different construction,
mandating only that the subject matter of both inquiries - though different - be shown
affirmatively on the record. Matthews v. State, 46 Md. App. 172, 178, 416 A.2d 1314, 1317
(1980). This standard differs from the Court of Appeals' standard, which permits a trial
judge to consider the record as a whole to determine whether a defendant understands the
nature of the charge. 289 Md. at 291, 424 A.2d at 361. The intermediate appellate court's
requirement of an "affirmative showing" suggests a strict construction of Rule 731(c) similar
to the strict construction of Rule 735(d) enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Countess. By
summarily concluding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the trial
judge had not complied with Rule 731(c) in Prier, 289 Md. at 290, 424 A.2d at 360-61, the
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The parallel language of Rules 735(d) and 73 1(c) suggests that the
court should have interpreted these rules similarly.52 Furthermore,
sound policy considerations would support a strict reading of Rule
731(c), requiring the trial judge to explain to the defendant the nature of
the crime to which he is pleading guilty.53 In McCarthy v. United
States54 the Supreme Court, construing the federal rule governing the
acceptance of guilty pleas, stated that building a strong and complete
record "not only will insure that every accused is afforded those proce-
dural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great waste of judicial
resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea con-
victions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when
the original record is inadequate."55 The Maryland Court of Appeals
has undermined these goals by allowing a trial judge to resort to "as-
sumptions," instead of a record based on the defendant's responses to
questions regarding the nature of the charge.56 Moreover, requiring a
more complete record would impose no substantial burden on trial
courts, because a thorough voluntariness and accuracy inquiry is esti-
mated to take ten minutes or less.57
Other courts have required even more on the record than the
Court of Special Appeals would have. In Commonwealth v. Ingram5
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the record must show
that the trial judge outlined, in understandable terms, the elements of
the charge.59 Observing that merely naming the crime is not sufficient,
the court said: "While such terms clearly connote some meaning to the
court obfuscated the fact that the Court of Special Appeals had construed the rule more
strictly.
Although the Court of Appeals garnered ample support for its Priet decision from
precedents in Maryland and other jurisdictions, see 289 Md. at 274-88, 424 A.2d at 353-59, it
did not explain adequately the reasons for the logical inconsistencies between its Priet and
Countess holdings. It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeals recently has amended Rule
735 so that it may now be susceptible to an interpretation that would apply a less stringent
standard for accepting jury trial waivers. See supra note 10. Query whether the court has
exercised its rule-making authority to harmonize its interpretation of Rules 731 and 735.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
53. For discussions of policy considerations supporting the strict construction of guilty
plea rules, see Comment, Pleading Guilty. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 and the New Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure fl, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 116; Note, Rule I of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.- The Case For Strict Compliance After United States v. Dayton, 66 VA.
L. REv. 1169 (1980). But see Comment, Appellate Review of Guilty Plea Acceptances in Fed-
eral Court." Harmless Error in a Rule I1 Proceeding?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 687 (1978).
54. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
55. Id. at 472.
56. See id. at 467.
57. Erickson, Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 835, 848-49 (1973).
58. 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974).
59. Id. at 203-04, 316 A.2d at 80.
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layman, this meaning does not always embrace the basic legal elements
of the crime."160 Otherwise courts would not need to instruct juries on
such points, "for certainly an average defendant cannot be presumed to
understand more than an average juror. "61 Furthermore, it is conceiv-
able that unless the trial judge explains the elements of the charge, the
defendant may plead guilty to a crime more serious than the one he
actually committed.
CONCLUSION
Although Priet's flexible standard for compliance with Rule 731(c)
meets minimum due process standards, it is a less than commendable
standard. A preferable standard would require that the record disclose
a direct discussion with the defendant eliciting his understanding of the
nature of the charge. Strict construction of the rule would better serve
to protect the defendant's rights and promote efficient and accurate re-
views of guilty plea convictions. Furthermore, as one commentator
noted: "[N]o judge can take pride in holding his procedure to the very
minimum of fairness as required by the law."' 62 In the words of former
Chief Justice Earl Warren: "It is . . .not too much to require that,
before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment. . . judges take
the few minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to deter-
mine whether they understand the action they are taking. '6 3
60. Id. at 203, 316 A.2d at 80.
61. Id.
62. Thompson, A Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 214, 222 (1960).
63. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 472.
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STATE . RUSE - A VICTIM OF MARYLAND'S RAPE LAW?
In State v. Rusk,' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to convict Edward Rusk
of second degree rape under Article 27, § 463(a)(1). 2 Although the
court's decision was ostensibly correct, the analysis offered in support is
incomplete, and so seems to suggest that Maryland courts have dis-
pensed with, or at least ignored the mens rea requirement in dealing
with this very serious crime against the person.
THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY
At trial, the 21 year old victim, Pat, testified that on September 21,
1977, after a high school alumnae meeting, she and a girl friend, Terry,
drove their separate cars to Fells Point to have a few drinks. Pat met
the defendant, Edward Rusk, when he engaged her in conversation af-
ter exchanging greetings with her friend Terry.3 After talking to him
for about twenty minutes, Pat told Rusk that she had to leave because it
was a week night and she had to wake up with her two-year-old son
early the next morning.4
Rusk asked Pat which way she was going and then requested a
ride to his apartment. Pat testified that although she did not know
Rusk, she thought Terry did because she, Terry, had greeted him by
name. Thus, Pat agreed to the defendant's request. On the way to her
car, however, Pat warned Rusk that "I'm just giving a ride home, you
know, as a friend, not anything to be, you know, thought of other than
a ride."5
Twenty minutes after leaving Fells Point they arrived at Rusk's
apartment in the 3100 block of Guilford Avenue. Pat testified that she
was totally unfamiliar with the. neighborhood. She parked her car at
the curb on the side of the street opposite the defendant's apartment,
but did not turn off the engine. Rusk then invited Pat into his apart-
ment three times. Pat refused three times. After her third refusal, Pat
1. 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).
2. Id at 246-47, 424 A.2d at 728. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 463(a)(1) (1982) provides:
(a) What constitutes - A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(1) By force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the
other person.
3. 289 Md. at 232, 424 A.2d at 721.
4. Id at 233, 424 A.2d at 721.
5. Id
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said that she could not accompany Rusk even if she wanted to because
she was separated from her husband and feared that a detective might
be watching her. Pat testified that the defendant then leaned over,
turned off the ignition and removed the keys. Getting out of the auto-
mobile, Rusk walked over to her side, opened the door and said,
"'Now, will you come up?' "6 The victim testified that at this point she
feared Rusk would rape her.' She justified her fear by citing his
"threatening"8 look and her unfamiliarity with the neighborhood.9
Despite this fear, or because of it, Pat walked with Rusk across the
street, into the dark row house, and followed him up the stairs. Pat
testified that she did not see or hear anyone in the building. They en-
tered his apartment, and Rusk turned on the light. The defendant sat
on the bed while Pat sat in an adjacent chair. Several minutes later,
Rusk left the apartment for a period of time which Pat estimated to be
between one and five minutes. According to the victim's testimony, she
did not attempt to leave, and she implied that she did not seek to draw
any attention to her situation by screaming or making noise. She fur-
ther testified she was unaware that there was a telephone in the room,
and that upon returning to the room, Rusk turned off the light and sat
on the bed. Although Pat requested that Rusk permit her to leave, the
defendant expressed his desire that she stay. Pat testified that, at this
point, Rusk still possessed her car keys.' 0
Pat further testified that following this exchange, Rusk asked her
to join him on the bed, pulling her towards him by her arms. He then
removed her blouse and bra and unzipped her slacks, which she re-
moved after he told her to do so. After she took off the remainder of
her clothing, he requested that she remove his pants. The victim
complied. "
Pat testified that as the defendant proceeded to kiss her, she
begged him to let her go, but that he refused. Then, prompted by an
indescribable look in his eyes, she asked Rusk if he would let her leave
without killing her if she did what he wanted. Pat testified that she
then broke into tears, at which point Rusk placed his hands on her
throat and started to "lightly choke her."' 2 She again asked, "'If I do
what you want, will you let me go?' "'s The defendant said yes. Pat
6. Id.
7. Id at 234, 424 A.2d at 721.
8. Id at 234, 424 A.2d at 721-22.
9. Id at 233, 424 A.2d at 721-22.
10. Id at 234, 424 A.2d at 722.
11. Id
12. Id at 235, 424 A.2d at 722.
13. Id
19821
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
testified that Rusk then made her perform oral sex followed by sexual
intercourse. 14
Immediately following the intercourse Pat again asked to leave.
Rusk agreed and they each got dressed. Rusk then returned Pat's car
keys and walked her to her car. Before Pat left, Rusk asked if he could
see her again. Although Pat said that he could, she emphasized at the
trial that she had no intention of meeting the defendant again. After
receiving directions out of the neighborhood, the victim left.1 5
THE DECISION
A Baltimore City jury found Rusk guilty of second degree rape. 16
The Court of Special Appeals, however, reversed the conviction in an 8
to 5 decision, holding that the evidence of Rusk's guilt was insufficient
to submit the case to the jury.17
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals identified the control-
ling issue as whether, in light of Maryland precedent, there was legally
sufficient evidence before the jury to establish that the defendant ac-
complished intercourse "[b]y force or threat of force against the will
and without the consent of the victim in violation" of the Maryland
second degree rape statute.'8 The court correctly explained that a re-
viewing court should not be influenced by its own perception of the
case, but should ask whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found
14. Id
15. Id
16. See id at 231-32, 424 A.2d at 720. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(1) (1982),
quoted supra at note 2. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1982) which provides:
(a) . . . - A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the person engages in vaginal
intercourse with another person by force or threat of force against the will and without
the consent of the other person and:
(1) Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the
other person reasonably concludes is a dangerous or deadly weapon; or (2) Inflicts suf-
focation, strangulation, disfigurement, or serious physical injury upon the other person
or upon anyone else in the course of committing the offense; or (3) Threatens or places
the victim in fear that the victim or any person known to the victim will be imminently
subjected to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or
kidnapping.
The apparent difference between § 462 and § 463 is that the former demands a stronger
showing of violence. But one can easily confuse a violation of § 463(a)(1), the statute under
which Rusk was convicted, with a violation of § 462(a)(1)-(3) due to the similar wording of
the statutes. Arguably the state should have prosecuted Rusk under § 462 since his "light
choking" of the victim was a significant factor in both the jury's conviction and the Court of
Appeals' decision.
17. Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624 (1979) (en banc).
18. 289 Md. at 240, 424 A.2d at 725.
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that the state had established the requisite elements of the offense.' 9
The Rusk case afforded the Court of Appeals its first discussion of
Maryland rape law since Hazel v. State,2 ° a prosecution for common
law rape. When the Maryland legislature codified detailed sexual of-
fense laws in 1976,21 it recited, but did not define the elements of rape.
In accordance with the statutory directive to give undefined terms their
"judicially determined meaning," the court in Rusk relied on Hazel's
definitions of the elements of rape.22 Citing Hazel, the Court of Ap-
peals noted that
[i]f the acts and threats of the defendant were reasonably calcu-
lated to create in the mind of the victim - having regard to the
circumstances in which she was placed - a real apprehension, due
to fear, of imminent bodily harm serious enough to impair or over-
come her will to resist, then such acts and threats are the
equivalent of force.23
The court then concluded that the reasonableness of the victim's fear
was an appropriate issue for jury resolution,24 and that the trier of fact
in the case at bar could rationally have found "that the elements of
force and non-consent had been established and that Rusk was guilty
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."25 Thus, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the Court of Special Appeals' judgment and ordered that
court to affirm the judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.26
19. Id (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
20. 221 Md. 464, 157 A.2d 922 (1960).
21. 1976 Md. Laws ch. 573. See Blotkamp v. State, 45 Md. App. 64, 69, 411 A.2d 1068,
1071 (1980) for a brief summary of the legislative history of the statutory sexual offenses.
22. 289 Md. at 240, 424 A.2d at 725. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464 E (1982) provides:
"Undefined words or phrases in this subheading which describe elements of the common-
law crime of rape shall retain their judicially determined meaning except to the extent ex-
pressly or by implication changed in this subheading."
23. 289 Md. at 242, 424 A.2d at 726 (quoting Hazel v. State, 221 Md. at 469, 157 A.2d at
925). Because submission to the defendant's advances as a result of fear does not equal
consent, the Rusk court concluded Hazel would allow evidence of the victim's fear to estab-
lish both the elements of force and non-consent. 289 Md. at 243, 424 A.2d at 726.
24. 289 Md. at 245, 424 A.2d at 727. The court held that if the victim's fear is reason-
able, it will "obviate the need for proof of actual force on the part of the assailant or physical
resistance on the part of the victim." Id at 244, 424 A.2d at 727. The Court of Appeals
cited 17 cases that supported its recognition of the "reasonable apprehension rule," as la-
beled by the Court of Special Appeals. However, in 14 of these cases, unlike in Rusk, the
defendant unequivocally manifested his criminal intent via his acts and/or threats of vio-
lence. The use of the reasonable apprehension rule in a case with a factual setting such as
that found in Rusk has its faults in that the court can overlook the requisite mens rea of the
offense. For a further explanation of the confusion that can develop, see infra notes 36-54
and accompanying text.
25. 289 Md. at 246-47, 424 A.2d at 728.
26. Id at 247, 424 A.2d at 427.
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Judge Cole, while concurring in the majority's choice of standard
for appellate review, dissented from the court's application of that stan-
dard. Specifically, he disapproved of the majority's determining that
rational jurors could have found the victim's fear reasonable, before it
questioned whether the jury could have concluded "that the defendant's
conduct under the circumstances was reasonably calculated27 to give
rise to a fear on her part to the extent that she was unable to re-
sist. .... ,2 Judge Cole stressed that "ft/he conduct of the defendant, in
and ofitself, must clearly indicateforce such as to overpower the prosecu-
trix's ability to resist or will to resist.' '29 Only after that requirement is
satisfied, he maintained, should a court reach the question of the rea-
sonableness of the victim's fear.
Judge Cole concluded that because the majority did not consider
whether the defendant had "objectively manifested his intent to use
physical force,"3 ° it had declared "the innocence of an at best dis-
traught young woman [but did not] demonstrate the defendant's guilt
of the crime of rape."'"
DISCUSSION
The nature of the crime makes many rape cases difficult to resolve.
Courts often find it hard to "distinguish an act of mutually desired sex-
ual union from an act of forced, criminal sexual aggression."32 They
can easily distinguish between the two acts when a woman physically
resists the rapist's attack. Resistance not only places the attacker on
notice that what he is doing is wrong (thereby establishing mens rea in
the usual case); it also demonstrates to the court that the victim was not
a willing participant.33
27. For further discussion of the phrase "reasonably calculated" and the problems it
creates, see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
28. 289 Md. 230, 247-48, 424 A.2d 720, 728-29 (Cole, Digges and Smith, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
29. 289 Md. at 248, 424 A.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
30. Id at 255, 424 A.2d at 733.
31. Id at 256, 424 A.2d at 733.
32. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 384 (1975). "[R]ape is the only form of violent
criminal assault in which the physical act accomplished by the offender. . . is an act which
may, under other circumstances, be desirable to the victim." MODEL PENAL CODE § 231.1, at
279 (1980) quoting Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition o/Forcible Rape, 61
VA. L. REV. 1500, 1503 (1975).
33. See Note, supra note 32, at 1533:
The issue of mental culpability is often not a significant problem in a forcible rape case.
Once the element of forcible or coercive physical conduct has been proven, some
mental culpability is apt to be assumed, since it is unlikely that the use of force or
coercion to accomplish sexual intercourse was accidental.
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By contrast, significant problems can arise when a woman offers
her attacker no physical resistance.34 In such cases the element of fear
plays a vital role. As the Rusk case emphasizes, if the woman reason-
ably fears for her life, the subsequent submission to the sexual inter-
course is deemed to be non-consensual, regardless of whether the
victim offered physical resistance. 35 What the Rusk court failed to em-
phasize, however, is that the reasonableness of the victim's fear is irrel-
evant unless the defendant's criminal intent has been established. By
focusing exclusively upon the victim's ,state ,of :mind, the. court over-
looked an essential element of the crime - the defendant's mens rea. 36
34. See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
35. 289 Md. at 244-45, 424 A.2d at 727.
36. See Pickard, Culpable Mfistakes in Rape. Relating Mens Rea to the Crime, 30 U.
TORONTO L.J. 75, 95 (1980).
[I]f in unusual circumstances, the victim does not manifest her lack of consent in any
manner, and there is nothing else to give rise to an inference that she is not consenting,
can anyone reproach the accused for failing to guess that she was not consenting? Is it
possible that a victim could, because of her equivocal conduct, give a man the impres-
sion that she was consenting to intercourse, and cause him to be convicted subsequently
by proving that inwardly she was refusing him? [T]he rule that mens rea is a required
element of the crime cannot be ignored.
Judge Wilner implicitly recognized that Maryland's rape law permits and even en-
courages courts to overlook the mens rea requirement in his dissent from the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals' opinion. In his dissent Judge Wilner noted that the chief concern in Maryland
rape cases such as Rusk is the establishment of the victim's resistance that inherently in-
volves a concentrated focus upon the victim's acts, as opposed to the defendant's. 43 Md.
App. at 486, 406 A.2d at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting). "[A]ttention is directed not to the
wrongful stimulus, but to the victim's reactions to it." Id at 486, 406 A.2d at 629 (One could
infer from Judge Wilner's reasoning that by permitting courts to ignore the wrongful stimu-
lus, Maryland law allows them to ignore the question whether the defendant was commit-
ting a wrongful act.). Wilner emphasized, however, that despite this unique and illogical
approach of the Maryland law, he would accept it as binding until the Maryland Court of
Appeals or the legislature initiated change. Id at 486, 406 A.2d at 629. After examining the
reasoning in Rusk, it becomes apparent that the court has deferred to the legislature.
This deferral raises a question of judicial propriety. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 160-68
(tent. ed. 1958). Although the electorate generally precludes legislatures from engaging in
wholly arbitrary behavior, courts are restrained by a different type of "political" check.
Courts are obligated to elaborate their decisions in light of the justifications and reasons for
their decisions. This process of reasoned elaboration is designed to create a system which is
predictable, consistent and acceptable. It applies, therefore, to a wide spectrum of decisions,
ranging from those that overrule precedent to those that extend established principles to
create new law.
When the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals' decision, it was
obligated to state why the law set forth by the intermediate appellate court was wrong, and
why it must reverse that law. It derived its controlling reason from Judge Wilner's dissent-
ing opinion, which was basically a two-pronged argument. A question of propriety arises,
however, when one notes that the Court of Appeals totally ignored the second prong of
Wilner's dissent that questioned the validity of Maryland's approach to rape. Because Wil-
ner's latter inquiry raises questions of undeniably greater scope than does the first prong of
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Maryland's rape laws trace from English common law. English
law has long recognized that "a wrongful intention or some other
blameworthy condition of the mind (mens rea)" is an essential element
of any common law crime, 37 including rape.38  Through its Constitu-
tion, Maryland adopted the English common law of crimes in 1867. 39
Thus, since that year, at least, mens rea has been an essential element
of the crime of rape under Maryland common law. Arguably, the basic
principles of fairness embodied in the United States Constitution40
his argument, which was concerned with the standard of review the Supreme Court estab-
lished in United States v. Jackson, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), arguably the Court of Appeals
missed a precious opportunity to bring predictability, consistency and acceptability to Mary-
land rape law.
37. See HAILSHAM, 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 10 (2d ed. 1933).
38. See F. WHARTON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 682 (12th ed. 1932) ("The intent
to use force, however, in case fraud or stupefaction should fail, is essential to the offense.");
accord Regina v. Wright, 176 Eng. Rep. 869 (Guilford Crown Ct. 1866) summarized in 15
THE ENGLISH AND EMPIRE DIGEST 1209 (repl. 1977):
On a charge of rape, there having been to some extent, assent, and it being doubtful
whether the act has been completed, it is necessary that the jury should be satisfied,
before they convict, either of a rape, or of an assault with intent to commit rape, that
prisoner intended, not only to commit the act, but did commit it, notwithstanding any
resistance on the part of the prosecutrix.
Although Wright notes the existence of some assent, that fact should not detract from the
court's emphasis on intent in the case. It required force, and an intent to use it against the
victim's resistance.
39. See Sizemore v. State, 10 Md. App. 682, 272 A.2d 824 (1971). MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RTS., art. 5 provides in part:
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England,
• . . according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English
statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and -other circum-
stances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity;
and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment
or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.
"The common law of England is the common law of this state, excepting such
changes as have been made by the Acts of the Legislature," Coomes v. Clements, 4 H. & J.
480, 481 (Md. 1819). Consequently Maryland courts recognize mens rea as a necessary part
of the general criminal law. See Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 400, 335 A.2d 142, 148
(1975) ("[Miens rea - general or special - is . . . a necessary element of the body of a
crime. Mens rea, by definition, exists in the head of the perpetrator .... "). Although the
Court of Special Appeals in Borza entertained an appeal for arson, it is clear from the con-
text that its discussion of mens rea pertained to the general criminal law. See Ricketts v.
State, 436 A.2d 906, 915 (Md. 1981) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting) ("There are, of course, two
components of every crime - the actus reus (the guilty or criminal act) and the mens rea
(the guilty mind or the mental state accompanying a forbidden act."). For a more complete
discussion of mens rea, see notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
40. There are inherent constitutional problems when a criminal statute omits a mens rea
element. For example, in Smith v. People, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Supreme Court held that
a Los Angeles ordinance that eliminated the need to prove the defendant's criminal intent
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would forbid the elimination of this element of the crime. Even if it
were possible to remove the mens rea requirement, it is clear that only
an express judicial decision4' or a statute could do so. 42  Because
neither the judiciary nor the legislature has attempted to effect such a
change, one must conclude that intent remains an element of rape
under Maryland law.43
Neither Hazel nor Rusk, however, paid adequate attention to the
defendant's intent.44 Hazel announced that the acts and threats of the
was constitutionally impermissible because it posed a threat to the defendant's first amend-
ment right to freedom of expression. Id at 155.
41. The Court of Appeals may alter the common law if the court is convinced that the
law "has become unsound in the circumstances of modem law." Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md.
585, 590, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (1980).
42. It is arguable that no penal structure can ever delete the mens rea element from the
definition of a serious crime and expect to survive. "'[A]s long as in popular belief intention
and the freedom of the will are taken as axiomatic, no penal system that negates the mental
element can find general acceptance. It is vital to retain public support of methods of deal-
ing with crime."' J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THE-
ORY AND PROCESS 770 n.14 (1974) (quoting Radin, Intent, General, 8 ENC. Soc. ScI. 130.
43. In Thompson v. State, 230 Md. 113, 117, 186 A.2d 461, 463 (1962) the Court of
Appeals discussed the intent to rape:
As to the rape, since there was evidence that the defendant had a deliberate design to
have intercourse with the intoxicated woman either with or without her consent, and
also evidence that the intercourse had been accomplished by force and without her
consent, there was a clear showing of the intent to rape.
If the element of mens rea no longer existed in rape then there would have been no need to
discuss it in this common law prosecution for homicide and rape.
One finds strong evidence of the existence of criminal intent as an element of rape in
Maryland by comparing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(2) (1982) with id, § 463(a)(1). A
person is not guilty of second degree rape when that person engages in sexual intercourse
with one who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, unless the
person performing the act knows or should reasonably know of the other's mental or physi-
cal condition. Id § 463(a)(2). If rape was a crime of absolute liability then the General
Assembly would not have required that the defendant realize the wrongfulness of his acts.
Because force or the threat of force usually does not exist in cases falling under § 463(a)(2),
and because the substantive difference between § 463(a)(1) and (2) is the existence of vio-
lence, one can conclude that the legislature presumes the existence of mens rea in cases
involving the elements of force or the threat of force.
Some legislative history may throw some light on the premise that a statutory crime
in Maryland presumes the existence of mens rea. LEGIS. COUNCIL OF MD., PROPOSED
CRIMINAL CODE OF MARYLAND, § 15.15(2) (1974) (emphasis added) provides:
Although no culpable state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense,
or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the prescribed conduct
necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless indicat-
ing a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of
mental culpability.
44. In practical terms, Rusk presents more of a problem than Hazel. The latter case
offered a situation where there was a greater manifestation of unequivocal conduct: the
defendant entered the victim's home, put his arm around her neck, and threatened to kill her
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defendant must be "reasonably calculated" to induce fear .4  This ap-
proach does not focus on the actor's conduct and state of mind as
clearly as does a requirement that the defendant intend his acts and
threats to induce fear in the victim. While the latter approach clearly is
directed to the "wrongful stimulus,"46 the "reasonably calculated" test
shifts the focus from the actor to the hypothetical reasonable person.47
It appears to instruct the fact-finder to consider whether the reasonable
person considers this conduct of a kind that would cause fear, rather
than whether the defendant intended the result.
Evidence that a reasonable person would expect the defendant's
conduct to cause fear is some evidence that a defendant intended his
conduct to have that effect. It is also evidence that the victim's fearful
reaction was reasonable. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of the
defendant's intent. Because mens rea is an element of rape, it is essen-
tial that a court ask what the defendant actually intended. The Mary-
land approach allows courts to lose sight of this question.
The Maryland approach also tends to confuse evidence of intent
with evidence that the victim was reasonably afraid. For example, the
Rusk court wrote that "[tihe jury could have reasonably concluded that
the taking of [the victim's] car keys was intended by Rusk to immobi-
lize her alone, late at night in a neighborhood with which she was not
familiar."4 Although her lack of familiarity with the neighborhood
may help to explain her fear as reasonable, it adds nothing to a consid-
eration of the defendant's intent unless he knew that she was unfamil-
iar with the neighborhood. Yet nowhere does the opinion suggest that
baby if she moved. 221 Md. at 466, 157 A.2d at 923. The clearer the element of force, the
easier it is to establish mental culpability. See supra note 33.
In the theoretical or legal sense, however, both Hazel and Rusk are equally deficient
due to their reliance on the term "reasonably calculated." For an elaboration on the prob-
lem that the phrase breeds, see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
45. 221 Md. at 469, 157 A.2d at 925.
46. Rusk, 43 Md. App. at 486, 406 A.2d at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
47. "[R]easonably calculated" does not adequately provide for the defendant's mens ra.
The central question is whether the defendant intended that Ius acts and threats induce fear.
Although the word "calculated" might be interpreted as a synonym for "intended," G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART § 28 (2d ed. 1961), the use of the modifying
word "reasonably" distorts the inquiry. It makes no sense to ask if the defendant reasonably
calculated that his acts and threats induce fear-either he did or did not intend to achieve
such a result. The issue inappropriately becomes whether the reasonable person (or reason-
able victim) would expect that such acts and threats were intended to induce fear. But this
test does not address the question of what the defendant intended - it only requires proof of
what the defendant was believed to intend (through the eyes of the reasonable person or
victim).
48. 289 Md. at 246, 424 A.2d at 728 (emphasis added).
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he knew this.4 9 This "finding" by the court is r~presentative of the spirit
of its entire analysis. The Court of Appeals igrored the principle that if
a defendant has a reasonable but mistaken belief that he is not commit-
ting a criminal act, then clearly he does not possess the requisite mens
rea.
50
The Court of Appeals in Rusk would have averted the plain defi-
49. If it was not even alleged that the defendant gave the victim directions to his apart-
ment, then the court cannot responsibly indicate that the defendant knew the victim was
unfamiliar with the area. Id at 233, 424 A.2d at 721.
The majority suggests that "from her testimony the jury could have reasonably con-
cluded that the taking of her car keys was intended by Rusk to immobilize her alone,
late at night, in a neighborhood with which she was unfamiliar .... ." But on what
facts does the majority so conclude? There is no evidence descriptive of the tone of his
voice; her testimony indicates only the bare statement quoted above. How can the ma-
jority extract from this conduct a threat reasonably calculated to create a fear of immi-
nent bodily harm? There was no weapon, no threat to inflict physical injury.
Id at 256, 424 A.2d at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting). It follows that the court should not have
implied that the defendant wrongfully exploited the victim's vulnerable position.
50. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 939-40 (2d ed. 1969); see also LEGIS.
COUNCIL OF MD., PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MARYLAND § 15.20 (1974) ("Ignorance or
mistake as to a matter of fact is a defense if the ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact is
a defense if the ignorance or mistake negatives the intention, knowledge, belief, recklessness
or criminal negligence required to establish a material element of the offense .... ")
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals overlooked the well-established principle that a
defendant's reasonably mistaken belief of fact that he was not committing a criminal act can
negate the mens rea element of a crime. Numerous courts have applied this principle in
rape cases. See People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1975); People v. Hampton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1981); State v. Dizon,
47 Hawaii 444, 390 P.2d 759 (1964); United States v. Short, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.04, 2.08, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Berger, Man's Trial
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61-65 (1977);
Lewis, Recent Proposals in the Criminal Law of Rape.- Signifcant Reform or Semantic
Change, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 445,452 (1979). In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Mor-
gan, [ 1975] 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L.) the House of Lords went further than most cases in holding
an honest belief of the victim's consent will negate the essential mens rea, even if it is based
upon unreasonable grounds. Id at 352.
The necessity of availing the defendant of this defense is obvious: if it exists, then the
defendant will not be convicted of rape despite the jury's finding of the victim's non-consent.
As the appellants argued in People v. Hampton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268
(1981), "a jury in a rape case could simultaneously find that the prosecutrix did not consent
to sexual intercourse, but that the alleged perpetrator had a reasonable and good faith belief
that she did consent." Id at 329, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 271. The California Court of Appeals
held that "the failure to give sun sponte the mistake of fact instructions in the case of appel-
lant Hampton was prejudicial." Id at 330, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 272. Accordingly, the Califor-
nia court reversed the conviction.
The Hampton court indicated that once the defendant alleged that he reasonably
believed the victim had consented, then it would be a matter for jury determination. Id at
329, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 271. Other courts, however, employ stricter prerequisites and demand
that the victim have misled the defendant before a jury is required to consider that evidence.
See State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444, 390 P.2d 759 (1964) where the Supreme Court of Hawaii
stated that "[ilt is clear that the authorities generally adhere to the rule that an instruction on
the defendant's belief will not be given in the absence of evidence showing some probability
1982]
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ciency in its analysis had it asked, prior to considering the reasonable-
ness of the victim's fear, whether, from the evidence presented, the jury
could have found the requisite mens rea. To this end, the Court of
Appeals should have asked whether the defendant knew of the victim's
lack of familiarity with the neighborhood before concluding that the
jury could have determined that he intended to make her fearful by
immobilizing her in a strange area. It should have asked whether a
rational jury could have assumed that the defendant had notice of Pat's
non-consent when, after leaving her alone in the room for one to five
minutes,5 he returned to find her still there. Finally, the court should
have reflected upon the defendant's asking the victim for her telephone
number after intercourse.52 Was that behavior consistent with inten-
tional rape? The court should have considered all of these factors and
then asked if it was reasonable for the jury to have found that the de-
fendant possessed the requisite mens rea. If, and only if, this question
was answered in the affirmative, should the court have proceeded to
determine whether it was reasonable for the jury to have found that the
victim's fear was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Had the court properly addressed this question, it would probably
have upheld Rusk's conviction just the same. The victim's testimony
that Rusk agreed to let her go without killing her if she did what he
wanted, and her testimony that the defendant "lightly choked" her
gave the jury a reasonable basis upon which to find that the defendant
possessed the requisite criminal intent to overcome her resistance with
the threat of force.
Although the court may have reached a sound result, Rusk dem-
onstrates that Maryland courts ought to consider the defendant's intent
more carefully when the state seeks to establish that rape was perpe-
trated by means of a threat of force rather than by actual force.53
Criminal intent is generally obvious in cases where the defendant em-
that the defendant was actually misled by the conduct of the complaining witness." Id at
461, 390 P.2d at 769.
51. 289 Md. at 234, 424 A.2d at 722.
52. Id at 235, 424 A.2d at 722.
53. Although a conviction involving the defendant's force can be firmly supported by
the objective manifestations of his acts, a conviction dependent upon the threat of force
necessarily entails a certain degree of subjectivity - the quality of the victim's fear. Al-
though treatment of the former element of force virtually always accounts for the defend-
ant's mental state as well as the victim's fear, the latter is subject to more manipulation by
the jury and, therefore, can create one-sided results.
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ploys actual force,54 but the element of intent is more difficult to prove
when unequivocal force is lacking. In such cases courts should con-
sider additional factors that bear directly on the defendant's state of
mind. Until Maryland courts carefully separate questions regarding
the victim's consent from questions about the defendant's intent, it is
possible that men, innocent of rape, as it is supposed to be defined, may
be convicted, or their convictions upheld as a consequence of wholly
inadequate consideration of one fundamental principle - that is, crim-
inal intent.
54. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
POOLE V STATE-IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESSES
In Poole v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed
Maryland's "voucher rule,"2 a longstanding prohibition against im-
peaching one's own witness absent surprise and affirmative damage.
The unanimous court held that the state had impeached its witness by
eliciting her prior inconsistent statement4 and that the prerequisites for
invoking the exception to the prohibition were absent.' Additionally,
the court concluded that the statement was not harmless as merely cu-
mulative to other evidence.6 Because the state's use of the prior incon-
sistent statement seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present
his defense, the court reversed the defendant's murder conviction and
set aside his death sentence.7
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Calvert County,
Timothy Clyde Poole was convicted of premeditated murder, felony
murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and the use of a handgun
in a crime of violence.' At trial, the state established that Poole, on the
night of the murder,9 had signed out of his half-way house residence
listing the address of his girl friend, Jennifer Lanier, as his destination.
Testifying for the state, Lanier's roommate stated that Poole had not
visited Lanier that night. However, Poole contended that he commonly
signed out to Lanier's address when his destination was elsewhere. In
1. 290 Md. 114, 428 A.2d 434 (1981).
2. Historically, the "voucher rule" states that a party who produces a witness in court
vouches for that witness's credibility and trustworthiness. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 120
Md. 229, 234, 87 A. 811, 813 (1913); Patterson v. State, 275 Md. 563, 570, 342 A.2d 660, 665
(1975), notedin 36 MD. L. REV. 399 (1976). Commonly, commentators view the basis of the
rule as more historical than practical. For a discussion of the rule's origins, see infra notes
31-38 and accompanying text.
However, the rule as applied in Maryland has the practical effect of prohibiting a
party from impeaching its own witness. See, e.g., Proctor Elec. Co. v. Zink, 217 Md. 22, 32,
141 A.2d 721, 726 (1958); State ex rel. Chenoweth v. Baltimore Contracting Co., 177 Md. 1,
15-16, 6 A.2d 625, 632 (1939), noted in 4 MD. L. REV. 193 (1940). Because of the signifi-
cance of this practical application, this recent decision refers to the "voucher rule" as the
"prohibition against impeaching one's own witness."
3. 290 Md. at 118, 428 A.2d at 437.
4. Id. at 123, 428 A.2d at 439.
5. Id. at 123-24, 428 A.2d at 439-40.
6. Id. at 124, 428 A.2d at 440.
7. Id. at 115, 428 A.2d at 435.
8. Id.
9. On the evening of October 22, 1979, two men attempted an armed robbery of Mc-
Carty's Pharmacy. During the course of the robbery, one robber was shot by the proprietor,
Dr. McCarty, who in turn was shot by the second robber. Both McCarty and the first robber
later died.
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fact, Poole claimed that he had been with Yvonne Bethea that night.
Bethea testified to the same effect.' 0
The prosecution's examination of its final witness, Lanier, "not
only corroborated her roommate's testimony, but elicited a prior state-
ment, inconsistent with Lanier's in-court testimony."'" Initially, Lanier
10. Poole based his entire defense on Bethea's alibi testimony, and, in fact, offered her as
his sole witness.
11. The pertinent part of Lanier's examination follows:
Q. What was your conversation with Timothy Clyde Poole the
morning of October 23, 1979?
A. Well, we just talked.
Q. Talked about what?
A. School and people.
Q. Did you have a conversation concerning his whereabouts on
the day prior, October 22, 1979?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever indicated to anyone that you had that
conversation concerning his whereabouts?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that, any conversation that you indicated?
Mr. Cardin: Objection.
Court: Overrule.
Mr. Anders: Q. Go ahead?
A. I had told the Officer that he had told me to say he was there
the night before.
Q. Did you tell -
Court: Just a minute. Would you read the answer back, please, Mrs.
Bates? The Jury didn't hear it.
Reporter: 'I told the Officer that he had told me to say he was there the
night before.'
Mr. Anders: May we approach the bench, Your Honor?
Court: Yes, you may.
(Whereupon a conference at the bench is held with the
defendant present and out of the presence of the Jury, and the
following proceedings were had:)
Mr. Cardin: Your Honor, it would appear to me that the State is at this
point trying to impeach his own witness. If that's what he is
doing, I think it's incumbent upon the State to proffer to the
Court that it is surprised, caught by surprise by the witness's
testimony. Otherwise, I don't think it's proper for the State to
impeach his own witness.
Mr. Anders: Well, the State's in the position where this witness has given
several stories concerning what has occurred, and I'm really
calling her to explain which is true and why. I don't know
that I'm attempting to impeach her. I'm not claiming surprise
because whereas Mr. Cardin has heard stories that she's told,
she is a necessary witness and I'm calling her to explain what
occurred and what she said before and why.
Court: Well, it seems to me in this case that although you may have
had more than one story and Mr. Cardin objected, you didn't
have any choice but to ask the question, and then having
asked it you now - the matter which is inconsistent
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testified that she had spoken with Poole the morning after the crime
and that they simply had discussed "school and people," but never
talked about Poole's whereabouts on the day of the crime.' 2 The prose-
cution then asked whether she previously had told police that her con-
versation with Poole had included a discussion of his whereabouts that
evening. 13 She admitted that she had.14 Next, the prosecution inquired
whether Lanier previously had told police that Poole had come to her
house and requested that she tell the police that he had been there the
evening before.' 5 Lanier admitted that she had made the previous
statement, but affirmed her in-court testimony that their discussion had
not included Poole's whereabouts.' 6
Because Poole was sentenced, inter alia, to death,' 7 the Court of
apparently with the first statement given. I really don't think
this amounts to anything other than to demonstrate to the
Court that she is trying to help the defendant if she could -
Mr. Anders: Beg your pardon?
Court: I said I think it's pretty obvious to the Court that she is in a
tough spot and it is certainly obvious to the Jury that she's in
a tough spot. She apparently is trying to help the defendant if
she can. It's only natural since they're boyfriend, girlfriend.
To that extent I think you have demonstrated to the Court
that you did have knowledge of another statement and she had
said that she made other statements.
I sustained the objection that Mr. Cardin made when I
thought he was right and I overruled it when I thought he was
wrong. I don't think you're impeaching your witness by
bringing out more than one story, which everybody knows.
(Whereupon the conference at the bench is concluded, and the
following proceedings were had:)
Mr. Anders: Q. Jennifer, to clear this up, you indicated that you told the
police originally that Timothy had come over to your house
and asked you to tell the Police that he was at your house the
night before, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he was not at your house before?
A. No.
Q. And your testimony today is that you just had a general
conversation concerning what on October 23rd when he came
over to your house?
A. School mostly, because I wasn't going to school that day.
290 Md. at 120-23, 428 A.2d at 438-39.
12. Id at 120, 420 A.2d at 438.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 122-23, 428 A.2d at 439.
16. Id. at 123, 428 A.2d at 439.
17. Id. at 115, 428 A.2d at 435. Poole was also sentenced to life imprisonment, 20 years
(concurrent) and 15 years (consecutive). Id.
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Appeals directly reviewed his case.'" Focusing on Poole's argument
that his conviction rested on improperly admitted impeachment evi-
dence,' 9 the Court of Appeals first acknowledged Maryland's adher-
ence to the rule prohibiting a party from impeaching its own witness.20
It observed that in Maryland recourse to impeachment is strictly lim-
ited to cases where the calling party has been prejudicially misled and
surprised, or entrapped.2" To avoid this prejudice, a trial court may
exercise discretion to "permit a party to impeach its own witness upon
a showing: (1) that the calling party is surprised; (2) that the witness'
[present] testimony is contrary to prior statements made by this witness
to a party, his attorney, or a person to be communicated to them; and
(3) that the statement involves facts material to the case."' 22 The court
explained that this proof of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible
to show why the party has called the witness,23 although it is not sub-
stantive evidence. 4
In analyzing the prosecution's examination of Lanier, the Court of
Appeals noted that the prosecution knew before trial that Lanier's testi-
mony would be inconsistent with her prior statement to the police. In
fact, the state had specifically disclaimed surprise.25 Furthermore, the
court observed, Lanier's original in-court testimony regarding her con-
versation with the defendant had not prejudiced the state's case; it had
been merely unhelpful.2 6 Although the state had additionally tried to
argue that the prior statement was harmless as merely cumulative to
other evidence, 7 the court reasoned that the statement permitted the
jury to infer not only that Poole had not been at Lanier's house, but
that he had no "innocent explanation for his whereabouts. '28 Addi-
tionally, the prior statement undermined the credibility of Yvonne Be-
thea-if the jury believed that Poole had tampered with one witness, it
also might conclude that he had prompted perjury in Bethea's testi-
18. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414 (1982) (requiring direct Court of Appeals review
of all death sentences).
19. 290 Md. at 120-23, 428 A.2d at 438-39.
20. Id. at 118, 428 A.2d at 437.
21. Id. The trial judge also has discretion to make exceptions for hostile or deceitful
witnesses. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 275 Md. 563, 342 A.2d 660 (1975); Proctor Elec. Co.
v. Zink, 217 Md. 22, 141 A.2d 721 (1958).
22. 290 Md. at 118, 428 A.2d at 437.
23. Id. at 119, 428 A.2d at 437.
24. Id. at 119, 428 A.2d at 438.
25. Id. at 123, 428 A.2d at 439.
26. Id.
27. Appellee's Brief at 23.
28. 290 Md. at 124, 428 A.2d at 440.
29. Id.
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mony.4 5 Because the admission of Lanier's statement was "fraught
with prejudice, ' 30 the court reversed the judgments and granted a new
trial.
Although the general prohibition against impeaching one's own
witness has existed for centuries, its history is "singularly obscure."3
Most commentators theorize that it originated with the system of "oath
helpers" at primitive trials by compurgation. 32 At early common law,
one who called a witness could not later object to the witness's compe-
tency.33 The rule that in a criminal trial a calling party could not dis-
credit its witness evolved in the 1600's, and later emerged in civil cases
as "notorious and unquestioned. 34
The common law rationales for the rule are equally obscure. Wig-
more has offered three possibilities: 1) that the calling party was "mor-
ally" bound by his witness's statements;35 2) that the party guaranteed
his witness's general credibility;36 and 3) that courts would not grant a
party the means to coerce his own witness.37 Commentators, however,
generally have viewed these common law justifications as unpersuasive
and have soundly criticized them.38
As early as 1849, reformers unsuccessfully advocated a modifica-
tion to allow impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. 39 Yet criti-
30. Id.
31. 3A J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 896 at 659 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); see Ladd,
Impeachment of One's Own Witness - New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1936); Note,
Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REV. 996 (1963).
32. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 896; Note, supra note 31 at 996. Trials by
compurgation were somewhat analogous to the current use of character witnesses. The pro-
cess consisted of some predetermined number of friends or relatives of a litigant swearing to
the veracity of his statement. Once the witness had testified under oath, the calling party
could not contradict him. Id. at 996 n.4. But see Ladd, supra note 31, at 70 (hypothesizing
that the rule was probably a result of the transition from an inquisitorial trial method to an
adversary system).
33. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 896.
34. Id
American courts initially accepted the rule prohibiting impeaching one's own wit-
ness, but gradually authorized restricted use of impeachment. See, Ladd, supra note 31, at
75 n.39. In Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 309 (1894), the Supreme Court allowed
limited exceptions for surprise and hostile testimony. Likewise, in Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md.
561, 5 A. 334 (1886), the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited the general prohibition and
noted that courts must stringently review the facts before allowing an exception, id at
563-70, 5 A. at 336-37. Smith stated that because "not every light or trivial circumstance
• . . would justify an exception," id. at 570, 5 A. at 337, a trial court should be satisfied that
the calling party has been surprised, and that the statements concerned material facts, id. at
569-70, 5 A. at 336-37.
35. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 897.
36. Id. § 898.
37. Id. § 899.
38. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
39. See Commissioners' Report, New York Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1845, 1848
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cism became strident only in the first half of this century. Dean Ladd's
seminal article on impeachment4' urged complete abolition of the com-
mon law prohibition, arguing that "restraint upon impeachment of a
party's own witness has burdened the courts from the Sixteenth Cen-
tury to the present day."'" Wigmore agreed, noting that the "dangers
supposed to accompany its use are too speculative and trifling to merit
consideration."42 Additionally, he observed that excluding evidence
unjustly deprives the calling party the opportunity to exhibit the truth,
and leaves it the prey of a hostile witness.4"
Most criticism of the prohibition has focused on its early common
law justifications." For instance, critics noted that in the actual con-
duct of trials neither party may know, much less be prepared to guar-
antee, the character and trustworthiness of its witnesses.45 In fact,
parties often have little choice in calling their witnesses. 4 An even
more persuasive objection is that the ends of truth are "not to be sub-
served by binding the parties with guarantees and vouchings, and that
it is the business of a court of justice, in mere self-respect, to seek all
sources of correct information. '47 Because this search for truth is im-
peded by prohibiting the introduction of often reliable and material
out-of-court statements to aid in evaluating a witness's testimony, these
critics argued, the common law prohibition had outlived whatever lim-
ited purposes it once served.48
Responding to this criticism, Congress adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 607 in 1975. 4 ' Rule 607 provides that "[t]he credibility of a
witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
(1849) cited by Ladd: "The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit
by evidence of bad character but he may contradict him by other evidence, and may also
show that he has made at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testi-
mony. ... Ladd, supra note 31, at 88 n.78.
40. Ladd, supra note 3 1.
41. Id. at 96.
42. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, §. 903, at 672.
43. Id.
44. See id, §§ 897-899, at 661-66; Ladd, supra note 31, at 76-80.
45. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 898, at 662.
46. See Peeples, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's
Own Witness. The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1398 (1974).
47. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 898, at 662.
48. Note, Impeachment of One's Own Witness Under Rule 607, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 393,
397 (1979); see also London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfie, 83 F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir.
1936) ("The purpose of a trial, however, is to seek for and, if possible, find the truth and to
do justice between the parties according to the actual facts and the law, and any rule which
stands in the way of ascertaining the truth and thus hampers the administration of justice
must give way.").
49. See FED. R. EVID. 607, Advisory Comm. Note.
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him."5 This position recognizes that even if a party does not trust a
witness's credibility, the party may have to call that witness to prove its
case.5 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 607 clearly addresses
this situation:
The traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness is aban-
doned as based on false premises. A party does not hold out his
witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free choice in
selecting them. Denial of the right leaves the party at the mercy of
the witness and the adversary.52
Despite congressional adoption of the rule and the clear language
of the Advisory Committee's Note, the debate in this area continues.
Some commentators, aware that the traditional rationale underlying
the prohibition does not withstand analysis, nevertheless have realized
that rule 607 has certain disadvantages.53
A literal application of rule 607 may allow a party to bring before
the jury hearsay evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. 54 Most prior
inconsistent statements are considered hearsay under the federal
rules. 55 Normally, parties use rule 607 to circumvent the hearsay rules
by offering the statement, not as evidence of its truth, but as evidence
that the witness is not credible. 56 For example, the state may place a
50. FED. R. EVID. 607.
51. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 297 (2d
ed. 1977).
52. FED. R. EID. 607, Advisory Comm. Note.
53. See, e.g., Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements For Impeachment and as Sub-
stantive Evidence.- A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(1)(), 613, and 607, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1565, 1610-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Graham I]; Ordover, Surprise/ That Damaging Turncoat Witness ir Still With Us.- An Analy-
sis of Federal Rules ofEvidence 607, 801(d)(1)(4) and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1976).
54. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1614-15; Ordover, supra note 53, at 67, 72-74.
55. FED. R. EID. 801 (d)(1)(A) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) in-
consistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of per-
jury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
As originally drafted, the rule would have excluded from hearsay all prior inconsistent state-
ments of a witness available for cross-examination, on the theory that the present cross-
examination would provide an adequate degree of reliability. See S. SALTZBURG AND K.
REDDEN, supra note 51, at 457. In rejecting this proposal, the House of Representatives
apparently reasoned that reliability would not be guaranteed sufficiently, and sought to re-
strict those prior inconsistent statements introduced for their truth to statements previously
subject to cross-examination and made under oath. See id. at 458. The present rule
emerged as a compromise. Thus, the liberal federal rules recognize prior inconsistent state-
ments as inherently unreliable and admit them as substantive evidence in only limited
circumstances.
56. See, e.g., Graham I, supra note 53, at 1615; Ordover, supra note 53, at 73.
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witness on the stand ostensibly to impeach with an earlier inconsistent
statement, but hoping that the jury will believe the prior statement.
Commentators fear that despite limiting instructions, juries probably
attach substantive weight to the impeaching statements and thereby
reach a decision based on hearsay evidence."
To combat this problem, Professor Graham argues that rule 607
should incorporate the surprise and damage requirements.5 8 Graham
contends that the requirements properly function as prophylactic safe-
guards to prevent a party from calling witnesses solely to introduce
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence under the guise of
impeachment.59
Alternately, some commentators suggest that the balancing test
contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 might exclude a witness's
prior statements when offered on the issue of credibility.' Rule 403
states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."'" Judge Weinstein suggests that the admissibility of a witness's
prior inconsistent statement should not depend on the motive of the
profferor, but on whether the statement could withstand scrutiny under
Rule 403.62 This approach, he maintains, is consistent with the under-
lying policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this test, the
trial judge would determine and balance the prior statement's prejudi-
cial effect against its probative value before deciding whether to admit
it.63 Weinstein, responding to criticism that this balancing leads to ad
hoc determinations,' argues that balancing is still preferable to a
57. Professor Morgan has labeled this attempt at limiting instructions in these circum-
stances a "pious fraud" and has argued that a jury faces an impossible task when asked to
accept a statement as bearing on a witness's credibility while ignoring its substantive con-
tent. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 177, 193 (1948).
58. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1617; Graham, Examination fa Party's Own Witness
Under the Federal Rules ofEvidence:A Promise Unfu'dled, 54 TEx. L. REv. 917, 1005 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Graham II]; Graham, The Relationship Among Federal Rules ofEvidence
607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 4031A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 TEx. L. REV. 573, 582 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Graham III].
59. See supra note 58.
60. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 607, at 18 (1975).
61. FED. R. EVID. 403.
62. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, at 17.
63. Id.; see also United States v. De Lillo, 620 F.2d 939, 947 (2d Cir. 1980) (court bal-
anced these elements and determined that the prosecution was entitled to impeach its own
witness).
64. For a discussion of this criticism see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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"wooden insistence" on surprise and damage that would mean a "re-
turn to the unsatisfactory mechanical approach which helped lead to
the adoption of rule 607. " 65
Graham, however, views balancing as a non-viable alternative to
the surprise and damage criteria. 66 He warns that the balancing con-
templated by rule 403 can be too difficult, uncertain, time-consuming
and likely to result in rulings that allow subterfuge impeachment.67 A
balancing test, he asserts, "would lead in practice to divergent results
based as much upon the personal predilections of particular judges as
upon an actual balancing of probative value and prejudicial impact. '68
Furthermore, Graham notes that the key factors suggested in Wein-
stein's balancing test, probative value and prejudicial impact, appear to
vary directly: the more probative a prior statement is of credibility, the
greater the likelihood that the jury will improperly view it as substan-
tive evidence; the less probative of credibility, the less the risk that ju-
rors will improperly consider it.69 At least, Graham contends, surprise
and damage must be the controlling criteria in any balancing.7 0
In Poole, the Court of Appeals did not mention the continuing
debate involving impeachment of one's own witness.7 1 However, the
court is apparently sensitive to the issue. The Court of Appeals re-
cently has granted certiorari in Cooper v. State72 and has expressly re-
quested that argument be addressed to the efficacy of retaining the
prohibition in Maryland.73
The present Maryland approach, like Graham's and Weinstein's
suggestions, is premised on the assumption that, as hearsay, a witness's
prior inconsistent statement is inherently unreliable. The traditional
common law hearsay rule prohibits the use of a witness's prior out-of-
court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 74 This prohi-
65. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, at 18.
66. See Graham I, supra note 53, at 1616; Graham III, supra note 58, at 578.
67. See Graham III, supra note 58, at 578.
68. Id. at 576.
69. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1616.
70. See Graham III, supra note 58, at 578; see also Ordover, supra note 53, at 70 (if the
balancing test is employed, surprise and damage should be key determinants).
71. Because of Maryland's traditional adherence to the prohibition, the court probably
saw no need for change. Moreover, the Court of Appeals was apparently reluctant to tinker
with an established evidentiary rule that could determine the outcome in a capital case.
Because the prosecutorial abuse was so blatant in Poole, the Court might have had difficulty
justifying a contrary result. Cf. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Court refused to accept voucher rule, but because of prosecutorial abuse, it disallowed gov-
ernment's impeachment of own witness. Decided before FED. R. EviD. 607 took effect.).
72. No. 78 (Md. Sept. 10, 1981).
73. Id
74. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1568.
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bition is grounded on the fear that such a statement is unreliable be-
cause: (1) the statement was not initially made under oath; (2) the trier
of fact had no opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor at the
time the witness originally made the statement; and (3) the declarant
was not subject to contemporaneous cross-examination before the trier
of fact by the party against whom the statement now is being offered.75
Opponents of this orthodox rule argue that the jury can adequately as-
sess the reliability of these statements if the witness is in court and sub-
ject to cross-examination.76 Proponents, however, contend that "prior
inconsistent statements are often biased as a result of subtle influence,
coercion, or deceit on the part of the person eliciting the statement, who
is often an investigator or police officer."" This danger justifies view-
ing prior inconsistent statements as unreliable. Because such state-
ments are unreliable, the Maryland court properly has concluded that
their admissibility for impeachment purposes should be strictly
limited.78
Maryland permits a party to impeach its own witness only if the
party has been surprised and damaged by the witness's in-court testi-
mony.79 To satisfy the surprise requirement, a party must show that it
relied on the witness's prior inconsistent statement and was unaware,
prior to trial, that the witness intended to recant."0 In the absence of
75. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245, at 581 (2d ed. 1972).
76. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1018.
77. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1573. In support of this proposition, Professor Graham
cites Hearings on HA. 5464 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
302 (1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel):
The problems of inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incompleteness of out-of-
court statements may be found in both written and oral statements, although the prob-
lem is more acute in oral statements. But written statements are also subject to distor-
tion. We are all familiar with the way a skilled investigator, be he a lawyer, police
officer, insurance claim agent, or private detective, can listen to a potential witness and
then prepare a statement for signature by the witness which reflects the interest of the
investigator's client or agency. Adverse details are omitted; subtle changes of emphasis
are made. It is regretable but true that some lawyers will distort the truth to win a case
and that some police officers will do the same to "solve" a crime, particularly one which
has aroused the public interest or caused public controversy. Or the police officer may
be seeking to put away a "dangerous criminal" who the officer "knows" is guilty but
against whom evidence is lacking.
Id. at 1573 n.25.
78. See Mason v. Paulson, 43 Md. 161, 176-77 (1875) (prior inconsistent statements are
the "loosest and most unreliable hearsay"); De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 H & J 191, 219-20
(Md. 1807).
79. See, e.g., Fleming v. Prince George's County, 277 Md. 655, 678, 358 A.2d 892, 904
(1976); Green v. State, 243 Md. 154, 157, 220 A.2d 544, 546 (1966).
80. See Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 569, 5 A. 334, 336 (1866) ("If a plaintiff calls a
witness, relying upon statements made to him or his attorney, and when on the stand he
proves the defendant's case, we think that the principles of justice require that the plaintiff
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surprise and damage, impeachment is inappropriate: if the witness does
not give affirmatively damaging testimony, the party need not attack
his credibility;"' if the witness's testimony does not surprise the calling
party, it can refrain from eliciting the in-court statement.8 2 Impeach-
ment is a tool for allowing a party to ask the jury not to believe a wit-
ness's testimony. When the party offering the witness can demonstrate
surprise and damage, that party has a legitimate reason to show the
jury why it called the witness and to ask the jury to disregard the wit-
ness's testimony. Under the circumstances, there is no danger that the
calling party is seeking to introduce hearsay under the guise of im-
peachment. However, if the calling party knows beforehand that the
witness will not repeat his earlier statement, "there seems to be no pur-
pose for eliciting the trial statement except to impeach the witness, hop-
ing the jury improperly will consider the hearsay statement as
substantive evidence despite the judge's limiting instruction. '8 3 Even
under the current prohibition, however, a party may still call the wit-
ness to testify on other matters.
The possibility for abuse under a rule similar to federal rule 607
mandates retention, with certain modifications, of the current Mary-
land rule in all criminal trials.8 4 The rule 607 approach is especially
dangerous when the calling party is the government and a defendant's
life or liberty is at stake. Given juries' notorious inability to ignore the
substantive content of evidence introduced solely for the purpose of
impeachment, 5 abandoning the surprise and damage requirements
would unnecessarily risk a defendant's conviction on the basis of unre-
should be able to show why he called him."). See also Tornquist, The Prior Inconsistent
Statement: The Illinois Law and the Art, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 381, 392 (1979).
81. A possible exception exists for defendants in criminal cases. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
82. See Graham III, supra note 58, at 579.
83. Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness With a Prior Inconsistent Statement Ohio and
Federal Rules 607 And Hearsay Considerations, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 100, 111-12 (1981).
84. Civil trials do not present the same pressing concerns for retaining the prohibition as
do criminal cases. Because in a civil trial the defendant's life or liberty is not at stake, he or
she may not need the rule's prophylactic safeguards. Additionally, civil trials provide other
safeguards through greater discovery opportunities. In fact, MD. R.P. 413 (a)(1) seemingly
provides an exception to the prohibition by allowing any party to use a deposition for im-
peachment.
Although a defendant has a constitutional right to impeach his or her own witness
by use of prior inconsistent statements, the government does not have a corresponding con-
stitutional right. The Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 297-98
(1973), held that the "availability of the right to confront and to cross-examine those who
give damaging testimony against the accused has never been held to depend on whether the
witness was initially put on the stand by the accused or by the State."
85. Graham I, supra note 53, at 1615.
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liable hearsay.86
A rule adopting Weinstein's balancing approach in place of the
current prohibition would be too difficult to administer and unlikely to
lead to uniform, predictable results. Under Weinstein's criteria, a prior
statement that directly contradicts a fact of consequence in the case and
that a witness admits having made, but now asserts is untrue, would be
very probative of credibility. Thus, the trial judge could not easily de-
termine that the prejudicial impact outweighed the probative value.
The jury, however, is likely to treat such a statement as substantive
evidence." Also, use of a balancing test, even if it resulted in the exclu-
sion of impeaching evidence, could consume valuable court time, while
still permitting the jury, as a result of argument, to learn of the prior
statement's existence.8" Additionally, time does not usually permit the
type of analysis Weinstein envisions, and courts often resort to sponta-
neous evidentiary rulings on relatively complex matters.
Although the present Maryland rule is basically sound, a few mi-
nor modifications may be in order. The rule should not apply to de-
fendants in criminal trials who have a constitutional right to confront
and impeach any witness.89 Furthermore, if the prior statement is not
hearsay, or falls within certain exceptions to the hearsay rule,90 a court
already can admit it without a showing of surprise and affirmative
damage. The only justification for excluding prior statements is that
they may be unreliable. Thus, prior statements should be admissible if
reliable - if, for instance, the statement was given under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing. Additionally, in the in-
terest of truth-gathering, some exception should be made to allow a
party to "refresh" the recollection of its witness under oath, but out of
the presence of the jury. In this manner, the unsurprised or undam-
aged party can attempt to bring forth the testimony it desires, but can-
not use the occasion to present to the jury otherwise inadmissible and
potentially prejudicial evidence.
In Poole, the Court of Appeals has once again reiterated its adher-
ence to the common law rule prohibiting a party from impeaching its
own witness unless the party first shows surprise and damage. How-
ever, the court's action in granting certiorari in Cooper indicates a will-
86. Id.
87. Graham III, supra note 58, at 579.
88. Id. at 578.
89. See supra note 84.
90. Maryland recognizes a few exceptions to the hearsay rule, inter alia, admissions of a
party opponent, see Lambros v. Coolahan, 185 Md. 463, 45 A.2d 96 (1946), and decedent's
declarations against interest, see Western Md. R.R. Co. v. Manro, 32 Md. 280 (1870).
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ingness to reconsider the issue. Although the prohibition has been the
target of much criticism in the past, its practical effects warrant reten-
tion, albeit with minor modification.
ADDENDUM
On March 24, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued a per curiam
opinion dismissing the grant of certiorari in Cooper v. State.9 Al-
though the court noted that the issues involved in the grant of certiorari
were "a matter of public importance," it determined that they were
"not presented on the facts of this case." 92
91. No. 78 (Mar. 24, 1982) (per curiam).
92. Id, slip op. at 1. In Cooper's robbery trial, a key prosecution witness, allegedly
Cooper's accomplice, failed to identify a gun that the prosecutor had expected him to say
was the weapon used in the robbery. In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor remarked that the
witness had "spun" him and stated, "I'm not vouching for [his] credibility, but I think there
are some things that he brought out that are truthful." Id., slip op. at 2. Defense counsel
then sought a "curative instruction that the State is bound by the testimony of their own
witnesses." Id However, after consulting the trial judge, the defense counsel apparently
withdrew the request. The court held that the issue was not preserved when the request for
an instruction based on the voucher rule was withdrawn. Id, slip op. at 4.
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CONDORE v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY-IS THE
NECESSARIES DOCTRINE NECESSARY?
In Condore v. Prince George's County,' the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals abolished both the state common law doctrine of necessaries and
its statutory counterpart.2 The common law necessaries doctrine pro-
vided a remedy for creditors who sold goods or services to wives on the
basis of their husbands' credit.' The creditor proceeded against the
husband for payment of delinquent accounts, relying on the husband's
common law obligation to furnish his wife with "articles necessary to
sustain life or to preserve decency."' Maryland provided by statute
that the husband's liability for debts incurred by the wife for neces-
saries "shall be or continue as at common law."5
Condore presented the question whether the state Equal Rights
Amendment6 imposed on the wife a reciprocal and equal duty to pay
for her husband's medical expenses, which traditionally have been clas-
sified as necessaries.7 In its five-to-two decision,' the Court of Appeals
held that the doctrine was "predicated upon a sex-based classification
which is unconstitutional under [the state] ERA,"9 and subsequently
1. 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
2. Id. at 532-33, 425 A.2d at 1019. The statutory form was found at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 45, § 21 (1980).
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (5th ed. 1979), which describes the doctrine of
necessaries as: "One who sells goods to a wife or child may charge the husband or father if
the goods are required for their sustenance or support." See also Brown, The Duty of the
Husband to Support the Wfe, 18 VA. L. REV. 823, 824 (1932), noting that:
The conception of the common law judges was that the duty [to support] was to
be enforced through the merchants or other outside parties who have furnished the wife
with necessaries. That is, the wife is to purchase the articles required, and the trades-
man is then to collect for them from the husband.
4. Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 292, 114 A.2d 66, 69 (1955); see also D. STEWART,
HUSBAND AND WIFE, § 64 (1885) (common law binds a husband to support his wife).
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 21 (1980). The complete text reads:
Nothing in the article shall be construed to relieve the husband from liability
for the debts, contracts or engagements which the wife may incur or enter into upon the
credit of her husband or as his agent or for necessaries for herself or for his or for their
children; but as to all such cases his liability shall be or continue as at common law.
6. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs., art. 46. ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be
abridged or denied because of sex.").
7. See Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 210 Md. 375, 379, 123 A.2d
333, 336 (1956); Anderson v. Carter, 175 Md. 540, 542, 2 A.2d 677, 678 (1938) (last illness
and burial expenses); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24, 59 A. 139 (1904) (last illness and
burial expenses).
8. Rodowsky, J., joined in part by Davidson, J., dissented.
9. 289 Md. at 530, 425 A.2d at 1018.
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abolished the common law doctrine,' 0 nullifying its statutory counter-
part as well.
I. THE CONDORE DECISION
On November 4, 1976, Prince George's County General Hospital
admitted the appellant's husband, Louis Condore, who received medi-
cal treatment there until he died on December 11 th. His hospital in-
surer paid all but $3,435 of the bill."I The county brought suit against
the decedent's wife for the unpaid amount, arguing that the ERA modi-
fied the common law doctrine of necessaries, making the wife responsi-
ble for her husband's necessaries.' 2 The trial court' 3 granted summary
judgment for the county and held that the ERA did expand the com-
mon law doctrine.' 4 The Court of Appeals' dissent, written by Judge
Rodowsky, echoed the trial court's position.'5 On appeal, however, the
majority reversed, stating that "[t]he general purpose of the ERA to
proscribe sex-based classifications offensive to its provisions is satisfied
by eliminating the necessaries doctrine in its entirety."' 6
A. Historical Background
At common law the marriage union created one legal person; the
wife was "covered by" her husband and she had no legal existence of
her own.' 7 The effect of "coverture" was to deny the wife certain legal
rights,"8 including the right to contract.' 9 As a result of this disability, a
10. Id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019.
11. Apparently, the insurer refused to pay for services that were performed after the
husband's death. See Appellant's Record Ext. at E-5. Mrs. Condore contended at trial,
however, that the services actually had been performed prior to his death, but because of a
billing error, the dates were incorrectly recorded. As was remarked by the attorney for the
appellant, if a mistake were made so that fees purportedly for "blood transfusions, or some-
thing of that nature," were actually administered to a patient dead for two days, then this
case might very well have been a "red herring." Id. at E-21. But the Court of Appeals held
that whether the trial court erred on this question was irrelevant to the disposition of the
appeal. 289 Md. at 520, 425 A.2d at 1013.
12. Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 4-8.
13. Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
14. See 289 Md. at 520, 425 A.2d at 1013.
15. 289 Md. 516, 533, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019-20 (1981) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019.
17. See D. STEWART, supra irote 4, §§ 38, 331.
18. A married woman's will was considered "a mere nullity." Id. § 341. She had no
property rights and thus her deeds were also "nullities." Id. § 394. Likewise she had no
right to sue individually and could maintain an action only if her husband was sued with
her. Id. at § 43 1.
19. Id. § 357. At common law a married woman's individual contracts were considered
"null and void." Also:
The grounds of their invalidity were that a married woman had no legal existence,
[VOL. 41
1982] CONDORE V. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
married woman was unable to conduct business with creditors in her
own name. She could, however, act as her husband's agent, and credi-
tors then could look to her husband for payment on her accounts.20
The necessaries doctrine, however, entitled the creditor to payment
only if the wife's purchases qualified as "necessaries," i.e., items "suita-
ble to her situation and the husband's circumstances in life." 2'
In the late nineteenth century, the Maryland General Assembly
passed a series of Married Women's Acts22 that were designed to re-
move many of the common law disabilities married women bore.
These statutes granted wives the right, among others, to contract in
their own names;23 yet the necessaries doctrine remained in force de-
being merged in her husband; that she had no separate existence; and that she had no
consenting capacity, as she was under the power and control of her husband, and his
wish was her law.
Id. § 357 (footnotes omitted).
20. "The liability of the husband for goods sold to the wife, upon his credit, and by his
authority, or assent, either express or implied, cannot be questioned. In such cases she be-
comes his agent, and the principles of law incident to that relation, necessarily attach."
Weisker v. Lowenthal, 31 Md. 413, 416 (1869), quoted in Noel v O'Neill, 128 Md. 202, 204,
97 A. 513, 513 (1916); see also Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 617-18, 31 A.2d 316, 318
(1943) (result of wife's agency in law is privity of contract between husband and merchant so
as to give husband right of action against merchant where latter sold wife spoiled sausage).
Regarding the "attachment" of the "principles" of agency, one commentator states:
Agency is primarily consensual, and the husband who is compelled to pay for neces-
saries purchased by his wife against his own protest made known to the merchant, is
held not because his wife acted as his agent, but because the law imposes upon him the
duty to suport her . . . . The truth is that this obligation of the husband is quasi-
contractual in nature; in other words, it is an obligation imposed by law without...
the husband's consent.
Brown, supra note 3, at 827; see Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 119, 299
N.W.2d 219, 222 (1980) (husband's liability is a quasi-contractual obligation).
Another rationale for liability is restitution. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 18 (1958)
and cases cited therein; see also Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 255 Md. 247, 251 n.l,
257 A.2d 437, 440 n.1 (1969):
A person who has performed the non-contractual duty of another by supplying a third
person with necessaries which in violation of such duty the other had failed to supply,
although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution
therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor.
Id (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 113 (1966)).
21. Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 617, 31 A.2d 316, 317-18 (1943).
22. See, e.g., Act of 1898, ch. 457; Act of 1892, ch. 267 (current version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 45, §§ 1-5, 11, 15-21 (1980)).
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (Cum. Supp. 1981). A married woman was also granted
the right to protect her property from the debts of her husband. Id. § 1. This statute was in
accord with MD. CONST. art. III, § 43, which protects the wife's property from her husband's
debts. As noted by the majority, had the court expanded the doctrine, the constitutional
provision would have had to "yield" to the ERA based holding. 289 Md. at 532, 425 A.2d
at 1019. The wife also was granted the right to hold property for her separate use as though
unmarried. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 4 (1980).
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spite wives' new freedom from coverture.2 4 Thus, although a wife now
could contract in her own name, she was presumed to have pledged her
husband's credit for the purchase of necessaries 25 unless circumstances
demonstrated that both she and the creditor intended her to be person-
ally liable. 6
The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, ratified in 1972,27 called
into question the validity of laws that place different rights and obliga-
tions on men and women. One year after Maryland ratified the ERA,
the Court of Special Appeals heard the case testing the amendment's
affect on state marital support law. In Minher v. Minner28 a husband
challenged the constitutionality of Maryland's alimony provisions,
which allowed only the wife to sue for support upon divorce.29 As the
husband himself was not suing for support, however, and thus had no
standing to raise the issue, the court refused to label the alimony statute
unconstitutional. 30 In response, the General Assembly amended the
statute to allow either spouse to sue for alimony.
31
In 1977, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals
each handed down a major decision responding to ERA mandates, and
again these cases dealt with family support law. In Rand v. Rand3 2 the
Court of Appeals held that both parents are to share, in accordance
with their means, the parental obligation for child support. 33 More-
24. See supra note 5.
25. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 19 (1958) (presumption, arising from fact of cohabita-
tion, that the wife is the agent of the husband for the purpose of purchasing necessaries).
26. See, e.g., Farver v. Pickett, 162 Md. 10, 12, 158 A. 29, 30 (1932) (husband not liable
for wife's necessary funeral expenses where provision in wife's will directed these costs to be
paid out of her estate); Noel v. O'Neill, 128 Md. 202-03, 97 A. 513, 513 (1916) (wife may be
held liable for necessary goods sold to her solely on her own credit); Jones v. Joel Gutman &
Co., 88 Md. 355, 367, 41 A. 792, 795 (1898) (evidence showing creditor sold goods to wife
alone will remove husband's presumed liability).
27. The amendment is now codified as Article 46 of the Maryland Constitution, Decla-
ration of Rights. For further history, see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO STUDY IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: APPLICATION OF THE MARYLAND EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1976).
28. 19 Md. App. 154, 310 A.2d 208 (1973).
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 1-3, 5 (1973), repealedby 1980 Md. Laws 575. Although
§ 3 stated merely that "[iun all cases where a divorce is decreed, alimony may be awarded,"
§ 5 qualified this by adding: "[T]he court shall not award such alimony... unless. . . the
wife's income is insufficient to care for her needs." (emphasis added).
30. 19 Md. App. at 159, 310 A.2d at 211 (1973).
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1(a) (1981) ("In granting a limited or absolute divorce,
annulment, or alimony, the court may award alimony to either party .. "). Section 3
further states: "The court may from time to time ... order one party to pay to the other a
reasonable amount for the reasonable and necessary expenses, including suit money, attor-
ney's fees, and costs [incurred in a proceeding instituted under this title]."
32. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
33. Id. at 516-17, 374 A.2d at 905. While the Court of Special Appeals had apportioned
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over, the strong language of this decision suggested that the Maryland
courts would join Washington and Pennsylvania as one of the few ju-
risdictions where ERA obligations are strictly enforced:34 "The words
of the ERA are clear and unambiguous. . . . This language mandat-
ing equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor."35 Quoting
this passage, the Court of Special Appeals later that year, in Coleman v.
State,36 held unconstitutional the state's criminal non-support statute
as it penalized only men who refused to support their families.37 The
legislature subsequently expanded the crime and placed reciprocal re-
sponsibility for family support on the wife.38
B. The Court's Holding
In approaching the question whether to expand or abolish the
necessaries doctrine, the Condore court initially acknowledged its
power to so modify the common law doctrine as to require a reciprocal,
spousal liability,39 yet it ultimately refused to take such action. First,
the respective amounts according to a "net income after personal expenses" test, the Court
of Appeals vacated that decision and remanded the case to the chancellor to determine the
appropriate method. Id.
34. Pennsylvania's ERA provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28. In Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974), the
court wrote: "That the purpose of this constitutional provision was to end discriminatory
treatment on account of sex is clear. . . . In this Commonwealth, sex may no longer be
accepted as an exclusive classifying tool." Id. at 296, 328 A.2d at 855; see Beck, Equal Rights
Amendment: The Pennsylvania Experience, 81 DICK. L. REV. 395 (1977) (invoking strict scru-
tiny equal protection test).
Washington's ERA reads: "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1. In Darrin v.
Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (en banc), the court commented:
Presumably the people in adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more than repeat what
was already contained in the otherwise governing constitutional provisions, federal and
state, by which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational relation-
ship and strict scrutiny tests.
Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889.
See Comment, The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment. Eight Years of Application, 9
U. BALT. L. REV. 342 (1980), where the author states that this "progressive minority of
states," now joined by Maryland with the Rand decision, "have interpreted their states'"
equal rights amendments to prohibit any sex-based discrimination, thus indicating "their
commitment to a clear break with sex stereotypes of the past." Id. at 350-5 1.
35. 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03.
36. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
37. This statute provided that "[a]ny person who shall without just cause desert or
wilfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor." MD. ANN, CODE art. 27, § 88(a)(1976) (emphasis added),
amended by 1978 Md. Laws 921.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(a)(1981).
39. 289 Md. 516, 530, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981). Additionally the court reasoned:
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the court was hesitant "to create a cause of action against a wife where
none has previously existed."'  And second, the court felt that the
choice between abolition and expansion was "a matter of such funda-
mental policy" that it should leave the decision to the legislature.4'
Of course, by abolishing the necessaries doctrine the court made
the fundamental policy choice it claimed to be avoiding. Perhaps the
court stressed legislative responsibility for fundamental policy choices
in an effort to encourage the legislature to focus on the necessaries doc-
trine. In fact, part of the majority's decision appears to be the court's
recommendation for legislative action.
The majority quoted extensively from Jersey Shore Medical
Center-Fikin Hospital v. Baum,42 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court modified that state's necessaries doctrine by imposing a secon-
dary liability on the non-contracting spouse in the event the needy
spouse was unable to pay the debts for necessaries.43 The Condore ma-
We do not doubt our authority so to change the common law to conform the necessaries
doctrine to the equality of rights principle which underlies the ERA. Plainly, if the
necessaries doctrine is to be retained, the provisions of Art. III, § 43 of the Constitution,
protecting the property of the wife from the debts of the husband, must yield to the
extent necessary to accommodate the later-enacted dictates of the ERA.
Id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019. Unfortunately, little authority supports the Maryland judici-
ary's power to expand the common law. In each of the three cases cited to support its power
to "change" the common law, the court had eliminated old common law doctrines whose
utility in modem society was suspect. In Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 593, 414 A.2d 929,
933 (1980), the common law action for criminal conversation, in which the husband sues the
wife's paramour for damages to his "property," was eliminated as being a "vestige of the
past." In Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 716, 404 A.2d 1073, 1077 (1979), the court, for reasons
of "basic fairness," eliminated prospectively the common law rule precluding trial of an
accessory until the principal is sentenced, and in Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054
(1979), the court abolished the common law rule of misprision of felony, in which one is
liable for viewing yet not reporting a crime. Notably, the court concluded this opinion by
stating: "[We are not free to usurp the. power of the General Assembly by attempting to
fashion [a rule] that would be [appropriate]." Id. at 352, 396 A.2d at 1078.
Perhaps the Condore court was more aware of this limitation than it admitted, be-
cause one of its reasons for not expanding the doctrine was its hesitation to extend an action
against the wife. See infra text accompanying note 40. However, if this awareness was in
fact the case, then the majority's assertion that it could extend an action represents a contra-
diction, and a flaw, in the opinion.
40. 289 Md. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019.
41. Id.
42. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).
43. In ruling as such, the New Jersey court considered and eliminated two other options.
The first was a "gender-neutral scheme under which each spouse is independent of the
other." Id. at 149, 417 A.2d at 1009. The court eliminated this chore because "literal appli-
cation of the act would leave creditors of a dependent spouse without recourse to the only
realistic source of payment, the financially independent spouse." Id (Of course, this is the
"scheme" Maryland has adopted.) The second option was to expand the doctrine to trans-
form individual necessary debts into joint obligations. The court termed this "equality with
a vengeance," the result being "the immediate exposure of the property of one spouse for a
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jority stressed that the New Jersey court had justified its decision by
observing that "[a] modem marriage is a partnership. . . . Many wo-
men have shed their traditional dependence on their husbands for ac-
tive roles as income earners."" The New Jersey court further observed
that "[i]nterdependence is the hallmark of the modem marriage. The
common law rule imposing liability on husbands, but not on wives, is
an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society.""5 As a result
of this reasoning, the New Jersey court concluded that: "The common
law must adapt to the progress of women in achieving economic equal-
ity and to the mutual sharing of all obligations by husbands and
wives."'
Because the Court of Appeals neither questioned nor criticized any
of the rationales for the Jersey Shore holding, it seems likely that the
majority approved of this logic and cited it as a veiled recommendation
to the Maryland legislature.
In his dissent, Judge Rodowsky noted that, following passage of
the ERA, Maryland had made wives reciprocally liable for alimony,
child-support, and criminal non-support.47 He concluded that these
changes were evidence of a fundamental policy imposing joint obliga-
tions for family support. That policy, he argued, mandated extension
of the necessaries doctrine.48 Consequently, the dissent recommended
that "[ain expanded application, on a prospective basis. . . should be
the holding of this case."49
debt incurred by the other spouse." Id., quoted in Condore, 289 Md. at 529, 425 A.2d at
1017.
44. Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at 147, 149, 417 A.2d at 1008, quoted in Condore, 289 Md. at
527-28, 425 A.2d at 1017.
45. 289 Md. at 528, 425 A.2d at 1017.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
48. 289 Md. at 543-45, 425 A.2d at 1025-26. Judge Rodowsky commented: "[A] deci-
sion in the instant case to expand the doctrine to embrace necessaries furnished the male
spouse will not be imposing a duty of support on the female spouse. The duty is already
there, at least by statute." Id. at 544, 425 A.2d at 1025.
49. Id. at 533, 429 A.2d at 1019.
Other states similarly have expanded the doctrine. In Florida, the state Court of
Appeals expanded its necessaries doctrine to reciprocal liability, despite the legislature's re-
jection of a state Equal Rights Amendment. Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDon-
ald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). The Florida court left open, however, the
question whether the doctrine should be applied on a joint or secondary liability basis. Id.
at n.l.
The dissent also relied on the reasoning, but not the holding, of Sharpe Furniture,
Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980). In Sharpe, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the traditional, one-sided operation of the doctrine:
The necessaries rule encourages the extension of credit to those who in an individual
capacity may not have the ability to make these basic purchases. In this manner it
19821
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C. Assessment
Arguably the court could have found evidence of a clear funda-
mental state policy regarding family support in the strong language of
Maryland's ERA"0 and the state's expansion of alimony, child-support,
and marital support obligations. Other states have done as much with
less ammunition. For example, the Jersey Shore court drew support for
its holding from New Jersey's expanded alimony statute." The court
reasoned that this expansion indicated the legislature's intent that both
spouses bear equitable burdens for marital support.5 Likewise, a Flor-
ida District Court of Appeals expanded the doctrine after noting the
legislature's grant of alimony rights to both husbands and wives.53 And
in A/bert Einstein Medical Center v. Gold,54 the Pennsylvania court
stated simply that the state ERA demanded that "those who seek to
expand the equal rights concept. . . be prepared to accept the burdens
as well as the benefits of such expansion."55 The court then held that a
wife could be liable for her husband's necessary medical expenses. 6
The Condore majority, however, implicitly rejected the dissent's con-
facilitates the support of the family unit .... The rule retains a viable role in modern
society.
Id. at 119, 229 N.W. at 222. Thus, although the Wisconsin court reached a different conclu-
sion, the dissent found this reasoning helpful.
Pennsylvania, a state whose rigid enforcement of ERA requirements has been com-
pared to that of Maryland, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, also has expanded the
obligations of the necessaries doctrine. In United States v. O'Neill, 478 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), the federal court, in applying the common law of the state, upheld a wife's pay-
ment for her husband's legal debts. Id. at 854; see also Albert Einstein Medical Center v.
Gold, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 347, 349-50 (1974) (wife cannot assert that she is not legally respon-
sible for the husband's necessary medical expenses); Kurpiewski v. Kurpiewski, 254 Pa.
Super. 489, 492 n.2, 386 A.2d 55, 57 n.2 (1978) (Pennsylvania ERA imposes a sex-neutral
burden of support). But see Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Nathans, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 561,
564 (C.P. 1977) (decision to give reciprocal application to necessaries doctrine is best left to
the legislature).
50. See supra note 6 (noting the mandatory tone of Maryland's constitutional provision).
51. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-23 (West 1981), noted in Jersey Shore Medical Center
- Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 142, 417 A.2d 1003, 1005 (1980); supra notes 42-45 and
accompanying text.
52. 84 N.J. at 150-51, 417 A.2d at 1010. The New Jersey court went on to find the
common law doctrine, as traditionally used, unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, id. at 144-48, 417 A.2d at 1007-08, and under art. 1,
para. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, 84 N.J. at 148, 417 A.2d at 1008, as a denial of equal
protection. New Jersey has no Equal Rights Amendment.
53. See FLA. STAT. A'N. § 61.08 (1981), noted in Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v.
McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Florida has no Equal Rights
Amendment.
54. 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (1974).
55. Id. at 347.
56. See supra note 49.
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tention that, in light of state policy, "[tihe duty is already there. '57 Per-
haps the majority felt the state policy was not firm enough. This is
unlikely, however, given Maryland's progressive attitude toward ERA
requirements regarding family support obligations.
The court's deference to the legislature nonetheless has some
merit. Had the court undertaken to modify the common law, it would
have had to choose between alternative methods of enforcing a recipro-
cal duty to supply necessaries. For instance, Maryland could establish
reciprocal obligations by imposing primary liability on the contracting
spouse and secondary liability on the other, by making the spouses
jointly liable, or by making each spouse liable in proportion to his or
her financial resources.5" The choice between these alternatives in-
volves a balancing of advantages and disadvantages that normally
characterizes legislative decisionmaking,59 and perhaps the court ap-
propriately left this choice to the legislature.
Unfortunately, in choosing not to choose, the court has created a
gap in the marital support laws. As the law stands now, the neglected
spouse's primary recourses are to seek alimony60 or to persuade the
state's attorney to bring a criminal non-support action against the neg-
lectful spouse.6' If Maryland still had a necessaries doctrine, the
57. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. As discussed supra note 39, the Ma-
ryland cases on court modification of the common law do not support a contention that
courts may create new causes of action. However, were the marital duty to support viewedas
already there, as concluded by Judge Rodowsky and (implicitly) by the New Jersey, Florida
and Pennsylvania courts, then an expansion of the common law necessaries doctrine (in
accordance with a firm mutual support policy) would not be creating a new cause of action
against the wife. This interpretation is analogous to Rand where the court justified the ex-
tension of child support to the mother by asserting that the maternal duty to support already
existed. Specifically, the Rand court pointed to Act of 1929, ch. 561 (codified as MD. ANN.
CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978)), which stated: "The father and the mother are the joint natural
guardians of their minor child and are equally charged with its care, nurture, welfare and
education. They shall have equal powers and duties ....
58. There are other possible remedies; e.g., a civil statute allowing suit for non-support,
see infra note 68 and accompanying text, as well as the abolition of the doctrine, which was
the Condore court's choice.
59. See State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 97, 318 A.2d 257, 261 (1974) ("[E]xpression and
weighing of divergent views, consideration of potential effects, and suggestion of adequate
safeguards, are better suited to the legislative forum.").
60. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1981). See generally 41 MD. L. REV. 456 (1982).
61. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 89-96 (1981).
Other remedies available to the wife include a contract with the husband for sup-
port, as sanctioned by MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 28 (1981); withdrawal ofjoint bank account
funds, Sody v. Sody, 32 Md. App. 644, 363 A.2d 568 (1976)(wife may retain money if it is
used for its original purposes, here for family expenses, and not spent for items or services
adverse to the husband); or contracts with suppliers based on agency in fact. This latter is
different from agency by necessity (upon which the doctrine of necessaries is based) as here
the supplier is viewed as contracting with the needy spouse solely on the basis of the non-
1982]
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spouse who could persuade a supplier to provide goods or services on
the basis of the other spouse's ability to pay could obtain the necessities
of life without going to court. Had the court followed the dissent's sug-
gestion, and probably its own preference, by adopting the Jersey Shore
solution, it certainly would not have been treading on the legislative
prerogative.62 The choice between alternatives ultimately would have
remained with the legislature, for the legislature can always modify the
common law.63
II. RECOMMENDATION
The legislature should fill the gap left by the Condore decision,
and it should also consider other means of protecting dependent
spouses. Because any civil action for support necessarily entails the
delays and expenses that generally attend court proceedings, the doc-
trine of necessaries should be expanded to allow the neglected spouse
the benefit of its relatively speedy operation.' A reciprocal necessaries
doctrine would allow a dependent spouse to obtain necessaries immedi-
contracting spouse's indication to be liable for the contracting spouse's debts. In McFerren
v. Goldsmith Stem Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 A. 107 (1921), the Court of Appeals stated that a
husband may withdraw his "consent" (as based on his past payment to the merchant for his
wife's debts) to his wife's agency, where he is already supplying her with sufficient alimony,
thus removing her agency by necessity. Id at 578-79, 113 A. at 109. Thus, a needy spouse
who has some, yet not enough, of the independent partner's money, may contract with fa-
miliar suppliers, who expect payment from the independent spouse. The agency in fact
exists, however, only until the paying spouse withdraws his or her consent to the agency
status by informing the supplier of his or her unwillingness to pay in the future. See RE-
STATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27, 125 (1957)(discussing the creation and termina-
tion of apparent authority).
62. That is, assuming the majority interpreted the marital duty to support as mandating
the extension of the necessaries doctrine.
63. This, however, might be different. If the independent spouse has refused to support
and the doctrine is invoked as a remedy, "the tradesman is buying a lawsuit." Brown, supra
note 3, at 844. "[Mlerchants quite reasonably do not want to enter a family quarrel and rely
on their right of a law suit against the husband for goods they give the wife." Sayre, A
Reconsideration ofHusband's Duty to Support and W!fe's Duty to Render Services, 29 VA. L.
REV. 857, 861 (1943). The merchant's plight is further complicated by the burdens he must
bear in court. Specifically, a creditor must prove the goods were received by the contracting
spouse, that (s)he needed them, that they were in fact necessaries suitable to the couple's
station in life, that credit was extended to the independent spouse and not to the partner, and
that the independent spouse had failed to provide the necesaries or an allowance sufficient to
buy them. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 22 (1958). Perhaps out of fairness to the merchant a court
might shift these burdens of proof to the contracting spouse if it expanded the doctrine. Cf.
Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 255 Md. 247, 252-54, 257 A.2d 437, 440-41 (1969)
(merchant's ignorance of wife's adultery, which was misconduct severing the husband's duty
to supply necessaries, was irrelevant and immaterial; the merchant thus was barred from
recovery).
64. See supra text accompanying note 62.
CONDORE V. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
ately if he or she could persuade a supplier to extend credit,65 a process
made even easier if the husband and wife have joint checking accounts
or credit cards. Additionally, Maryland's Equal Credit Opportunity
Act anticipates the use of the doctrine where the spouse applying for
individual credit has no references or income of his or her own. Sec-
tion 12-704 of the Commercial Law Article reads in part:
Discriminatory practices defined. Prohibited discriminatory prac-
tices include any:
(5) Request for or consideration of the credit rating of an ap-
plicant's spouse where the applicant is otherwise creditworthy and
is not applying for a joint account unless the applicant lists credit
references in the name of spouse or former spouse or has no indi-
vidual prior credit history or the creditor permits the applicant to
designate the applicant's spouse as an authorized purchaser on the
account.66
Thus, even if the needy spouse is applying for credit, the Maryland
Annotated Code allows the creditor to look to the spouse's credit and
determine creditworthiness on that basis.67  Finally, the legislature
should expand the necessaries doctrine to operate on a basis equitable
to the non-contracting spouse-perhaps on a primary-secondary liabil-
ity basis, as the New Jersey version of the doctrine does.
The legislature should also retain the criminal non-support law.
Because the state prosecutes these cases, success is not dependent on the
needy spouse's financial ability to retain legal counsel. Furthermore,
when the dependent spouse can persuade the state to prosecute, it is
under constitutional compulsion to proceed quickly,68 and thus the ne-
glected spouse can obtain quick, court decreed, ongoing support.
Finally, the legislature should consider the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act.69 This act demands reciprocal support duties for
spouses as well as for children and parents-in-need. It contemplates
65. Obviously, a genderless-based necessaries doctrine would provide a creditor's rem-
edy against the independent spouse. The only issue, therefore, would be the form of the
creditor's remedy; e.g., joint liability, secondary liabiity, or liability according to proportion-
ate resources.
66. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-705 (1981) (emphasis added).
67. If a merchant has received information regarding the spouse's income in accordance
with this statute, then his burden of proving reliance on that income is easier.
68. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs., art. 21: "[In all criminal prosecutions, every man hath
a right . . . to a speedy trial .... "). See generally Note, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 47 (1976)
(discussion of right to speedy trial in Maryland).
69. 9 U.L.A. 135 (1973). One student commentator recommended this subsequent to the
Coleman decision, holding the one-sided criminal non-support statute unconstitutional. See
Comment, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1977).
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enforcement by either the obligee or the state, and whenever the state
provides support for the obligee, the state may bring an action against
the obligor to recover the amount.
Together, these laws would provide a dependent spouse with truly
necessary support as well as the means to obtain further support in
accordance with the family's station in life. In the wake of Condore,
the Maryland General Assembly should proceed quickly along these or
similar lines.
WALLACE V. WALLACE - MARYLAND RETAINS FAULT
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DETERMINATION OF
ALIMONY AWARDS
In Wallace v. Wallace' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
wife's culpable conduct did not bar her from obtaining alimony in Ma-
ryland when she demonstrated (1) that she had grounds for divorce
under Maryland's no-fault statute, and (2) that her husband had re-
ceived a no-fault divorce in another state lacking personal jurisdiction
over her.2 The court noted that either showing would have enabled her
to seek alimony in Maryland, but stressed that her fault remained a
factor in the alimony determination. Although Wallace somewhat
eases the way for dependent spouses seeking alimony in Maryland, it
unfortunately retains fault as a factor in determining those awards.
In March, 1976, after nine years of marriage, Dr. Wallace aban-
doned his wife and commenced an adulterous relationship with his
dental assistant.' Within two months, Mrs. Wallace also began an
adulterous relationship. In March, 1977, she filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, seeking a divorce a mensa et thoro4 on
the ground of her husband's desertion. The court granted Mrs. Wal-
lace an a mensa decree and ordered Dr. Wallace to pay alimony
pendente lite.5 Following the entry of this order, Dr. Wallace moved to
Virginia and, after establishing that state as his domicile, obtained a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii6 based on Virginia's no-fault ground of
1. 290 Md. 265, 429 A.2d 232 (1981).
2. Id. at 277-86, 429 A.2d at 239-44.
3. Id. at 267-68, 429 A.2d at 234.
4. A divorce a mensa et thoro [hereinafter referred to as a divorce a mensa], sometimes
called "legal separation," is a limited type of divorce rather than an actual dissolution of the
marriage. Though forbidden from living together, the parties remain married in the eyes of
the law. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 69, 281 A.2d 407, 409 (1971); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979). For a list of the causes for which a divorce a mensa may be
decreed, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (1981). Divorce a vinculo matrimonii [hereinafter
referred to as divorce a vinculo], on the other hand, is a complete severance of the marital
ties. Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 302, 66 A. 16,17 (1907); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
124 (5th ed. 1979). For a list of the causes for which a divorce a vinculo may be decreed, see
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1981). Thus following a divorce a vinculo, but not a divorce a
mensa, the parties are free to remarry.
5. Pendente lite alimony is paid only during the course of the litigation, whereas "per-
manent alimony" is intended to provide support for a longer period. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1020 (5th ed. 1979). In addition to permanent and pendenle lite alimony, Mrs.
Wallace sought custody of the couple's two minor children, child support, and reasonable
attorney fees. 290 Md. at 268, 429 A.2d at 234.
6. See supra note 4.
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statutory separation.7 Shortly thereafter, he stopped paying the tempo-
rary alimony, and as a result, Mrs. Wallace amended her complaint in
the circuit court, seeking permanent alimony.'
The chancery master recommended that the circuit court award
Mrs. Wallace permanent alimony along with accrued alimonypendente
lite and custody of the couple's two children. Over Dr. Wallace's ob-
jections, the circuit court substantially adopted the master's findings
and recommendations, including the alimony award. The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's decree,9 and the Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari to consider whether alimony was proper in
light of Mrs. Wallace's post-separation adulterous conduct." The
court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, hold-
ing that even though Mrs. Wallace's adultery was relevant to the deter-
mination of alimony, it was merely a factor and did not bar an alimony
award. "
Wallace represents another step in the long and gradual develop-
ment of Maryland domestic relations law, a body of law rooted in the
practices of the ecclesiastical courts of England. 2 Divorce was un-
known at common law, and is a creature of statute.' 3 Originally, the
Maryland equity courts could grant only a mensa, or "partial," di-
vorces, and could award alimony only in conjunction with such de-
crees. '4 Then, in 1841, the legislature extended the power of the equity
courts, authorizing them to award a vinculo, or "absolute," divorces.' 5
Traditionally, a wife's entitlement to alimony stemmed from the
husband's common law duty to support her.' 6 Although the legislature
7. VA. CODE § 20-91(9)(a)(1975); see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
8. In light of the Virginia decree, Mrs. Wallace's new complaint abandoned her prior
claim for an adjudication of divorce by the Maryland court. She chose not to collaterally
attack the Virginia decree. 290 Md. at 269, 429 A.2d at 235.
9. Wallace v. Wallace, 46 Md. App. 213, 416 A.2d 1317 (1980), a t'd, 290 Md. 265, 429
A.2d 232 (1981).
10. Wallace v. Wallace, 290 Md. 265, 269, 429 A.2d 232, 235 (1981).
11. Id. at 280-83, 429 A.2d at 240-42.
12. See, e.g., Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 590, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913).
13. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913). Originally, the
legislature, rather than the courts, granted divorces in Maryland. Id., cited in Foote v.
Foote, 190 Md. 171, 176, 57 A.2d 804, 807 (1948). However, an attempt by the legislature to
grant alimony was held to be a judicial function and therefore unconstitutional. Crane v.
McGinnis, I G. & J. 463, 477 (Md. 1829).
14. Foote v, Foote, 190 Md. 171, 176, 57 A.2d 804, 807 (1948); Emerson v. Emerson, 120
Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913). The power of the ecclesiastical courts was limited in
the same fashion. Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 185, 129 A.2d 917, 918 (1957).
15. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913); Staub v. Staub, 170
Md. 202, 208, 183 A. 605, 608 (1936).
16. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 590, 87 A. 1033, 1035-36 (1913).
In some states, alimony was really a form of property disposition, by which the wife
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empowerered the equity courts to grant "alimony," no statute defines
that term.' 7 In Wallingsford v. Wallingsford,18 however, the Court of
Appeals defined alimony as "a maintenance afforded to the wife, where
the husband refuses to give it or where from his conduct he compels her
to separate from him.' ' 9
Although the authority to grant alimony is statutory, the standard
governing its award is judicial.2 °  In 1940, the Timanus v.
Timanus21decision enumerated the factors that courts should consider
in determining an appropriate award. The Court of Appeals said that,
as a general rule, an alimony award should contemplate "the mainte-
nance of the wife in accordance with the husband's duty to support her
suitably, together with the husband's wealth and earning capacity."22
The court added that an award also should be based on such factors as
the parties' "station in life, their age and physical condition, ability to
work, the length of time they lived together, the circumstances leading
up to the separation, the fault which destroyed the home, and their
respective responsibilities for the care and support of the children."23
Initially a foreign divorce decree which did not award alimony
barred an alimony award in Maryland, because the right to alimony
was viewed as an incident of the marital relationship that was extin-
guished upon a decree of divorce a vinculo .24 This reasoning often put
a dependant spouse in the manifestly unfair predicament of choosing
between defending a divorce action in a foreign jurisdiction, often a
received a sum of money in lieu of some property held by the husband. In Maryland, how-
ever, the awards of property settlements and alimony have always been viewed as two sepa-
rate and distinct measures. 1d. at 591, 87 A. at 1036. Of course, alimony and property
disposition are related since both are methods to provide for the spouses upon dissolution of
the marriage. Thus the determination of what is an appropriate alimony award should al-
ways be made in light of how much each spouse is to receive from the division of the
couple's assets.
17. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A. 1033, 1035 (1913).
18. 6 H. & J. 485 (Md. 1825).
19. Id. at 488.
20. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 339, 311 A.2d 407, 410 (1973); Willoughby v.
Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 592, 261 A.2d 452, 453 (1970).
21. 178 Md. 640, 16 A.2d 918 (1940).
22. Id. at 642, 16 A.2d at 920.
23. Id. Although fault is a factor in determining permanent alimony, it is not consid-
ered in awarding alimonypendente ite. Dougherty v. Dougherty, 189 Md. 316, 320, 55 A.2d
787, 788 (1947).
24. In Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265, 208 A.2d 611, 613 (1965), the court stated:
"The rule in Maryland is that after the dissolution of the marital relationship, whether by
decree of this or another state, the courts of this State are precluded from awarding ali-
mony." See also Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 337-39, 86 A.2d 520, 523-24 (1952)
(holding that the alimony provision of the wife's Maryland a mensa decree could not survive
the later granting of an a vinculo decree to the husband by a Florida court).
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distant state, or foregoing any alimony claim.25 Since 1978 when the
Maryland Court of Appeals decided A/tman v. Altman,2 6 Maryland has
allowed the domiciliary spouse to pursue a claim to alimony in a Mary-
land court even though the other spouse has already obtained a foreign
divorce decree.27
An alimony award to either party may accompany any Maryland
divorce decree.2 8 Thus although an alimony claimant was required to
prove that he or she was entitled to a Maryland divorce either a mensa
or a vinculo, 29 afterAltman the claimant did not actually have to obtain
the divorce.30 In fact, a claimant may seek alimony without requesting
a divorce decree.3'
25. Relatively wealthy husbands would take advantage of this rule by travelling to a
state where a divorce could be easily obtained. See, e.g., Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483,
386 A.2d 766 (1978); Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969) (husbands
went to Nevada to obtain divorce, attempting to preclude their wives from later seeking
alimony in Maryland).
26. 282 Md. 483, 386 A.2d 766 (1978).
27. In 1969, the Court of Appeals for the first time awarded alimony to a wife who had
already been divorced by her husband's foreign decree. Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md.
331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969). The court indicated, however, that it would award the wife support
only from the husband's property that remained in Maryland, and expressly limited its hold-
ing to these particular facts. Because husbands merely removed all their property from Ma-
ryland prior to obtaining the divorce, this rule proved ineffective. Then in Altman v.
Altman, 282 Md. 483, 386 A.2d 766 (1978), the court expanded the Dackman holding to
allow alimony awards from all of the ex-husband's property, so long as the Maryland court
had obtained personal jurisdiction over him.
This problem is now expressly dealt with by statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § l(d)
(1981).
28. Alimony in Maryland is now available to husbands as well as wives. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § l(a) (1981). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a statute providing
alimony only for women violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
29. The Maryland courts consistently have held that, as a prerequisite to receiving ali-
mony, a claimant must prove that he or she is entitled to a divorce. See, e.g., Bender v.
Bender, 282 Md. 525, 529, 386 A.2d 772, 775 (1978); Stein v. Stein, 251 Md. 300, 302, 247
A.2d 266, 267 (1968).
30. The Wallace court stated that Maryland law requires that "[tihe spouse seeking the
[alimony] award either obtain, or prove grounds that would entitle that party to, a divorce
either a nensa et thoro or a vinculo matrimonii." 290 Md. at 272, 429 A.2d at 236. This
statement, however, is misleading. Maryland law requires that an alimony claimant prove
that he or she would be entitled to a divorce a mensa or a vinculo. Bender v. Bender, 282
Md. 525, 529, 386 A.2d 772, 775 (1978). Thus even if the claimant could prove fault grounds
that otherwise would entitle him or her to a divorce, the alimony claim nonetheless would be
barred if the claimant were guilty of recriminatory conduct.
31. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 258 Md. 534, 266 A.2d 337 (1970).
Maryland's current alimony statute was not yet in effect when Wallace was decided.
See 1980 Md. Laws ch. 575, § 3 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § I (1981) (statute
applicable only to cases filed after July 1, 1980). The statute provides in part: "In granting a
limited or absolute divorce, annulment, or alimony, the court may award alimony to either
party, and the existence of a ground for divorce against the party requesting alimony shall
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The doctrine of recrimination traditionally limited the availability
of divorce, and therefore the availability of alimony. Recrimination
precludes a spouse from obtaining a fault-based divorce if he or she has
committed acts that would entitle the other spouse to a divorce.32 The
conduct must be a ground for an a vinculo divorce, not merely for a
divorce a mensa, but need not be the same ground as that charged by
the divorce claimant.33
The advent of no-fault divorce has radically altered the entire field
of domestic relations law. No-fault statutes allow parties to obtain a
divorce without reference to which party is responsible for the demise
of the marriage.34 Currently, there are two major no-fault grounds for
divorce in Maryland,35 voluntary separation and statutory separation.
Voluntary separation allows parties to receive a divorce after they have
voluntarily lived separate and apart, without hope of reconciliation.
Voluntary separation is immediately grounds for a divorce a mensa36
and after the separation has continued for one year, it entitles either
party to a divorce a vinculo.37 Statutory separation, on the other hand,
not be an automatic bar thereto." MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1(a) (1981). At first glance this
language might be interpreted to indicate that a divorce must be "granted" in order for
alimony to be awarded. The words "or alimony," however, clearly indicate that a party may
receive alimony without requesting a divorce.
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (5th ed. 1979); see Courson v. Courson, 208 Md.
171, 117 A.2d 850 (1955).
33. Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 174, 117 A.2d 850, 852 (1955); Matakieff v.
Matakieff, 246 Md. 23, 35-36, 226 A.2d 887, 893 (1967).
34. Thus no-fault divorce eliminates the concept of having one "innocent" spouse and
one "guilty" one. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
Traditionally, the rationale for a fault-based approach to divorce was the state inter-
est in the sanctity of marriage, and the notion that marriages should be dissolved only for
"grave and weighty" reasons. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 248 Md. 455, 459, 237 A.2d 523,
525 (1968); Harrison v. Harrison, 223 Md. 422, 426, 164 A.2d 901, 903 (1960). It is undoubt-
edly true that the family is a very important institution in our society. However, it is difficult
to see how a state policy of preserving marriages "at all costs" serves the public interest.
Comment, Alimony in Florida: No-Fault Stops at the Courthouse Door, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
521, 531 (1976). Indeed, by making it difficult for embittered spouses to dissolve what has
become a marriage in name only, the state does far more harm than good. Cf. Bradway, The
Myth ofthe Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REV. 377, 382-87 (1937) (criticizing the doctrine of
recrimination for this reason).
35. Some of the traditional divorce grounds are "no-fault" in a technical sense. For
example, a Maryland court may decree a divorce a vinculo based on insanity, impotence, or
imprisonment of one of the spouses. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24, 26 (1981). However,
modem notions of "no-fault" are limited to voluntary separation and statutory separation,
which concentrate on the separation of the parties rather than any aspect of their conduct
during the marriage. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
36. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (1981).
37. Three elements must be shown in order to establish voluntary separation grounds for
a divorce a vinculo: "(i) an express or implied agreement to separate, accompanied by a
mutual intent not to resume the marriage relationship; (ii) voluntarily living separate and
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entitles either spouse to a divorce a vinculo upon proof that the parties
have lived separate and apart for any reason for three years.38
The addition of no-fault divorce grounds to Maryland's predomi-
nantly fault-oriented domestic relations law39 has raised many ques-
tions concerning the relationship between these grounds and concepts
such as recrimination that are products of the older fault-oriented ap-
proach.40 By statute, recrimination does not bar a divorce sought on
grounds of statutory separation.4' Moreover, the Court of Appeals
consistently has held that legislative policy prevents the use of recrimi-
nation to defeat a divorce sought on the grounds of voluntary separa-
tion.42 Because a spouse's right to obtain alimony is contingent upon
his or her entitlement to divorce,43 adoption of no-fault grounds dilates
the factual circumstances that can form the foundation for an alimony
award.44
Although recrimination does not bar a divorce sought on no-fault
grounds, initially it was unclear whether a spouse's culpable behavior
bars an otherwise existing right to alimony. The Court of Appeals first
addressed this question in 1957, in the landmark case of Courson v.
Courson. 4 Mrs. Courson received an alimony award in conjunction
with a decree for divorce a mensa based on her husband's desertion.
Mr. Courson subsequently filed suit, seeking a divorce a vinculo and
apart without cohabitation for twelve months prior to the filing of the bill of complaint; and
(iii) that the separation is beyond any reasonable hope of reconciliation." Smith v. Smith,
257 Md. 263, 266, 262 A.2d 762, 763-64 (1970); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1981).
38. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1981), Originally, a five year period of separation
was required. See 1969 Md. Laws ch. 656, § 1.
39. Even though technically there are five no-fault grounds for divorce (insanity, impo-
tence, imprisonment, voluntary separation and statutory separation), see supra note 35, and
two fault grounds for divorce (adultery and abandonment), see MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24
(1981), fault considerations consistently pervade the dissolution process, even when the di-
vorce is sought on no-fault grounds.
40. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
41. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1981) ("A plea of res judicata or of recrimination
with respect to any other provisions of this section shall not be a bar to either party ob-
taining a divorce [based on statutory separation].").
42. Wallace, 290 Md. at 279, 429 A.2d at 240. Moreover, the court took this position
even prior to the enactment of the statutory separation ground in 1969. See, e.g., Holofcener
v. Holofcener, 242 Md. 727, 729, 219 A.2d 839, 840 (1966); Matysek v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44,
50-54, 128 A.2d 627, 630-33 (1957).
43. See supra notes 29-30.
44. 290 Md. at 274, 429 A.2d at 237.
45. 213 Md. 183, 129 A.2d 917 (1957).
The Courson case actually came before the Court of Appeals twice. The first time,
the court, on the grounds of recriminatory conduct, reversed a divorce granted to the hus-
band. Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 117 A.2d 850 (1955). It was not until the second
time the court heard the case that the relationship between alimony and adultery was
addressed.
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suspension of his wife's alimony on the ground that Mrs. Courson had
committed adultery after receiving her a mensa decree. In affirming a
termination of Mrs. Courson's alimony, the court stated that:
The proper rule, supported by reason and authority, is that
when a wife, who is living separate and apart from her husband
due to his fault and who has obtained no more than a limited di-
vorce from him, commits adultery, shefo(reits her right to her hus-
band's support and the future payments of alimony.'
The court again considered the relationship between fault and ali-
mony in Flanagan v. Flanagan.4" Mr. Flanagan, who had received a
divorce a vinculo on the no-faultground of statutory separation, main-
tained that his wife's alleged recriminatory adultery barred her claim
for alimony. Mrs. Flanagan argued that because the divorce was ob-
tained on no-fault grounds, her fault should not be a factor in the ali-
mony award. The Court of Appeals held that her fault could be a
factor in determining a proper alimony award. Flanagan adopted a
balancing test and held:
[I]f there exists separation causing culpability other than adultery
or abandonment on one side, or fault on both sides which caused
the separation of the parties, the chancellor should consider the
46. 213 Md. at 188, 129 A.2d at 920 (emphasis added). The Courson decision was
reached by a narrow three-to-two vote, and contained a vigorous dissenting opinion. See id.
at 189-94, 129 A.2d at 920-23 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
In Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d 407 (1971), the Court of Special
Appeals refused to extend the Courson holding to conduct that occurred after an absolute
divorce. Mr. Atkinson sought modification of his ex-wife's alimony award, based on allega-
tions that she had sexual relations with her boyfriend. The court, however, rejected Mr.
Atkinson's claim. The court noted that Mrs. Atkinson did not commence sexual relations
until after she had received a divorce a vinculo, a decree which completely severed the mari-
tal bond and any duty of chasity which she may have owed to her ex-husband. Therefore,
the court held that the Courson situation, which involved misconduct after a divorce a
mensa but prior to a divorce a vinculo, did not apply. 1d. at 71, 281 A.2d at 409.
The court, however, specifically noted that the chancellor found that Mrs. Atkinson's
conduct was not "flagrant misconduct," and in dicta implied that a spouse may lose the right
to alimony because of flagrant misconduct committed after a divorce a vinculo. Id. at 72-73,
281 A.2d at 410. But in Meyer v. Meyer, 41 Md. App. 13, 21, 394 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1978), the
court rejected this dicta, holding that alimony awarded in a decree of divorce a vinculo may
not be terminated or reduced on the basis of the claimant's unchaste conduct after the
divorce.
47. 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973). This case is the final case in a trilogy of reported
decisions. It was litigated in the Court of Special Appeals twice before reaching the Court of
Appeals. See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 17 Md. App. 90, 299 A.2d 520 (1973); Flanagan v.
Flanagan, 14 Md. App. 648, 288 A.2d 225 (1972). For a discussion of these three cases, see
generally Recent Decision, Divorce -Alimony -Fault ir to be Considered M AwardingAlimony
in an Absolute Divorce Based on Five Years of Uninterrupted Separation - Flanagan v. Rlana-
gan, 33 MD. L. Rv. 489 (1973).
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parties' degree of blame as well as their relative guilt in those cases
where applicable and, in conjunction with the factors [listed in
Timanus], decide upon the proper award.48
Although Flanagan appeared to modify substantially the harsh
rule established in Courson, the court completely ignored Courson in
creating its new test.49 Apparently the only distinction between the two
cases was that Courson involved alimony that rested on a fault-based
divorce, whereas Flanagan dealt with alimony based on a no-fault di-
vorce. This distinction does not seem to justify such different treatment
of the wives. Under Courson, a wife who receives an a mensa divorce
and who commits adultery after she was living apart from her husband
is barred from obtaining alimony, while under Flanagan, a wife's adul-
tery occurring prior to the parties' separation does not automatically
bar her claim to such an award.5 °
The Wallace court nevertheless continued to observe the fault/no-
48. 270 Md. at 339-42, 311 A.2d at 410-11; accord Rhoad v. Rhoad, 273 Md. 459, 465-
66, 330 A.2d 192, 195-96 (1975); Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 638-39, 339 A.2d 328,
339-40 (1975). The Flanagan court also stated:
[When] the actions of the party seeking such a pecuniary award constitute the sole cause
for the demise of the marriage, and this wrongdoing consists of acts which are either
adultery or abandonment, then, except in rare instances where there exist extremely
extenuating circumstances, the award of any alimony would be an abuse of discretion.
270 Md. at 341, 311 A.2d at 411. For an example of what might qualify as "extremely
extenuating circumstances" allowing a spouse whose actions are the sole cause of the mar-
riage's demise to receive alimony, see Recent Decision, supra note 47, at 496 n.35.
The court felt that adultery and desertion were "the more heinous of the acts which
can terminate a marriage." 270 Md. at 341, 311 A.2d at 411. It is interesting to note that
although courts have traditionally viewed adultery as a particularly heinous act, as a crime it
is punishable in Maryland only by a fine of $10. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 (1976).
The Flanagan court gave no reason for applying the same factors to both an alimony
claim sought in a fault context and an alimony claim sought on no-fault grounds. Instead,
the court flatly asserted: "This is logically so and there is nothing in the public policy of
Maryland as expressed in the statute to the contrary." 270 Md. at 340, 311 A.2d at 410.
49. The Courson decision was mentioned only once in Flanagan, and then was cited
only as a case in which the history of alimony in Maryland had been chronicled. See 270
Md. at 339, 311 A.2d at 409-10. The Flanagan decision also ignored the Court of Special
Appeals' decision in Renner v. Renner, 16 Md. App. 143, 294 A.2d 671 (1972), even though
that case had been decided only one year earlier and had addressed the same question.
Renner similarly held that fault was a relevant factor in arriving at an alimony award based
on a no-fault divorce granted on grounds of statutory separation. 1d. at 158-60, 294 A.2d at
679-80.
50. This anomaly between Courson and Flanagan was noted by the Court of Special
Appeals in Flood v. Flood, 24 Md. App. 395, 399-400, 330 A.2d 715, 718 (1975). Flood held
that Mrs. Flood had not automatically forfeited her right to alimony by committing adultery
after she had been separated from her husband, noting that Flanagan tempered, albeit sub
silentio, the harsh rule of Courson. 1d. at 403, 330 A.2d at 720-21. Nevertheless, because the
chancellor found as a fact that the husband was 90% at fault and the court emphasized the
outrageousness of Mr. Flood's conduct, see id., the impact of the Flood holding is limited.
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fault distinction. The court agreed with Dr. Wallace that his wife's
adultery precluded her from claiming that his desertion supplied
grounds for divorce and thus for alimony.5 However, after finding
that Mrs. Wallace had established voluntary separation as a ground for
a divorce a mensa, the court concluded that she was entitled to seek
alimony on the same basis that Mrs. Flanagan had.52 Although Dr.
Wallace argued that Courson barred any such award,53 the court made
it clear that Courson only applied to alimony claims resting on grounds
for a fault-based divorce. 4
The fault/no-fault distinction is now less important under the new
Maryland alimony statute, which became operative after Wallace.55
The statute specifies that "the existence of a ground for divorce against
the party requesting alimony shall not be an automatic bar thereto."56
Yet even though fault is minimized, by using the word "automatic" the
legislature apparently intended that the existence of a fault ground
against a claimant still can be a bar to alimony if a court desires.5 7
51. 290 Md. at 270 n.l, 429 A.2d at 235 n.l; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Because Dr. Wallace's Viginia decree was given presumptive validity, and was not attacked
by Mrs. Wallace, she was in the awkward position of having to establish grounds for a
divorce notwithstanding the fact that she had already been validly divorced from her hus-
band and therefore was not able actually to obtain a divorce from the Maryland court. Id.
at 274, 429 A.2d at 238. Nonetheless, this situation did not in itself defeat Mrs. Wallace's
claim. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. 290 Md. at 277, 429 A.2d at 239.
Reversing the chancellor, the court held that Mrs. Wallace could not satisfy the re-
quirement for a divorce a vinculo, because the separation had not been voluntary for the
necessary 12 months before she filed suit. Id.; see supra note 37.
Because MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (1981) imposes no durational requirement, the
court held that Mrs. Wallace had grounds for a divorce a mensa based on voluntary separa-
tion. 290 Md. at 277, 429 A.2d at 239. Even though the separation began with Dr. Wallace's
desertion, the subsequent development of a mutual intent to remain apart made the separa-
tion voluntary. 290 Md. at 276-77, 429 A.2d at 239. The court noted that although mere
acquiescence to what one cannot prevent does not amount to a voluntary agreement, it is
possible for a separation that begins with the abandonment of one spouse by the other, or
with one spouse merely resigned to the reality of the division, to be converted subsequently
into a disjunction that is voluntary. .d. The court noted further that this apparently would
be more likely where, as in Wallace, it is the estranged spouse, rather than the deserter, who
seeks the voluntary separation adjudication. Id. at 277, 429 A.2d at 239.
53. 290 Md. at 280, 429 A.2d at 241.
54. 290 Md. at 283, 429 A.2d at 242. In adopting Flanagan's balancing approach, Wal-
lace reaffirmed the decision in Flanagan that legislative policy mandates that recrimination
is not a defense to divorce sought on either of the nonculpatory grounds. See 290 Md. at
279-80, 429 A.2d at 240; supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 31.
56. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § l(a) (1981).
57. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § l(b)(7)(1981) (requiring the court, in determining an
alimony award, to consider "[t]he facts and circumstances leading to the estrangement of the
parties and the dissolution of the marriage").
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Thus, like Wallace, the statute tempers the harsh rule of Courson, but
stops short of eliminating it altogether.
In Wallace the court also held that a spouse seeking alimony in
Maryland need not always establish that he or she has grounds for a
Maryland divorce. If the other spouse has obtained a no-fault divorce
from a state lacking jurisdiction over the Maryland domiciliary, that
foreign decree will support an alimony award in Maryland. 8 Thus
Wallace and the new alimony statute enable dependent spouses to ob-
tain alimony in Maryland more easily. Now an alimony claimant's
fault will not automatically bar his or her claim, even when it is sup-
ported only by a foreign no-fault divorce. 9
However, neither Wallace nor the new alimony statute makes fault
irrelevant to the alimony determination.6" Fault remains a significant,
and apparently at times virtually dispositive, factor in determining ali-
mony awards.6 It is important, therefore, to look beyond Wallace to
58. 290 Md. at 284-85, 429 A.2d at 243. The issue, one of first impression, did not raise
any question involving the accordance of full faith and credit to the Virginia decree, but
concerned whether grounds for a divorce in Virginia would support an alimony award in a
Maryland court. Id. at 283-84, 429 A.2d at 242-43.
59. The court noted that in enacting the new alimony statute, "the General Assembly
expressed the authority of the Maryland courts to award alimony under certain circum-
stances after a divorce or annulment has been granted by a court of another jurisdiction."
290 Md. at 285 n.7, 429 A.2d at 243 n.7 (construing MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1(d) (1981)).
Thus although the new statute was not applicable in Wallace, see supra note 31, the court
employed the statute to bolster its interpretation of legislative intent.
60. Although Mrs. Wallace's adultery alone did not preclude her from receiving ali-
mony, the court reasoned that it was one of the relevant factors to be weighed in deciding
whether to make such an award. 290 Md. at 282-83, 429 A.2d at 242. The court felt that
Mrs. Wallace's adultery was merely an "incidental contributing factor" to the marriage's
demise. Id. Nonetheless, Wallace expressly reaffirmed the principle that post-separation
conduct may be taken into account in determining an alimony award. Id; see Willoughby v.
Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 593-94, 261 A.2d 452, 453-54 (1970).
The new alimony statute does not use the word fault. Nevertheless, even though the
statute provides that "[t]he existence of a ground for divorce against the party requesting
alimony shall not be an automatic bar thereto," MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § l(a) (1981) (em-
phasis added), it does not prohibit a court from using the ground as a bar if it chooses. See
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Moreover, the statute's list of factors to be con-
sidered in determining an alimony award includes "[t]he facts and circumstances leading to
the estrangement of the parties and the dissolution of the marriage," MD. ANN. CODE art.
16, § l(b)(7) (1981), and "[s]uch other factors as the court deems it necessary or appropriate
to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable award of alimony," id. § l(b)(l 1).
Either factor could well be interpreted to include evidence of marital misconduct. The new
statute is ambiguous regarding the role of fault in the determination of alimony. However,
because fault has traditionally played such an important role in Maryland domestic relations
law, it is highly unlikely that the courts will read this ambiguity as an intent on the part of
the legislature to remove considerations of fault altogether.
61. See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 341, 311 A.2d 407, 411 (1973). It is not
clear whether the new alimony statute incorporates the Flanagan standards or is intended to
replace them.
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evaluate Maryland's domestic relations system in which fault plays
such a vital role.
One obvious defect of a fault-oriented approach to alimony is that
it heightens the hostilities attending dissolution of a marriage. By tying
the future economic well-being of a spouse to proof of the other's
wrongdoing, the fault approach encourages accusations of marital mis-
conduct.62 The resulting litigation is not only longer and more expen-
sive,63 but it maximizes the psychological hardships of divorce.64
Furthermore, the fault-oriented approach to alimony is based on
several questionable assumptions. For instance, this approach tradi-
tionally contemplated one innocent party and one "at fault," while in
reality the cause of a marriage's demise is rarely attributable solely to
one of the two parties. 65 Even under Flanagan's comparative fault ap-
proach it is exceedingly difficult to quantify each party's misconduct. 66
Moreover, the grounds for divorce are usually the symptoms and mani-
festations of dead marriages, rather than the causes of their death.67
In order to evaluate the fault system, it is essential to examine the
underlying purpose of alimony.68 Alimony traditionally has been seen
as a statutory substitute for the common law duty of a husband to sup-
port his wife. 69 Thus alimony is a type of maintenance or support for
the dependent spouse, designed to allow her to maintain an acceptable
standard of living without becoming a ward of the state.7" Even though
that is its stated purpose, it is clear that courts nevertheless also are
62. See Note, The No Fault Concept: Is this the Final Stage in the Evolution o/Divorce?,
47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 959, 965 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, The No Fault Concept];
Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U. CINN. L. REV. 133,
144 [hereinafter cited as Note, Economics of Divorce].
63. Weitzman & Dixon, TheAlimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?,
14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 160 (1980).
64. See Zuckman & Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J. FAM. L. 515, 524
(1973).
65. Comment, Alimony Considerations Under No-Fault Divorce Laws, 57 NEB. L. REV.
792, 792 (1978). "The responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage is frequently shared
by both spouses; hence, the present legal theory that one spouse is guilty and the other
innocent is unrealistic." Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REV.
403, 405 (1971) (citing PUTTING ASUNDER, THE REPORT OF A GROUP APPOINTED BY THE
ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY IN JANUARY 1964 30-31 (1966)).
66. Because it is difficult to quantify misconduct, "it is rarely clear which partner is more
responsible for the breakdown of the marriage." Note, Economics ofDivorce, supra note 62,
at 144-45.
67. Clark, supra note 65, at 405; Note, Does No-Fault Divorce Portend No-Fault Ali-
mony?, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 486, 494 (1973).
68. Wadlington, Sexual Relations After Separation or Divorce.- The New Morality and the
Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249, 277 (1977).
69. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913).
70. See Comment, supra note 65, at 793.
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using alimony to punish the party at fault.7 '
Alimony has been the subject of some fundamental misconcep-
tions. For example, it often has been viewed as a gift or reward. This
approach ignores the modem view of marriage as a partnership72 and
disregards the nonmonetary contributions that even a financially de-
pendent spouse makes to a marriage.73 Moreover, the public percep-
tion of alimony grossly exaggerates both the frequency and size of
awards, a phenomenon that has been called "the alimony myth. 74
The fault approach to alimony has produced awards that are not
commensurate either with the concept of alimony as a maintenance or
with the economic realities of the parties' situation.75 Moreover, the
standards for determining fault-based awards are extremely vague and
conclusory, vesting a tremendous amount of discretion in the trial
judge.76 Thus such alimony awards are extremely subjective, and are
determined more by the individual judge's perception of "fault" than
by his appreciation of the parties' needs and their abilities to pay.
77
Fortunately, the inadequacies of the fault-oriented approach to al-
imony have not gone unnoticed.78  The modem trend in the United
71. Comment, supra note 34, at 532-33.
The Maryland courts consistently have held that alimony is never a punitive meas-
ure, e.g., Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 593, 261 A.2d 452, 453 (1970); Danziger
v. Danziger, 208 Md. 469, 474, 118 A.2d 653, 656 (1955), which suggests that the amount a
husband is ordered to pay should not increase because of his fault. Nevertheless, by reduc-
ing or terminating a wife's award because of her fault, alimony clearly is being applied in a
punitive fashion. See Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 194, 129 A.2d 917, 923 (1957)
(Henderson, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 65, at 796.
72. See generally Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974); Note, The Implied Partnersh:p." Equitable Alternative to Contem-
porary Methods of Postmarital Property Distribution, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 221 (1974).
73. Maryland law now requires that the courts consider these nonmonetary contribu-
tions as factors in both alimony awards and property dispostion. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
16, § l(b)(6) (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b)(1) (1980).
74. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 63, at 142-46. These commentators state that the
major explanation for this myth lies in the greater visibility and salience of the small number
of divorce cases involving higher income families in which alimony is awarded. Id. at 181.
75. See Comment, supra note 65, at 794-95, 815.
76. Id. at 798; Clark, supra note 65, at 409.
77. See Note, Economics ofDivorce, supra note 62, at 145; Wadlington, supra note 68, at
277-78 (A judge's "own concepts of morality may differ sharply from those of a substantial
portion of the population."). The judge's discretion may at times operate to the detriment of
either husband or wife. Although some judges are very reluctant to award alimony, see, e.g.,
Hopson, The Economics ofa Divorce.'A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial Court Level, 11 U.
KAN. L. REV. 107, 125 (1962), others may impose an excess burden on the payor, see, e.g.,
Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970) (reversing the trial court's award of
94% of the husband's monthly income for combined alimony and child support).
78. See, e.g., Note, The No Fault Concept, supra note 62, at 959 ("In the past twenty
years society has been screaming for more realistic divorce grounds.").
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States favors the no-fault approach,79 which emphasizes economic cir-
cumstances rather than vague notions of morality. In fact, nearly one-
third of the states now exclude by statute, either exlressly8 ° or implic-
itly,8 ' the consideration of fault in the determination of alimony.
Opponents of the no-fault approach argue that dependent spouses
should not be rewarded for their misconduct.8 2 However, that view
completely ignores the maintenance function that alimony is designed
to serve. 3 In addition, opponents of no-fault criticize alimony for cre-
ating a disincentive for dependent spouses to support themselves.8" At
one time, when the usual alimony award was "permanent," this criti-
cism may have been valid. 5 But the shift to no-fault has led to the rise
of "transitional alimony," a limited grant providing support just long
79. See, e.g., Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States.- An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229,
247 (1981); Wadlington, supra note 68, at 251.
Voluntary separation and statutory separation, see supra notes 36-38 and accompa-
nying text, have not been the only no-fault divorce grounds. A number of states have chosen
the "irretrievable breakdown" standard, which allows parties to receive an a vinculo divorce
without any minimum period of separation, so long as they can convince the court that the
marriage is in fact beyond all reasonable hope of reconciliation. See Freed & Foster, supra
at 241-43. Thus the irretrievable breakdown ground is similar to the Maryland voluntary
separation provision for divorce a mensa. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
80. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (1962); Ansz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319B (1976);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c) (1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 504(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552 (Subd. 2)
(West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(2) (1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.036 (Supp.
1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090(1) (Supp. 1981).
81. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (Supp. 1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp.
1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (West 1981).
82. A typical reaction is: "If a woman has been a tramp, why reward her?" M.
WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE 57 (1974).
A related criticism of the no-fault approach has been that it may permit a "serious
marital offender" to escape the consequences of his or her acts. See Renner v. Renner, 16
Md. App. 143, 159-60, 294 A.2d 671, 679-80 (1972); Comment, supra note 34, at 531. Be-
cause the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity still exists in Maryland, see Lusby v. Lusby,
283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Recent Decision, Interspousal Immunity in Maryland, 41
MD. L. REV. 181 (1981), the divorce may provide the only opportunity for the aggrieved
spouse to seek redress. Some commentators have suggested the creation of an independent
cause of action in tort for "abuse of the marital relationship." See, e.g., Schwartz, The Seri-
ous Marital Offender: Tort Law as a Solution, 6 FAM. L.Q. 219, 222 (1972). Although hostil-
ities and extensive litigation would still result, at least fault would be removed from the
determination of alimony.
83. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Hofstadter & Levittan, Alimony - A Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55
(1967):
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It
should not be suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent young
women into an army of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain
on society and a menace to themselves.
85. However, even so-called permanent awards have been subject to modification under
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enough to permit the formerly dependent spouse to become self-
sufficient. 6
Not only does the no-fault approach reduce hostility,87 thereby
minimizing the harm to all parties involved, 88 but it also reduces the
time89 and cost 90of litigation. Moreover, by removing considerations of
misconduct and substituting more clearly defined economic factors, the
system reduces the discretion of individual judges and thus provides for
awards that are better designed to deal with the economic realities fac-
ing the parties.9'
The Maryland legislature and courts have not been totally unre-
sponsive to the alimony reform movement. As the Wallace decision
indicates, much of the harshness of the old fault-related doctrines has
been alleviated.92 However, instead of completely replacing the laws
with a purely no-fault approach, the legislature has chosen simply to
add no-fault divorce grounds to the existing system, thereby creating a
"hybrid" statute. 93
Hybrid statutes are problematic. The frequent failure of legisla-
tures to explain the relationship between the fault and no-fault provi-
sions has generated a great deal of confusion. 94 For example, in those
states that provide only no-fault divorce grounds and do not specify
whether fault should remain a consideration in alimony determina-
tions, the courts have split. Some have held that fault has no place in
the new law, while others have decided that fault is still relevant. 9
When interpreted in the latter fashion, these statutes frustrate the pur-
poses of the no-fault provisions by allowing fault considerations to re-
proper circumstances. See, e.g., Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475, 477, 164 A.2d 877,
878 (1960); Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 498-99, 15 A.2d 914, 918-19 (1940).
86. See Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275 (1973); Goddard,
A Report on Caliornia's New Divorce Law- Progress and Problems, 6 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1972).
Although the new Maryland alimony statute does not use the term "transitional alimony," it
does effectively provide for such awards. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1(c) (1981).
87. Comment, supra note 65, at 815.
88. Zuckman & Fox, supra note 64, at 564-65.
89. Comment, supra note 65, at 794.
90. Comment, supra note 34, at 532.
91. See id., at 795, 815. Furthermore, removing evidence of fault from the record helps
to assure a more neutral disposition of the case on appeal. See Note, supra note 67, at 499.
92. See 290 Md. at 272-73, 429 A.2d at 237.
93. "Hybrid" statutes retain some or all of the fault grounds, but in addition include one
or more no-fault grounds. Wadlington, supra note 68, at 251-52. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 30-102 (1980).
94. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 65, at 809.
95. Compare In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (Iowa Supreme
Court, by a 4-to-3 vote, held that fault had no place under the new statute) with Kretzschmar
v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973) (interpreting Michigan statute,
similar to Iowa's, to retain fault considerations).
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surface in the alimony award. Thus the hostilities and the costs
associated with the fault approach to divorce are perpetuated by a fault
approach to alimony.9
6
Although the Wallace decision and the new alimony statute are
positive steps in the reform of Maryland domestic relations law, further
steps are needed. Truly effective reform must emanate from the legis-
lature in the form of a comprehensive pure no-fault scheme.9" While
such an approach is by no means a miracle cure,9" it offers clear advan-
tages over Maryland's current system.99 The fault approach is outmo-
ded.lc ° Our laws must be changed to reflect the changes in society,101
for only then will alimony meet the needs of the people it is designed to
serve.
96. Comment, supra note 34, at 534; Note, supra note 67, at 497.
97. The original version of the UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1970), reprinted in
5 FAm. L.Q. 205 (1971), provides an excellent model from which to draft such a statute. For
a discussion of the elements of a pure no-fault system, see Zuckman & Fox, supra note 64, at
558-86.
The Maryland Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Law has discussed
the possible adoption of a pure no-fault system, but its membership is split on the issue. See
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS, MINUTES OF MEETING (Nov. 19,
1980); GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS, MINUTES OF MEETING (Feb.
8, 1977).
98. Current research, although not conclusive, indicates that even under a pure no-fault
system alimony awards often remain woefully inadequate. For example, one study found
that "when the total post-divorce resources are divided between the two new households of
the former spouses, the husband's post-divorce household retains two-thirds to three-
quarters of the total, while the wife is left with no more than one-third." Weitzman &
Dixon, supra note 63, at 178. Also, some commentators argue that the "transitional" awards
given thus far, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, in fact have not been sufficient to
permit retraining of the dependent spouse. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 63, at 163.
Moreover, quite often adequate resources do not exist to support the family members after
they have been split into two households. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 63, at 181; R.
EISLER, DISSOLUTION 54 (1977).
99. Suggestions other than no-fault grounds for divorce have included mandatory recon-
cilation counseling, see Note, The No Fault Concept, supra note 62, at 969, and alimony
insurance, see Clark, supra note 65, at 412.
100. Zuckman and Fox, for instance, write that "the social scientists have known for
some time that the old ecclesiastical concepts of divorce are both outmoded and harmful."
Zuckman & Fox, supra note 64, at 538.
101. See Wadlington, supra note 68, at 277.
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TABLE I
SOURCE OF CASESa
A. PROCEDURAL SOURCE
Number Percentage
CERTIORARI
To the Court of Special Appeals
Decided in the Court of Special
Appeals 77 55.4
Expedited to Court of Appeals 41 29.5
To Circuit Courts 10 7.2
DIRECT APPEALSb
Circuit Court 1 .7
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 1 .7
PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISION 9 6.5
139 100.0
a. Throughout these Tables, unless otherwise noted, the data include all published
opinions of the Court of Appeals decided during the September 1980 Term, between Sep-
tember 1, 1980 and August 31, 1981, inclusive. These Tables, unlike previous Tables, in-
clude per curiam opinions and orders. Separately-captioned cases consolidated and
disposed of by the court in a single decision are treated as separate cases in Tables I and III.
All other Tables treat such a decision as a single case.
Bogley v. Middleton Tavern, 288 Md. 645, 421 A.2d 571 (1980), was decided on June 5,
1980, before the period covered by these Tables, but the court issued a per curiam opinion
on the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification on October 22, 1980. The per curiam
opinion, but not the opinion on the merits, is included in the Tables. Health Serv. Cost
Review Comm'n v. Holy Cross Hosp., 290 Md. 508, 431 A.2d 641 (1981) is counted twice, as
a decision on the merits and as a decision on a Motion for Leave to File a Motion for
Reconsideration as Amicus Curiae, id. at 548, 431 A.2d at 661. Separate authored opinions,
each with a different voting alignment, accompanied the decisions.
b. The only direct appeal from a circuit court was a mandatory review of a death
sentence in Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981), a review required by MD.
R.P. 898.
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B. COUNTY OF ORIGINC
PCT. OF PCT. OF
COUNTY No. OF CASES POPULATIONd CASES POPULATION
Allegany 0 80,548 0.0 1.9
Anne Arundel 11 370,775 8.5 8.8
Baltimore 18 655,615 14.0 15.5
Calvert 2 34,638 1.6 0.8
Caroline 0 23,143 0.0 0.5
Carroll 6 96,356 4.7 2.3
Cecil 4 60,430 3.1 1.4
Charles 1 72,751 0.8 1.7
Dorchester 0 30,623 0.0 0.7
Frederick 0 114,263 0.0 2.7
Garrett 0 26,498 0.0 0.6
Harford 2 145,930 1.6 3.5
Howard 3 118,572 2.3 2.8
Kent 2 16,695 1.6 0.4
Montgomery 24 579,053 18.6 13.7
Prince George's 17 665,071 13.2 15.8
Queen Anne's 0 25,508 0.0 0.6
St. Mary's 3 59,895 2.3 1.4
Somerset 0 19,188 0.0 0.5
Talbot 0 25,604 0.0 0.6
Washington 3 113,086 2.3 2.7
Wicomico 2 64,540 1.6 1.5
Worcester 1 30,889 0.8 0.7
Baltimore City 30 786,775 23.3 18.7
Total 129e 4,216,446 100.3f  99.8 f
c. Each separately-captioned case below is counted only once. See note a in Table I.
If a case below had multiple parties, such as co-defendants in a criminal trial or parties
joined on appeal before the Court of Special Appeals, the case is assigned to the county in
which the trial of the first-named party was held.
d. Population figures reflect population as of April 1, 1980. The statistics are taken
from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING-FINAL
POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS-PHC 80-V-22 MARYLAND (1981), reported in
MARYLAND CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT-MARYLAND POPULA-
TION ESTIMATED, JULY 1, 1979 AND JULY 1, 1980 AND PROJECTIONS TO 1986 WITH MARY-
LAND POPULATION AT THE 1970 AND 1980 U.S. CENSUSES (1981).
e. Not included in the total are nine professional supervision cases and one question
certified to the Court of Appeals by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.
f. Slight discrepancies in total percentages in this and subsequent Tables are caused
by rounding errors.
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TABLE II
ACTION OF JUDGES
JUDGE AUTHORED JOINEDa
Opinion
Opinion of of
Court (Pct.)b Concurrence Dissent c  Court Concurrence Dissentc
COLE 10 (8.8) 0 4 113 0 5
DAVIDSON 14 (12.3) 1 7 101 1 7
DIOGES 21 (18.4) 0 1 101 0 2
ELDRIDGE 12 (10.5) 0 4 106 3 4
MURPHY 17 (14.9) 0 8 97 2 2
RODOWSKY 14 (12.3) 1 3 102 0 4
SMITH 26 (22.8) 0 4 98 0 4
SPECIALLY
ASSIGNED 0 (0.0) 0 0 10 0 0
PER CURLAM d  18
TOTALC 132
a. Judges participating in a per curiam decision are listed as joining the opinion of the
court. A concurrence or dissent by a judge who does not publish an opinion is treated as
"joining" a concurrence or dissent.
b. The parenthetical figures in this column are the percentages of signed opinions of
the court authored by each judge.
c. Opinions designated by their author as "Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part"
are treated in this Table as dissenting opinions. Similarly, judges joining such opinions are
treated as joining dissenting opinions. Otherwise, the designation of the opinion used by the
author has been adopted.
d. "Per curiam" includes per curiam opinions and orders published without a signed
opinion, such as a dismissal of a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
e. The discrepancy between the total number of cases listed in this Table and in Table
I is explained in note a of Table I.
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TABLE III
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN
THE COURT OF APPEALSa
A. REPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS
MAJORITY CONCURRENCE DISSENTb
Authored Joined . Authored Joined Authored Joined
Afl'd Rev'd Aff'd Rev'd, 64f'd Rev'd Afld Rev'd' Aflfd Rev'd Aff'd Rev'd
COUCH 3 5 2
GILBERT 1 5 1 3
Liss 6 1 3 2
LOWE 2 3 4 4 1 1
MACDANIEL 3 6 2
MASON 1 2 3
MELVIN 1 3 5
MOORE 1 2 4 2 1 1
MORTON 1 1 5 3 1
MOYLAN 4 5 1 1 1
THOMPSON 2 2 3 1 1
WILNER 2 3 2 2 1 1
WEANT I 1 3 4
SPECIALLY
ASSIGNED I 1
TOTALc 24 19
B. UNREPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS
Number Percentage
Affirmed 10 32.3
Reversed 21 67.7
Totalc 31 100.0
a. In these Tables, a decision has been designated as "affirmed" or "reversed" if that is
the label placed upon it by the Court of Appeals. The "reversed" column includes decisions
which were "modified," "vacated" or "remanded," either wholly or in part.
"Affirmed" and "reversed" are fairly crude labels. A decision may be "affirmed," for
example, even if the reviewing court thought the grounds given by the lower court to support
the decision below were completely wrong. Nevertheless, the terms can serve as rough in-
dicators of possible trends or problems.
b. For dissenting opinions, "affirmed" and "reversed" refer to the Court of Appeals'
treatment of the majority decision. Thus, a dissenting opinion noted as "reversed" signifies
that the Court of Appeals may have reached the same result urged by the dissenter. But see
supra note a.
c. Total of reported and unreported opinions do not include three cases in which the
Court of Appeals dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
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TABLE IV
FREQUENCY OF SEPARATE OPINIONS'
The Court
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH CONCURRING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH DISSENTING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH BOTH CONCURRING
OPINIONS AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Number Percentage
94 71.2
7 5.3
31 23.5
0 0.0
132 100.0
a. Cases consolidated on appeal, in which the court issued a single opinion disposing
of more than one case, are treated as a single opinion in this and all subsequent Tables. The
word "opinions" includes concurrences and dissents without opinions. Per curiam opinions
and orders are included in this Table.
TABLE V
JUDICIAL PERSUASIVENESSa
Author of the
Opinion of
the Court
Unanimous
Opinions
Opinions
with
Concurrences
Opinions
with
Dissents
Opinions
with
Both
COLE 50.0 10.0 40.0 0.0
DAVIDSON 78.6 0.0 21.4 0.0
DIGGES 52.4 14.3 33.3 0.0
ELDRIDGE 83.3 0.0 16.7 0.0
MURPHY 64.7 11.8 23.5 0.0
RODOWSKY 85.7 0.0 14.3 0.0
SMITH 65.4 0.0 34.6 0.0
a. Figures are percentages of the total of each author's opinions. Per curiam opinions
are not included in this Table.
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TABLE VI
VOTING ALIGNMENTa
(Figures are Percentages)
A. ALL CASESb
COLE DAVIDSON DIGGEs ELDRIDGE MURPHY RODOWSKY SMITH
J 91.5 92.1 93.8 83.3 86.3 88.6
COLE C 1.5 0.0 2.3 1.6 0.8 0.0
D 6.9 7.9 3.9 15.1 12.9 11.4
J 91.5 84.8 90.0 77.8 83.1 81.7
DAVIDSON C 1.5 1.6 3.8 3.2 2.4 1.5
D 6.9 13.6 6.2 19.0 14.5 16.8
J 92.1 84.8 88.6 87.5 90.7 96.0
DIGGES C 0.0 1.6 2.4 1.7 0.8 0.0
D 7.9 13.6 8.9 10.8 8.5 4.0
J 93.8 90.0 88.6 81.5 85.4 84.5
ELDRIDGE C 2.3 3.8 2.4 4.0 3.3 2.3
D 3.9 6.2 8.9 14.5 11.4 13.2
J 83.3 77.8 87.5 81.5 95.0 88.9
MURPHY C 1.6 3.2 1.7 4.0 0.8 1.6
D 15.1 19.0 10.8 14.5 4.2 9.5
J 86.3 83.1 90.7 85.4 95.0 92.7
RODOWSKY C 0.8 2.4 0.8 3.3 0.8 0.0
D 12.9 14.5 8.5 11.4 4.2 7.3
J 88.6 81.7 96.0 84.5 88.9 92.7
SMITH C 0.0 1.5 0.0 2.3 1.6 0.0
D 11.4 16.8 4.0 13.2 9.5 7.3
J 100.0 60.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SPECIALLY C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ASSIGNED D 0.0 40.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
a. Key: J - The two judges joined in the same opinion. One may have
authored it.
C - The two judges agreed in the result, but in different opinions.
D - The two judges disagreed in the result.
Due to rounding errors, the scans may not total 100 percent. For ease of use, the format
for Tables VI.A and VI.B have been modified slightly from the format used in the earlier
Tables; otherwise the Tables are comparable.
b. This Table includes all cases, both those with signed opinions of the court and per
curiam opinions and orders.
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B. CASES WITH CONCURRENCE OR DISSENTc
COLE DAVIDSON DIGGES ELDRIDGE MURPHY RODOWSKY SMITH
J 71.1 73.7 78.9 44.7 51.4 60.5
COLE C 5.3 0.0 7.9 5.3 2.9 0.0
D 23.7 26.3 13.2 50.0 45.7 39.5
J 71.1 52.6 65.8 26.3 44.4 36.8
DAVIDSON C 5.3 5.3 13.2 10.5 8.3 5.3
D 23.7 42.1 21.1 63.2 47.2 57.9
J 73.7 52.6 63.2 60.5 69.4 86.8
DIGGES C 0.0 5.3 7.9 5.3 2.8 0.0
D 26.3 42.1 28.9 34.2 27.8 13.2
J 78.9 65.8 63.2. 39.5 51.4 51.4
ELDRIDGE C 7.9 13.2 7.9 13.2 11.4 8.1
D 13.2 21.1 28.9 47.4 37.1 40.5
J 44.7 26.3 60.5 39.5 83.3 67.6
MURPHY C 5.3 10.5 5.3 13.2 3.3 5.4
D 50.0 63.2 34.2 47.4 13.3 27.0
J 51.4 44.4 69.4 51.4 83.3 74.3
RODOWSKY C 2.9 8.3 2.8 11.4 3.3 2.9
D 45.7 47.2 27.8 37.1 13.3 22.9
J 60.5 36.8 86.8 51.4 67.6 74.3
SMITH C 0.0 5.3 0.0 8.1 5.4 2.9
D 39.5 57.9 13.2 40.5 27.0 22.9
J 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
SPECIALLY C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ASSIGNED D 0.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
c. This Table considers only those cases in which at least one judge concurred or dis-
sented. This serves to highlight judicial alignment by eliminating the masking effect of the
large number of unanimous decisions. See Table IV.
C. MOST ALIGNED - LEAST ALIGNEDd
MOST ALIGNED
DIGGES/SMITH
MURPHY/RODOWSKY
COLE/ELDRIDGE
RODOWSKY/SMITH
COLE/DIGGES
J
86.8
83.3
78.9
74.3
73.7
D
13.2
13.3
13.2
22.9
26.3
LEAST ALIGNED
DAVIDSON/MURPHY 26.3 10.5 63.2
DAVIDSON/SMITH 36.8 5.3 57.9
ELDRIDGE/MURPHY 39.5 13.2 47.4
DAVIDSON/RODOWSKY 44.4 8.3 47.2
COLE/MURPHY 44.7 5.3 50.0
d. Figures used on these charts are from Table VI.B. The "Most Aligned" chart
presents the five most aligned pairs of judges; the pairs are arranged in descending rank
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order according to the "J" figure. See note a in Table VI. Conversely, the "Least Aligned"
chart presents the five least aligned pairs arranged in ascending rank order.
TABLE VII
PRIMARY SUBJECT MATTER OF OPINIONSa
Number of Opinions
A. Public Law
Criminal
Constitutional Issues (federal and/or state) 9
Evidentiary 3
Procedural (non-constitutional) 24
Substantive 12
Quasi-Criminal
Juvenile 2
Civil
Administrative 14
Constitutional-Maryland 5
Municipal Law 3
Real Property
Eminent Domain I
Zoning 4
Sovereign Immunity 2
Taxation 4
B. Private Law
Procedural
Appellate 5
Pre-Trial and Trial 5
Substantive
Contracts 4
Custody/Domestic Relations 3
Insurance 4
Labor 3
Property (not including eminent domain and
zoning) 2
Tort
Automobile 2
Other 2
Uniform Commercial Code I
Wills/Estates/Trusts 3
C. Professional Questions
Reinstatement 1
Discipline 8
126
a. Not listed in this Table are six cases in which the writ of certiorari was dismissed.
